79. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I have studied with interest your speech of March 6 before the Council on Foreign Relations in Cleveland.2 One passage which particularly struck me was the reference, in the section on NATO defense, to our receptivity “If the European countries wish to play a larger role, possibly [Page 196] as a collective entity, in sharing the burdens and responsibilities of NATO defense.” Do I interpret this correctly to mean that we will, at some stage prior to the final achievement of unity, be prepared to accept within NATO the collective organization of European defense—non-nuclear as well as nuclear? Your statement would represent a truism in the event of true European political unity, when Europe must act as one.
On the nuclear side, a possible consequence of such an interpretation would appear to be that we would also be willing to consider the creation of an independent European nuclear force prior to the achievement of final political unity. This might come about whenever the uniting nations were able to make the necessary arrangements among themselves to manage such a force. The force might embody what Europe itself could contribute—i.e., the force de frappe and, if the UK were to participate, the UK nuclear forces. If an ANF-MLF had in the meantime been created, it could also include the collective European share.
If we permitted these steps to be taken in advance of unity, we would not only place ourselves clearly on the side of unity but might find that the exercise of building a European nuclear force had contributed powerfully, perhaps decisively, toward achieving unity. This is why I have always attached so much importance to our acceptance, in a forthcoming way, of a good “European clause” in the ANF/MLF negotiations. If we would make clear now that the way is open to the Europeans to create a European force, French arguments that only their force de frappe could act for Europe would no longer find support.
On the conventional side, another possible consequence of your Cleveland speech would appear to be that we would be willing to accept not only the development of a common European defense policy, including strategy, but the creation of a European army. Reconciliation between European and American strategic concepts could probably be more easily accomplished under such circumstances than at present—where there exists a complete impasse on strategy within NATO. There should, moreover, be no particular difficulty in integrating U.S. and European Army representatives at the various NATO command levels—i.e., there is at present of course no actual integration of forces as such nor is this envisaged. Provision might be made for the Commander of the American forces and the Commander of the European forces to rotate as SACEUR. I realize, of course, that this is something for the future, since none of it will be possible until after De Gaulle.
In my discussion on March 24 with Jean Monnet, reported to you in Embtel 3638,3 he expressed gratification at the cooperation which has been achieved within the EEC in Brussels, which he felt has led to the development of cooperation in the economic field which is truly “European” [Page 197] —and which already projects into the political field. Although he does not believe it can be accomplished until after De Gaulle, he sees as necessary additional steps the development of similar bases for cooperation in the foreign policy and defense fields. I assume him to mean that this could be developed progressively, even before the accomplishment of political unity which would be its ultimate consequence.
In the political field this could greatly facilitate our dealing with Europe on bilateral matters. It might also provide the only way to obtain any response to our repeated propositions, which you first made at the Oslo NAC meeting in 1961 and made most recently in your Cleveland speech—that Europeans should help us in facing the problems in the peripheral areas. A Europe even beginning to be united in the foreign policy field might be able to develop common policy toward such problems which could lead to common actions. The present proliferation and contradictions of such policies among the various European countries, on the other hand, almost certainly precludes such common action.
As I indicated to you in my memorandum of last December 24,4 I feel that the burden is on us to convince the Europeans that we are really prepared to see a united Europe which is sovereign in the defense field, including the nuclear field, provided this can be done in a way which is not inconsistent with our basic national security interests. Indeed, if we held the contrary view we could be accused of working against European unification. In my judgment unification will not come about, as an abstract proposition, prior to the development of common foreign and defense policies to supplement existing common economic policies. Unification will, in my judgment, come about only as a consequence of the development of such common policies. Even though progress will undoubtedly be delayed until after de Gaulle it is in our interest, I believe, to encourage now those who are willing to “wait him out”, to prove our willingness to work with a unified Europe if and when they succeed in creating it, and to be sure that our policies and actions in the meantime facilitate where they can, but in no case obstruct, the achievement of unity. Otherwise we could end up athwart the whole historic process of European unity.
I would appreciate very much any comments you might have on the foregoing.5
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret.↩
- For text of Rusk’s address on Atlantic policy, see Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1965, pp. 427–431.↩
- Not found.↩
- A copy of this memorandum with an attached 5-page draft paper is in Department of State, S/MF Files: Lot 66 D 182.↩
- In his April 12 reply, Secretary Rusk told McGhee that his remarks were suggestive rather than definitive and noted that the United States did not demand European political unity as a condition of progress in collective defense. The United States welcomed progress toward integrated European forces, but the major steps in this direction had to be taken by the Europeans. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO)↩