Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

337. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, May 15, 1964, 7:38 p.m.

7503. Taiz 643,² London’s 5665³ and USUN’s 4126.⁴ We continue attach great importance to early meeting between YARG and UK representatives under UN aegis re abatement Yemen-Aden border tensions. Accordingly, we pleased at report YAR Ambassador al-Aini seeking authority begin talks with Sir Patrick Dean at UN and at fact HMG has apparently not ruled out entirely possibility direct talks. On other hand, we are concerned at British Cabinet’s apparent disinclination to authorize direct contact at this time and YARG’s continuing to insist that UK must first agree recognize YARG.

For London: We recognize that HMG might have difficulty authorizing direct talks with YARG at this time in view recent area developments and domestic attacks on HMG position. Nevertheless, request you again approach Foreign Office urging British approval and, citing Taiz 643 (275 to London), stress fact Yemeni authorities continue to protest desire settle peacefully outstanding problems. Emphasize again that failure take advantage opportunity engage in direct dialogue, affording Yemenis opportunity appreciate UK desire abate tensions, will not only weaken ability new, more moderate Yemeni leadership resist UAR domination but force YARG into increasing reliance on UAR (and possibly USSR) in handling affairs affecting South Arabia.⁵

For Taiz: Following up Foreign Minister’s earlier comments to you re YARG desire for “peaceful settlement” with British, you should stress fact that only practical first step in this direction is UN-sponsored YARK-UK meeting perhaps at UN. If YARG serious in this sentiment, it should waive all pre-conditions for talks. Immediate UK recognition of YARG totally unrealistic to expect, but could well flow eventually from understanding and rapport hopefully established through direct meetings. Latter present Yemenis with opportunity convince UK of their desire for peaceful relations. Also would appreciate knowing what “specific steps” Foreign Minister has in mind (Taiz 643).⁶

For Cairo: Request you probe further stated UAR desire (as expressed by Riad to Beeley) for direct YARG-UK talks and indicate that if this in fact represents official UAR position, latter should urge Yemenis—as we are urging British—to agree to meet without setting pre-conditions. At same time you should stress that calling Security Council on Aden would hardly facilitate this. In addition, you should (1) express concern at reports we are receiving that UAR intensifying training of Adeni dissident guerillas and (2) call attention to HMG decision resume constitutional talks re Aden, apparently to include consultation with all Adeni political parties.⁷

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Judd and Campbell, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Taiz and Cairo and repeated to Jidda, Dhahran, USUN, and Aden.
2. Dated May 12. (Ibid.)
3. Dated May 14. (Ibid., UN 10-4)
4. Dated May 14. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ADEN/YEMEN)
5. In telegram 5686 from London, May 16, Ambassador Bruce reported that, although the Foreign Office was closed for a long weekend, he had conveyed the substance of telegram 7503 to the Arabian Department duty officer, who had noted that nothing less than a ministerial decision would suffice to authorize such direct talks. (Ibid.)
6. Telegram 672 from Taiz, May 25, reported that Yemeni Foreign Minister Sirri stated that Yemeni representatives at the United Nations were authorized to meet with U.K. representatives, and that Yemen was willing to meet with the United Kingdom in New York or Cairo or “through friends.” (Ibid.)
7. In telegram 2747 from Cairo, May 18, Badeau reported that he had discussed the Department’s telegram with Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Fawzi, who responded that the problem was extremely complicated and that no single factor held the key to the solution. Fawzi said it was unreasonable to expect that training of dissident Adenis should cease without equal cessation of U.K. support for al-Badr, and called constitutional talks on Aden a “facade for inactivity.” (Ibid.)