Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

80. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 20, 1965, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• European Integration and Atlantic Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Under Secretary Ball
  • Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
  • Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt, American Ambassador to Italy
  • Ambassador Lloyd N. Hand
  • Mr. David H. McKillop, WE
  • Mr. Richard Phillips, P
  • Mr. Walker Givan, WE
• Italy
  • Prime Minister Aldo Moro
  • Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani
  • Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador to the United States
  • Ambassador Attilio Cattani, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Ambassador Egidio Ortona, Director General of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Minister Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Embassy of Italy
  • Minister Gianfranco Pompei, Diplomatic Advisor to the Prime Minister
  • Mr. Sereno Freato, Counselor, Prime Minister’s Office
  • Mr. Corrado Guerzoni, Chief of the Prime Minister’s Press Office
  • Mr. Walter Gardini, Chief of Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Secretary referred to the Prime Minister’s reaffirmation earlier in the day at the White House of Italy’s strong support for a genuinely united Europe as a source of strength for NATO and the Atlantic Community.² The Secretary praised Italian steadfastness in this regard, stating it has proved a constructive and stabilizing influence in Europe’s search for greater cohesion. Quoting the Prime Minister as having said a restatement of American support for European unification would be a valuable contribution to this movement, the Secretary called upon Mr. Ball to outline current American thinking on this important subject.

Mr. Ball reviewed the reasons why we have encouraged the principle of European unity as a means of assuring a strong, stable, peaceful Europe, with the capability, in an age of interdependency and indivisibility of defense, to play an effective role as an equal partner within the Atlantic Community. He commented on the appeal of De Gaulle for a more national approach to European problems, which the General dramatized in his press conference of January 1963. Since that time, the drive for European political integration has been checked by Gaullist concepts and tactics. Should they prevail, the achievement of a unified Europe and a dynamic Atlantic Community would be indefinitely postponed. On the positive side, Mr. Ball referred to the steady but less dramatic progress made in the economic field by the European Communities. This progress may lead eventually to the creation of European institutions needed to make the political decisions arising as a consequence of close economic integration.

Mr. Ball referred to the existence of serious Atlantic problems, especially the threat of French withdrawal from NATO or proposals that would radically alter the basic NATO structure in favor of looser and less effective arrangements. He stressed the importance of an eventual solution of the problem of nuclear military sharing in the Atlantic Community, stating that the MLF proposal had been based on the collective approach. We believe such an approach is the safest as well as an equitable means to avoid proliferations of national weapons programs. Conceding that no real progress is possible in this field until after the German elections, Mr. Ball said a “hard look” at the problem would have to be made in the fall. This delay in the time-table, however, should not be regarded as a slackening of American interest in finding a solution to the problem of mutually satisfactory nuclear arrangements with the Atlantic Community.

Concluding his remarks, Mr. Ball stressed the fact that an effective, strong and closely knit Atlantic Community is premised upon European unity.

The Secretary stated he wished to make several observations. In considering any proposals the French may make for the revision of NATO, possibly even before 1969, it should be kept in mind that NATO has enjoyed freedom from attack only because NATO strength has been able to persuade Eastern Europe that an attack would be suicidal. Secondly, in any alternatives to the NATO countries working together in their common defense, which the United States thinks is the best approach, we will never agree to remaining in an alliance where we would continue to commit armed forces to Europe but where Europe would make military decisions involving these troops independently of the United States. The Secretary admitted there are vital, unavoidable problems before the Alliance that must be considered in an appropriate forum and before they become unmanageable. We must all be prepared to probe deeply into these problems and consult each other on our future defenses.

The Prime Minister said that the Italian Government agrees completely with our views, including the vital role of NATO and the necessity of close ties with the United States. The French position has created uncertainties and problems for NATO, which should be vigorously tackled. NATO cannot be left to drift in the hope that things will arrange themselves. Italy will continue to search for solutions since the future of Europe and the world is dependent upon NATO unity.

The related question of European unity has also been affected by the French attitude. But Europeans should not become discouraged or falter. They must continue to study the problems and hope that growing economic integration will held lead to unity. Italy has felt that informal consultations such as the proposed Venice meeting would be helpful even though the French have rejected the idea.

As for the MLF or some form of common nuclear defense arrangements, the Prime Minister agreed that there can be no real progress until after the German elections. He said he would welcome our views as to whether we should push the MLF concept even if it meant great disruption and possible French withdrawal from NATO. He said that despite these prospects and domestic complications reflecting British views and fear of German predominance, the Italian Government accepts the MLF in principle. It, too, wishes to avoid new national nuclear capabilities, which would also help to allay domestic fears. Nevertheless, the French position should be studied and the repercussions considered since they could be fraught with political and psychological dangers. The Prime Minister wondered if these problems might be profitably considered at the May NATO meeting.

The Secretary commented that our trouble with France dates back to our rejection of General De Gaulle’s directorate proposal in 1958. We had done so because we could not accept the attempted direction of our other European allies without their consent. Now the General claims it is too late for a common policy and seeks a special position in Europe based on the force de frappe. The United States has overwhelmingly greater nuclear power than the French can ever dream of mustering, yet we do not claim a special position but rather hope for agreement on a common strategy. The Secretary doubted that the forthcoming NATO meeting, before the German elections and a clearer indication of French intentions, would provide much of an opportunity for going into these matters in depth. We have tried to sound out the French as to their specific intentions but so far unsuccessfully. He pointed out that we are not against change in NATO, but we do not yet know what the changes might be. We should, however, try to fix our ideas before confronted by a major crisis.

As for French hostility to the MLF, our attitude does not depend upon French views, but we recognize the need of a broad consensus of support from the other important members if progress is to be made. The Secretary suggested, therefore, that we remain in close touch on this subject.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S and U on May 3. The conversation was held at the Department of State. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI.”
2. A memorandum of the conversation at the White House at 11:30 a.m. is ibid., President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217; a memorandum of a second conversation with the President at 5 p.m. on April 21, during which Johnson reaffirmed his wish to be of assistance in fostering European unity, but also expressed his desire to avoid telling Europeans how to run their lives, is ibid.