Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

31. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Earle) and the Deputy Director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Orwat) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Washington, November 22, 1968.

SUBJECT

• IRG/NEA Paper on United States Policy in the Middle East

I-26041/68

The Staff Director of SIG has circulated a paper prepared by IRG/NEA (Tab B).² He proposes that this be approved “as policy guidance” by the SIG members without a SIG meeting. The paper would then be sent to Secretary Rusk for his approval, and finally forwarded to the President for his information.

The paper proposes the following guidelines: (1) the U.S. should meet the threat of expanded Soviet influence primarily by helping to support the forces of independence and modernization in the area, (2) American policy should pay particular attention to our relationship with certain key countries (Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia), (3) the U.S. should keep to a low level of involvement in local politics, (4) in dealing with the Arab/Israeli conflict, the U.S. should seek a modus vivendi between them which takes into account Israel’s need for security and also U.S. interests in the Arab world; the U.S. should avoid identification with the aims or policies of one side alone and should be prepared to bring pressure to bear on either or both parties as a means of moving the dispute towards a settlement, (5) the U.S. should promote a larger role in the area for Western European states, (6) oil is an important interest but it doesn’t require special commitments or the use of military power for its protection, (7) military aid should be related to political objectives in each country, (8) the U.S. should support economic development, and (9) the U.S. should giver greater attention to cultural and information programs.

It was our understanding that the IRG paper would go forward to the SIG for information, not for action. Frankly, we do not believe that the paper is of adequate quality to publish as policy guidance. It neither analyzes fully those issues and problems raised in the paper, nor does it consider other important policy questions which we will face in the coming year.

For example, the paper states that the Soviets appear to be aiming at becoming the dominant external power in the Middle East and the Soviet objectives include the building-up of a system of pro-Soviet states, neutralization of U.S. power, and the reduction of Western influence in the area. To meet this threat the paper proposes that we support local forces of independence and modernization. The paper doesn’t make clear who these forces are, how we support them, or what impact this will have on Soviet activities. It poses, however, two unreal alternatives to this strategy: on the one hand, a substantial build-up in U.S. and Western armed forces in the area and large increases in U.S. military aid; or, on the other hand, withdrawal from the area.

Another example, the paper proposes we concentrate on certain key countries, but goes on to say that we should also pay particular attention to Egypt and to do what we can everywhere else. It makes, in effect, a strong argument for selectivity, but holds out the opposite prospect.

The paper fails to treat certain important policy questions, such as: whether or not we should deal directly with the Soviet Union on certain problems in the Middle East (e.g., the Arab/Israeli conflict); the implications of the continuing arms race, and the increasing sophistication of weapons coming into the area; the impact of the growing instability in Jordan and Lebanon on the Arab/Israeli and conservative-radical Arab conflicts; and the role of military forces in the area generally and the Sixth Fleet in particular.

Finally, we do not believe it would be helpful to publish a policy paper in the last weeks of the Administration; even if it would be helpful, we believe this paper is inadequate policy guidance.

We recommend that Mr. Nitze sign the letter at Tab A to Mr. Katzenbach³ suggesting that the paper be published for background use rather than policy guidance.

Genl Wheeler concurs in attached letter.⁴

• Ralph Earle
• JS Orwat

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Middle East, 092. Secret. Drafted by Murray (DOD/NESA) on November 20.
2. Document 30.
3. Nitze’s November 26 letter to Katzenbach is attached but not printed. On December 5 Katzenbach responded to Nitze, noting that he had some difficulty with Nitze’s proposal that they deal with the paper as simply a background-information document rather than as useful general policy guidance. The Under Secretary pointed out that the paper was the product of a 2-year dialogue in the IRG and the SIG, drawing on the Holmes report and on subsequent work by all of the agencies under IRG/NEA auspices. He noted that no basic disagreements had been raised by OSD or JCS representatives or by other agencies when the paper was approved by the IRG. Katzenbach said he did not agree with withholding approval merely because the IRG paper did not cover every issue in full detail nor prescribe specific courses of action dealing with those issues. He proposed that they approve the document as general policy guidance while explicitly recognizing that certain aspects of the Middle East situation needed further study. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Middle East, 092)
4. This sentence is handwritten.