Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 17, 1964, 8 p.m.

1079. Embtels 900 and 929.² When I talked to Chancellor Erhard on Sept 16, I made ref to President’s suggestion (Deptel 67),³ which I had conveyed to Chancellor following his recent meeting with De Gaulle, that President might, after forthcoming elections, be willing take an initiative to establish firmer basis for cooperation between US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and, he would hope, Italy, if there were a fresh prospect of wider agreement. I also recalled subsequent suggestion, made in Chancellor’s speech at CSU Convention in Munich July 12, for NATO summit meeting. Minister Westrick had on Sept 4 suggested to me that Chancellor might in fact be willing to take an initiative with De Gaulle in bringing about such a meeting (Embtel 900). I asked Chancellor if he would clarify his present thinking on this general question.

He replied that he believed such meeting might, after appropriate soundings and preparations, make contribution to defense of Atlantic world, particularly in view of fact that NATO was “running out”. He felt that future of NATO itself would be one best subject for discussion at such meeting. Unless we reach agreement soon on this question, time will work in favor of French and success of Kennedy Round and other overall Atlantic objectives will be adversely affected. Such limited meeting should, however, not actually be called on NATO basis since the NATO countries excluded would be offended. The most logical ostensible basis for a meeting of the US, UK, France and Germany would be as signatories of Bonn Convention, although meeting could in fact be devoted to broader concepts of Western cooperation. This did not mean that he was against inclusion of Italy, but that it would be difficult to justify Italian participation while excluding others. He considered that an initiative by President along these lines would be helpful.

In response to my query, which I put to him on a purely personal and hypothetical basis, as to whether he would be willing sound out de Gaulle to see if he would be agreeable to such meeting, and to President’s taking the appropriate initiative, he answered with alacrity that he would. As a matter of fact, he had sounded out De Gaulle, not specifically with respect to summit meeting of any particular grouping of states, but more along lines of whether meeting between himself and President might not result in better understanding between the two. He thought it significant that De Gaulle did not say no, nor did he say that such a meeting would be without value. De Gaulle had merely replied, “We will have to see.”

Chancellor continued that in his judgment many unresolved problems which had arisen under the Franco-German treaty could be approached with more hope of success after a US-French rapprochement. He speculated that President might first meet with De Gaulle with understanding that he (Erhard) would join with them later. He did not explain, nor did I seek clarify, the question whether there was any discrepancy between such an approach and a four or five power meeting. Having received word in telephone conversation with the Dept earlier in the day⁴ that favorable consideration was being given in Washington to my proposal contained in Embtel 929 that the Chancellor be encouraged to make some approach to de Gaulle, I asked Chancellor whether he had any objection to my sounding out our govt on this question. He said he would welcome our reaction.

He then recalled that he had queried me immediately after the recent De Gaulle visit as to what U.S. reaction would be in event De Gaulle, following what he might have considered a rebuff, should turn to the U.S. (Embtel 47).⁵ He remembered the assurances which he had received at the time from President (Deptel 67). He wanted make it clear, however, that he was “not afraid” of a U.S.-French rapprochement. It is clear that De Gaulle wishes to establish closer cooperation with Germany, but it also understood that Germany not willing accept De Gaulle’s concepts. Since Germany and U.S. have similar concepts, De Gaulle cannot hope achieve full cooperation with Germany without at the same time harmonizing his views with U.S.

In parting, Chancellor asked me extend his warm greetings to President Johnson.

Comment will follow.⁶ Other subjects discussed in this meeting will be covered in separate telegrams.⁷

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis.
2. Telegram 900, September 5, reported that the Federal Republic was interested in a NATO summit meeting. Telegram 929, September 9, suggested that the United States should make its position on such a meeting known. (Both ibid.)
3. Document 28.
4. No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
5. See footnote 2, Document 28.
6. In telegram 1106 from Bonn, September 18, McGhee commented that Erhard found himself caught between the disparate policies of the United States and France and, for that reason, sought a summit meeting to relieve some of the pressure. McGhee then suggested various scenarios for a summit meeting, concentrating on a tripartite meeting of the United States, France, and West Germany, and proposing schedules that might assuage British and Italian sensibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3)
7. Telegrams 1077, 1078, and 1080, all September 17, reported the discussion of Western European and Soviet related topics. (Ibid., POL 7 WEU, FN 11–1 USSR, and POL 7 USSR)