72. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)1
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLIY DOBRYNIN
Mrs. Rusk and I had dinner last evening (November 18) with Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. Following dinner the Ambassador and I had a rather long and wide ranging talk while the two ladies went off to look at movies.
I called Ambassador Dobrynin’s attention to news stories indicating that, as we now see it, the prospect is that our defense budget, to be presented to the Congress, would show a continuation of a slightly downward trend and that the total would be just under $50 billion. In addition to the slightly more than billion dollar decrease in the over-all total, I said that he should take into account that this also represented an absorption of a substantial military pay increase of approximately a billion dollars. I reminded him that in commenting on this public information I wished to underline that we were not talking about any agreement or understanding or any loss of freedom of action but that if the information I had discussed was relevant to decisions being made in Moscow he could call it to their attention. I added the comment that we were still interested in some technical talks about the comparability of our two defense budgets. I told him that we were not at all clear about the meaning of the defense cuts announced by the Soviet Union last year because we were under the impression that their research and development budget had been significantly increased. He said he was not aware of the latter point but would check into it.
We then had a long and inconclusive discussion of Article 19. I pointed out to him, in connection with the Soviet charge that we were [Page 179] whipping this up into a great issue, that Moscow had apparently overlooked the fact that we had made no special campaign of the matter on the basis of failure of the Soviet Union to pay these assessments during the past two years. Were their arrearage moved beyond the two year level a constitutional issue under the Charter was raised and this issue very much affected our own interests and our own constitutional arrangements here at home for obtaining the necessary support for the United Nations. I said that we were surprised and disappointed that the Soviet Union presented us with this problem through a failure to keep their arrearages within the two year limit. He repeated the well worn Soviet position. We agreed that it would be better for the discussions to continue in New York with the informal committees working on the problem, with the Secretary General and between our delegations. He seemed to press rather hard for the idea that the issue ought to be deferred until the end of the General Assembly to give more time to work out an agreement on the “present and future aspects of the problem.” When I questioned him about the “present” aspects of the problem, he backed away fast and indicated that he saw no chance for a change in the Soviet position on that portion. I told him I thought it would be very difficult to postpone the Article 19 problem if the General Assembly expected to go ahead with its business, including voting procedures.
He left me the definite impression that he expected Gromyko in New York about the 29th of November.
We talked somewhat about non-proliferation and I told him that it was my information that both Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Mikoyan had commented to foreign visitors in recent weeks that the Soviet Union had provided the Chinese with information and materials suitable for a nuclear explosion and that the Soviets had been somewhat surprised that the explosion had not occurred much earlier. I told him that this had not coincided with earlier information which the Soviets had given to us about having limited their cooperation to the peaceful uses field. He said he was not aware of the point I raised but that he would “check into it.”
We then discussed Cuba along standard lines. The only thing of any particular interest was that, in connection with my strong emphasis upon Castro’s interference in other countries in the hemisphere, he seemed to be trying to say that this had been stopped in recent months. I called his attention to the special importance of the most recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS and pointed out that the Foreign Ministers exchanged information among themselves about Castro’s activities in the hemisphere which went considerably beyond the particular Venezuelan case and that the Foreign Ministers had taken all of the “peaceful” measures that were available to them under the Rio Treaty. I emphasized that we hoped that Castro got the clear message [Page 180] that such activities must stop. In connection with the Soviet military personnel in Cuba I told Dobrynin that we were aware that there has been a considerable reduction of their military personnel but that those who remain are too many. He said that they were there to train Cubans in the use of large quantities of Soviet military equipment which the Cubans did not know how to use.
In connection with talks with Mr. Gromyko in New York I suggested that it might be useful for us to “box the compass” to see where there might be any points in which we could make some headway. I described our attitude as like “an infantry advancing on a broad front.” Where we could move forward we were prepared to do so but if we encountered difficult problems or obstacles it might be necessary to take more time.
Throughout the conversation Dobrynin tried to leave the impression that Moscow was expecting some real fresh starts from the Johnson Administration following the election and that they hoped that this would affect more things than possibly some increase in trade.