71. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
- W. Averell Harriman
The most striking aspect of the lunch was Dobrynin’s insistence on drinking several martinis while I had a glass of vodka.
Ambassador Dobrynin expressed gratification at the outcome of the U.S. elections, and I gave him some details on the extraordinary landslide for the President in New York State and the repudiation of Goldwaterism. I said now that there had been three elections—the U.K., U.S.S.R. and the U.S., the atmosphere might be clearer.
[Page 177]He expressed regret that we had not been able to make more progress since the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, and contended that the non-aggression pact had been selected by the Soviets for a next possible step, as after considerable discussion it was thought to be the easiest for Western countries to accept. I explained the difficulties caused by limitations placed on it by Gromyko’s refusal to include access to Berlin.
In reply to his question as to how to make progress, I suggested that each side analyze carefully the other’s proposals for arms limitation, and see whether some program would not thereby develop.
He, himself, had no specific suggestions, although he contended that the new Government would wish to find a basis for further understandings.
I asked him why Khrushchev’s idea of voluntary retirement hadn’t been carried out. He contended the meetings had been orderly, with Khrushchev in the chair, and the votes taken in his presence. I commented that the publicity around the change certainly did not give it the impression of as orderly a decision as he maintained. Although he threw no new light on the reasons for Khrushchev’s removal, he appeared to want us to accept the view that Khrushchev’s independent methods were the basic reason.
He pointed to the need in the present circumstances of getting Party approval in the Presidium. In answer to my direct question, he maintained that the two jobs would be kept separate. When I suggested that Brezhnev, as Party Secretary, would call the signals for Kosygin, Dobrynin dodged by stating Brezhnev as Secretary would preside over the Communist Party meetings.
He brought up Article 19 and argued for discussion at the end of the General Assembly meeting. I reiterated the impossibility of any delay from our standpoint. He argued also about the difficulties which this created for the UN. I underlined the need for the Soviets to face the issue, and accept voluntary payment compromise.
MLF came up for its usual argument. At one point, I asked him why the Soviets didn’t propose MLF for China. He replied that China was now a nuclear power, which I scoffed at. In spite of my pressing, he threw no new light on Sino-Soviet relations, although he tried to get me to believe that their unity was based on both countries being communist.
He kept coming back to further progress in settlements of outstanding issues, so I asked him how soon the Soviet Union would get tired of its vast expenditures in Cuba, and reiterated that we would never accept a Cuba as a base for communist subversion. He dodged this one.
[Page 178]The conversation throughout was genial and at times jocular. I had to break it up early as I had a 2:30 engagement to speak to the Counter-Insurgency Course of the Interdepartmental Seminar.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Harriman on November 17. The conversation was held during a luncheon at the Harriman residence.↩