Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

33. Letter From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)¹

Paris, September 14, 1964.

Dear Bill:

I have been thinking for some time over the Brosio report of his conversation with De Gaulle on NATO, which you undoubtedly have seen (Polto 366, September 5, 1964).² While this report contains nothing of startling newness it nevertheless seems to me somewhat more brutal and specific than previous De Gaulle statements on the subject of NATO. Also, the fact that it was made to the Secretary General of NATO, with De Gaulle’s authority to pass it on to NATO Delegations, seems to put these utterances into a somewhat special category.

I would like to comment here, however, that I think that Brosio is wrong in his impression that De Gaulle is seriously thinking of denouncing the NATO Treaty. De Gaulle has always made a very definite distinction between the treaty setting up the Alliance and the structure of the organization. This, I think, emerges with sufficient clarity from his talk with Brosio.

While I fully realize that there is undoubtedly no disposition in Washington to take any action which might precipitate a row with De Gaulle at this time, especially before elections, I really am beginning to wonder how long we should remain quiescent in the face of De Gaulle’s gratuitous interpretation of American policy. You will notice in Paragraph 3 of the report in question he asserts that the U.S. is no longer interested in Europe, having transferred its main preoccupation to the Pacific, and as a consequence, as stated in the report, “U.S. would not come to assistance Europe if attacked by Soviets”.

I don’t know exactly what method we can use to convince De Gaulle or at least cause him to lay off this type of criticism, that the U.S. does not have any intention of going back on its pledged word in regard to the defense of Europe and/or the use of nuclear weapons if it seemed necessary. However, I do think that sooner or later our policy of rolling with the punch will begin to react against us. It seems to me that having made these statements, which are directly contrary not only to the announced intentions of the U.S. but also to its solemn obligations under the NATO Treaty, to as important an international official as Brosio would give us a certain basis for objecting. I imagine this will have to await the election, but I would certainly think, if only for the record, that we should take up with De Gaulle our refutation of his thesis in regard to the intentions of the U.S. vis-a-vis Europe.

I fully realize that De Gaulle does this in order to justify the enormous expenditures for France involved in the creation of the force-de-frappe, but I am concerned that if he continues to make these statements, and they are unrefuted by us, sooner or later through the process of erosion we will come to have this view in part accepted by a number of other countries in Europe. It would not be difficult to write out an iron-clad refutation of this thesis, including the stationing of troops in Europe, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the soil of Europe, provisions of the Treaty itself, as well as the fundamental considerations which led the U.S. to sign the Treaty in the first place. It is hardly likely for the U.S. to stand by and let Europe be overrun by the Soviets in the belief that we would be permanently saving a number of American cities.

The foregoing are just idle thoughts, but I wish you would discuss them with Mac Bundy (for whom I am enclosing a copy of this letter) and let me know in due course what you think could be done, if anything.³ There is no hurry. As I have said, you obviously do not wish to do anything before the election, and De Gaulle is off next Sunday for almost a month.

Yours,⁴

P.S. Avis and I are planning to take two weeks off at the end of this month and go down to the Cote Basque, taking advantage of the General’s and Couve’s absence from Paris.

1. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Tyler. Secret.
2. This telegram reported that in a 50-minute “relaxed, courteous and calm discussion” on September 5 with Brosio, De Gaulle had made the following points: NATO needed sufficient forces to fight the Soviet Union in case it decided to attack in Europe; France opposed NATO as an organization since its object was integration of national efforts, which De Gaulle opposed; and NATO was no longer necessary because the United States was not the only Western power with atomic capability. Brosio had asked De Gaulle how the NATO treaty might be revised, but the Gaulle said such suggestions would be useless since the United States would be “diabolically opposed to his ideas,” and nothing would come of the discussion. Although De Gaulle did not mention it specifically, Brosio got the impression that France would denounce the treaty in 1969. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF)1)
3. On September 18, Tyler replied that he had just heard the same argument from people at the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in Washington and that he would discuss Bohlen’s letter with Rusk in an effort to work out some plan to leave Europeans in no doubt about the U.S. commitment to Europe without making specific reference to De Gaulle. (Ibid., Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Tyler)
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.