32. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- US Position on an Austrian-EEC Arrangement
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
- Mr. Francis X. Lambert, EUR/WE
- Dr. Wilfried Platzer, Austrian Ambassador
1. Preliminary Remarks
Ambassador Platzer had asked for a briefing on the US position on an Austrian-EEC arrangement.
Mr. Schaetzel apologized for asking the Ambassador to come in on a holiday. He explained that he himself would be leaving for Europe on Wednesday, September 9.
The Ambassador said that he was grateful to have an opportunity to speak with Mr. Schaetzel because one of the principal topics to be discussed at the Austrian Ambassadors Conference scheduled for Vienna September 19–22 would be Austria’s relationship with the EEC.
Mr. Schaetzel said that we had followed Austria’s approaches to the EEC through the years and particularly since the “expectant period” of 1961 and early 1962. As we saw the situation, Austria’s relationship with the EEC revolved around two problems: the question of Austria’s neutrality and the type of arrangement that might be negotiated.
2. Neutrality
We looked upon Austria’s neutrality as basically a matter of Austrian responsibility. We were very respectful of how Austria had handled it, particularly Austria’s not having looked to other powers for an interpretation or definition of its neutrality, but having relied upon itself, as evidenced in its having joined the EFTA and sought an arrangement with the EEC. In short, we agreed that Austria had the freedom to interpret and define its own neutrality.
3. Austrian-EEC Relations
We had always looked upon the Austrian-EEC problem as a unique one, and we had a sympathetic attitude toward Austria’s achieving a relationship with the EEC provided the relationship would not create a precedent and the arrangement worked out would minimize discrimination [Page 70] against third countries. We continued to hope that the success of the Kennedy Round would go a long way toward eliminating Austria’s trade problems. We had also noted that Austria’s trade experience with the EEC had not been as bad as was thought in 1961–62 that it would be. We would therefore hope that in the continuing negotiations with the EEC it would be possible for Austria to take into account the possible benefits of the Kennedy Round and that any arrangement worked out would not be discriminatory. Against this background, we would hope for a successful conclusion of the negotiations.
The Ambassador pointed out that Austria’s talks with the EEC were approaching a new stage. Until now only preliminary discussions had been held, but it was anticipated that a new phase, namely, formal negotiations, would get under way sometime this fall.
Mr. Schaetzel said that he understood that one of the problems that lies ahead related to Austria’s own desires with respect to an arrangement with the EEC. The Ambassador replied that it was very difficult to come to conclusions on this score. Opinions in Austria were much divided. Differences existed not only between the coalition partners but within each of the parties; many Peoples Party adherents opposed an arrangement, and many Socialists favored one, and vice versa. Moreover, the Ambassador had recently talked with President Mayer-Gunthof of the League of Industrialists, who had told him that there were wide differences of opinion even within that group. There was also the problem of the USSR’s attitude.
Mr. Schaetzel said that one of the few really predictable things was that anything that tended to strengthen Western cohesion would be opposed by the USSR with various degrees of intensity. In this connection he wished to say once again that we believed it was the responsibility of Austria itself to decide how it wished to interpret its neutrality and its attitude toward an EEC arrangement. Otherwise, we saw no reason why Austria should hold back in its efforts to arrive at an arrangement with the EEC. He did not think there was any change in our basic attitude since we first started discussing this matter in 1962. We had always taken into account the fundamental fact of life about Austria’s large trade with the Six, and we thought it almost inevitable that some kind of special relationship would eventually be worked out. At the same time, we were quite hopeful that, despite difficulties, there were real prospects that the Kennedy Round, when the negotiations were completed next year or in 1966, would turn out to be the most successful negotiations we had ever attempted. Remaining difficulties pertained primarily to agriculture. We understood that Austria was more interested in industrial products. The Ambassador remarked that this was “absolutely correct”. Austria exported relatively few agricultural products to the Six, some cheese and cattle, wine and timber, but these were “not absolutely basic”.
[Page 71]Mr. Schaetzel asked the Ambassador’s prediction on what was likely to happen this fall. The Ambassador replied that he thought the negotiations would get started and we “could only see how things go”. In reply to Mr. Schaetzel’s question whether the preliminary talks had gone a long way toward laying the groundwork for successful negotiations, the Ambassador said that he would not say “toward successful negotiations,” but at least Austria had been able to find out where it stood with the EEC. The problem was not so much an economic as a political one, particularly as related to Austria’s neutrality. It had been much easier earlier when Switzerland was also seeking a relationship with the EEC. He recalled that in the Moscow Memorandum of April 19552 mention was made of Switzerland as the model to be followed by Austria with respect to neutrality. Mr. Schaetzel said that we would be interested to see how the negotiations unfolded in the fall. He added that he would like to exchange views again with the Ambassador upon their respective returns from Europe. The Ambassador said that he would return to Washington on September 24 and would be delighted to have another opportunity to speak with Mr. Schaetzel.