Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

70. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 11, 1964, 10 p.m.

1465. I saw Gromyko this afternoon at 2:30 (appointment postponed at his request) and had conversation with him on broad range of subjects lasting hour and a quarter. Gromyko took initiative in raising Article 19 issue to which much of conversation devoted and made clear that the Soviet Govt’s position is unchanged. While I cannot be sure from his treatment of subject, I had impression that probably his attitude toward participation in bilateral talks, if not his attendance in GA session may be affected by outcome Article 19 issue. At least, he tried leave that impression.

I started conversation by expressing hope Hornig and I would be able conclude desalinization agreement before our departure on 19th,² pointing out that DCM this morning had handed Smirnovsky our tentative revision of original Soviet draft text which I stressed had not yet been cleared by all interested agencies US Govt. Gromyko indicated some familiarity with problem and said that he hoped MFA would be in position to give us their reaction to revised text beginning of week in time for signature of agreement before our departure. I then referred to Gromyko’s promise of last Feb to provide us with leased line and said I hoped be in position report to principals in Washington that our needs had been met. Gromyko said he too hoped problem “with long beard” would be resolved soon and MFA would probably be in position to give us more specific info in near future. I then discussed briefly certain details with regard to social activities in connection with upcoming business international meeting and then asked him if he were in position inform me as to his own plans with regard opening of GA on Dec 1. I pointed out that as in past the Secy hoped to have opportunity for talks with Gromyko on major problems including bilateral issues and noted Sov Govt had also expressed such wish.

Gromyko said he had planned to be in New York on Dec 1 but outlook for GA opening may affect his plans. Sov Govt had great difficulty in understanding why Article 19 problem had been posed in such sharp terms immediately after elections. Sovs had welcomed Pres Johnson’s expressed desire to continue former policies directed toward development of US-Sov relations, and they were at loss to understand why in immediate post-electoral period US had stirred up so much agitation over “so-called financial crisis in UN” and “so-called Soviet arrearages.” Certainly the Soviets intend to direct their policies toward continued improvement US-Sov relations, as reflected in statements by both Brezhnev and Kosygin, but they had impression that the US Govt on contrary is pursuing action which can only result in increased tensions.

I told Gromyko that so far as US Govt was concerned our position on Article 19 issue was exactly the same now as before elections. As he would recall from my conversation with Kosygin,³ which I reaffirmed to him, US Govt did not regard issue as cold war question but one which affects very survival of UN. We certainly had no desire to exploit any possible arrangement the Sovs might be able to work out which would meet their own political requirements as well as avoid automatic application of Article 19. In fact as Stevenson had already demonstrated to Fedorenko in NY, we would be prepared to cooperate with the Sovs in preventing issue from coming to head.

Gromyko said Sov Govt does not regard UN Charter as scrap of paper and would do nothing to violate or weaken Charter. This is precisely what would happen if Sov Govt should accept US position on arrearages. Sovs had never said they would pay expenses incurred by other powers or accede to decision imposed by mechanical majority in UN. In Sov view all questions relating to peacekeeping forces are matter for decision by Security Council alone. Gromyko regretted that US had adopted position on question which could only be obstacle to development of good US-Sov relations toward which Sovs have indicated readiness to do all in their power.

I said we too were genuinely interested in improvement mutual relations but not at price of UN Charter. We were convinced that if members of UN should be permitted to select assessments they prepared to pay this would be death of UN. I recognized there was very real difference between our points of view but I hoped some way could be found to avoid issue coming to head.

Gromyko said it was simply impossible for Sov Govt to agree to payment and at same time maintain position of principle. This would be contrary to Charter and Sovs not prepared to do anything in violation of Charter. Sovs are deeply convinced their position is correct one, beyond reproach.

I said I regretted the Sov attitude since I had hoped some way might be found of preventing issue from being joined before opening of GA. I then suggested we leave this problem and discuss issues of which Gromyko might wish raise with Secy on assumption he would be in New York.

Gromyko said that in Sov view primary question is to ascertain how administration and Pres Johnson personally views prospects of US-Sov relations. Sov position in this respect had been made clear by Brezhnev in his cosmonaut and Nov 6 speeches⁴ as well as by Kosygin in his recent statements. Sovs intend to pursue “Leninist course of peaceful co-existence between states regardless of differing social systems” which had been established as Sov foreign policy line at 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. This, in Gromyko’s view, should be first question for discussion with Secy in NY.

I said I could assure Gromyko that we hoped to continue and expand progress which we had begun last year with signature Test Ban Treaty. We had noted favorable references in Brezhnev’s and Kosygin’s speeches to desirability of progress particularly in disarmament area and I was sure Secy would wish discuss with Gromyko concrete issues with hope of injecting new life into disarmament discussions. Meanwhile there were certain questions which I would like to put to Gromyko on which I would be expected to comment on my return to Wash. First of these related to Cuba. Gromyko would recall past refs to Cuban problem and I had recently noted the significant remark by Castro to Sulzberger that the Sovs retained veto on use of surface to air missiles deployed in Cuba. I thought it would be useful to have Gromyko’s comment on this statement by Castro, as spokesman for other interested party.

Gromyko said since he had not read the full text of Sulzberger’s interview he would prefer not to comment and in any case he felt it desirable avoid discussion of questions directly affecting Cuban-Sov bilateral relations. Reverting to my request regarding concrete issues which might be considered in talks with Secy, Gromyko noted a little progress had been made as the result of past exchanges of views in ENDC and elsewhere. It is Sov desire to see such basic problems as disarmament and European security on road to solution. If radical solutions of problems not immediately acceptable then approach through partial measure should be tried.

This approach could be implemented in number of ways—either formal agreements or through mutual example. Specific subjects (not exhaustive) which Gromyko had in mind were: 1) cuts in military budgets; 2) reduction in forces stationed abroad (although Sovs of course favor complete withdrawal); 3) non-aggression pact (on which no progress had been made despite certain promises made by US and UK negotiators during test ban talks to take action aimed at bringing matter to positive solution); 4) nuclear free zones or Polish variant which encompassed limitations on both nuclear and conventional forces; and finally, bilateral relations, especially economic relations. Re latter Gromyko wished make clear Sovs do not intend “beg” for improvements in economic field; Sov position is based on ideas that development of trade of mutual benefit. Gromyko recalled conversations with Rusk, Ball and late Pres Kennedy on problem in which US spokesmen had indicated interest, made certain promises, but pointed out action on question should be deferred until after election. If US side now has proposals or observations to make, Gromyko would be happy to hear them.

I said that Gromyko’s catalog was illustrative of the broad range of questions which might be discussed at talks in NY. Meanwhile I was glad to note Gromyko’s confirmation of Sov acceptance of step by step approach in disarmament. Without going into substance, I said I had list of nine Soviet and eight American proposals in disarmament field; we would be prepared discuss all and assumed from his remarks he would too. Re bilateral issues we would be prepared to discuss trade and related questions, and, of course, we hoped to take early action on consular convention ratification. I then reverted to questions on which I might be expected to comment in Wash and asked Gromyko for his views on recent Chinese nuclear explosion, particularly why there had been no Sov public reaction to event.

Gromyko said important thing was to recognize fact of nuclear explosion by China and draw appropriate conclusions therefrom. If he were asked what conclusion US should draw from event he would say first of these should be renunciation of traditional US policy toward China. He recognized that certain aspects of Chinese policy may be unpalatable to US but this was no basis for unreal non-recognition policy. In Sov view China should be admitted to UN and should be participant in all negotiations on international problems, particularly those related to disarmament, nuclear weapons and security. Gromyko said that such advice of course was pertinent before explosion but in his view this conclusion was made more obvious by event.

I said that there might be logic in Gromyko’s advice if we could be sure that China itself were aware of need for more rational approach to world problems. I wondered if in course of conversations in recent days with Chinese, Sovs had received any reassuring indications of this.

Gromyko said Sovs could not speak for Chinese and no one was authorized to do this except China. If US had certain questions with regard to Chinese policy such questions should be put to Chinese directly. I said we do this regularly, but with negative results. I had hoped to hear their talks were more reassuring.

I then said final question on which I would be asked to comment in Wash was who manned Sov end of hot line.

Gromyko was taken aback, hesitated and then said I had put very concrete question to him which he was not prepared at moment to answer. He suggested we could return to question at later date. Obviously, he said, if a nation has a govt it certainly has to have an authorized spokesman.⁵

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US–USSR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, and USUN.
2. For text of the Agreement of Cooperation in the Field of Desalination, including the Use of Atomic Energy, signed at Moscow on November 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 663–664. Donald Hornig, Director of the Office of Science and Technology, traveled to Moscow to sign the agreement with Kohler.
3. See Document 63.
4. For text of Brezhnev’s October 19 speech hailing the achievements of three Soviet cosmonauts, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, November 4, 1964, pp. 5–6. For text of Brezhnev’s November 6 speech, see ibid., November 18, 1964, pp. 3–9.
5. On November 19 Kohler raised the question of the hot line again with Gromyko. The Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the matter was under consideration, but the Ambassador could be sure that the person who responded on the hot line would be authorized to speak for the Soviet Government. (Telegram 1561 from Moscow; Department of State, S/S–I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm)