Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, April 29, 1965, 11:20 a.m.

3289. German Concern over US Views on NATO Strategy. Dept fully agrees with central point Embtel 3887² that main element of German concern on strategy, of which there have been increasing signs lately, is that in event of all-out Communist attack on central front US would not authorize use of nuclear weapons before aggressors have overrun large area of Germany. Agree also that concepts embodied in “flexible response,” etc., are taken as representing US disinclination to allow use of nuclear weapons to prevent FRG suffering severely. In view of some, US strategic thinking results in reduction deterrent effect Western military posture.

We believe these difficulties stem in part from FRG’s extreme dependence upon US nuclear strength for its security combined with its relatively limited influence over US defense planning, in part from feeling that geographic differences in US and German position inevitably lead to differences in judgment on questions such as timing for use nuclear weapons, and in part from insufficient realization that effectiveness of deterrence very much depends upon demonstrable ability to mount a plausible defense if deterrence were to fail.

We have grave doubts that this situation can be substantially improved by further hortatory assurances. New statements of US determination or reiteration present commitments unlikely to contribute basically to easing of German anxieties. Present record already includes following:

1. US has, in Athens Guidelines and series of US–FRG strategy talks, made it clear that US intent is to meet Soviet nuclear attack with nuclear response and to meet massive conventional attack with whatever means necessary to repulse it, including nuclear weapons.

2. SACEUR’s defense plans, which German officers participate in drawing up, accord with this basic concept and are not based on postponing use of nuclear weapons to last possible moment (as Krone suggested is US wish).

3. We have told Germans in recent talks that their ideas on question of nuclear weapons in limited zone should be studied carefully in connection with defense planning activities, although we have certainly not signed on to them.

4. We have always operated on basis that as objective matter US security is inextricably involved with that of Europe, and that loss of significant portion of European territory to Soviets would so tip balance of power that vital US security interests would be automatically involved.

FYI: Fact remains, however, that it is impossible and indeed undesirable, in our view, to define with precision point at which nuclear weapons would be used in various contingencies (and even were we to do so, doubts would probably remain). We recognize our present inability to be absolutely precise either as to use of nuclear weapons in less than all-out attack with nuclear weapons or as to size of conventional option we believe appropriate for NATO, or as to precise changes we would like to see accomplished in present NATO force posture, contributes to fundamental difficulty we have with FRG. End FYI.

Although we recognize US bears a primary responsibility for having initiated debate on strategy, we have come to conclusion that less we argue about abstract strategic question, the better. In our view, it is preferable to concentrate on practical aspects of NATO defense and to deal with underlying reasons for FRG anxiety as far as possible. Following are examples:

1. Defense Planning Activities. By focusing on concrete questions of NATO defense problem, as in present NFPE, we can, over time, hopefully secure a force posture that gives NATO wider range of defense options in Europe. This particularly so since we believe this objective need not entail significant increases in European defense expenditures, which we know will not be forthcoming in present political circumstances. Important improvements can be achieved by rationalization of forces even within present budget levels, giving NATO heads of government substantially greater flexibility in crises in choosing type of force to use in range of situations, all of which are not now foreseeable. Accordingly, US strongly supports NFPE activities, will seek its future strengthening and will in meantime continue to avoid “confrontation” or generalized debate on problems of strategy.

2. Improved Consultation Procedures. We hope forthcoming Defense Ministers’ meeting will be first of series and, when supplemented by NFPE effort and by continued bilateral DefMin meetings, will lay basis for more intimate and wider-ranging exchanges of views on defense issues among principal Alliance members. This will be helpful in giving DefMins common background of information as basis for more convergent perspectives on defense matters. We hope it will be possible to follow up in months ahead on US December 8 proposal for restricted DefMin meetings at which highly sensitive subjects could be thoroughly and frankly discussed.

3. Nuclear Sharing. We continue to view as highly important measures for giving Germans and others confidence that NATO nuclear forces of adequate size are organized, used and deployed according to plans which they have large degree of influence in drawing up. These measures can result in wider sharing of nuclear planning and operating responsibilities and we would hope that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such wider participation in planning and operating would reduce allied apprehensions re alliance nuclear problems. Present hiatus in ANF/MLF in no way indicates a reduced US interest in bringing allies more fully into nuclear planning and sharing process. We have solicited allied views on how this process might be given effect and we are ourselves constantly studying particular proposals to this end. However, we anticipate Germans and others will not want to pursue intensive discussions in this area until after September.

Dept believes it is in material progress in areas such as these rather than in further repetitions of US avowals to defend Europe that will, in due course, serve as best, and indeed only basis for effectively dealing with underlying German concerns.

Nevertheless, in further effort to meet problem, request your views on desirability of arranging for Secretary McNamara to talk with highly selected Germans during visit to Bonn. We would suggest you arrange restricted informal meeting of senior German officials (Luebke, if appropriate, Erhard, Krone, Von Hassel, Schroeder, et al), at which Secretary McNamara could informally discuss problem as he has done with number of German visitors to Washington. Conceivably Secretary McNamara and Von Hassel could meet with such group in guise of making report on their May talks. It is our feeling that this kind of authoritative and first-hand account could be far more valuable than many pages of written exegesis.

We are also considering whether communiqué which might be issued after McNamara/Von Hassel talks should include brief reaffirmation of US intentions to help defend German territory by all necessary means in event of Communist attack.

We are also, as you requested, looking at various public and classified statements issued on this subject, although we feel these statements of policy should be reasonably well know to senior German officials.

Request your comments on above suggestions, which are tentative and would receive high-level consideration only if you strongly endorse them.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spiers on April 22; cleared by G/PM, GER, S/P, Schaetzel, and DOD; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Paris Topol.
2. Dated April 7. (Ibid.)
3. On May 4, McGhee replied strongly endorsing the idea of McNamara discussing NATO strategy during his May visit to Bonn and the proposal for a McNamara-Von Hassel communique. (Telegram 4351 from Bonn; ibid., DEF 1 NATO)