Office of the Historian

32. National Intelligence Estimate1

NIE 30-2-68
Washington, December 19, 1968.

THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD IN THE AFTERMATH OF DEFEAT

Conclusions

A.
Of the issues that previously occupied the attention of the eastern Arab states, that of Israel has dominated the scene since the June 1967 war. Nasser and the Arab unity drive that he symbolized have been weakened, and the wealthy conservative states have acquired some leverage over him. This has brought some moderation of traditional inter-Arab rivalries, but antagonisms and suspicions between individual Arab states remain and will manifest themselves again.
B.
The war has further slowed the already glacial movement toward economic and social modernization in the Arab world, and has increased political instability in Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The many factors which make the Arabs technologically and militarily inferior to the Israelis will continue to be operative for a long time.
C.
The chances of any genuine movement toward a modus vivendi between the Arabs and Israel are slim indeed, except possibly in response to strong pressure by the US on Israel and by the USSR on the radical Arabs. Meanwhile, the war has given new stature to the fedayeen, and the present pattern of raids by these free-wheeling commando organizations and Israeli reprisals seems likely to perpetuate a situation of chronic violence between the two sides. This could develop—by accident or design—into broader hostilities which could in turn lead to a direct confrontation between the US and the USSR.
D.
The war and its aftermath have greatly reduced US influence in the Arab world and increased that of the USSR. So long as Arab-Israeli tensions remain high, Soviet influence is likely to remain strong, particularly among the radical Arabs. It will be limited by Arab resistance to external dominance and by the likelihood that the USSR will continue to support the existence of the Israeli state. But the ability and will of the radical Arabs to resist Soviet pressures are less than they were two years ago.

[Here follows the 8-page Discussion section of the estimate.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on December 19. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

    A note on the first page of the estimate reads: “A detailed presentation of the postwar posture of the eastern Arab states is contained in the Arab-Israeli Handbook (revised 15 February 1968, with most recent information to be included in a new edition to be published in January 1969).”

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