Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State¹

The Hague, April 19, 1968, 1800Z.

4939. From US Delegation to NPG. Subj: NPG highlights.

1. Meeting of NATO Nuclear Planning Group April 18 accomplished main US objectives.

2. Secretary Clifford’s presence, obvious interest, active substantive participation, and bilateral conversations, all emphasized that US retains liveliest intention to share responsibility for nuclear planning with interested NATO allies.

3. Full consensus reached that “in light of current and foreseeable technological circumstances, the deployment of ABMS in NATO Europe is not at present warranted”: but question kept under review in case “underlying factors” should change.

4. Greek ADM proposals were sidetracked in favor of a study of “time factors relevant to the employment of ADMs”. This is agreed to be key area that needs to be sorted out before detailed military plans could be drafted for use of ADMs in Greece or anywhere else. Germans continue to be skeptical of ADMs for FRG. Greeks would still like ADMs but tacitly accepted stalling tactic.

5. The development of political “guidelines” for tactical use of nuclear weapons was the main focus at the one-day meeting. It is now clear all around that NPG will not try to write a one-time full-bloom “concept” for tactical nuclear weapons as a class: rather, Ministers will gradually develop what Healey called a “corpus of doctrine” by induction from the ongoing studies of specific systems and scenarios. For this purpose, NPG Ministers agreed to concentrate for the time being on the kinds of uses most likely to be considered as politically feasible by NATO governments: (A) demonstrative use, (B) clearly defensive systems (ADMs and air defense), (C) use at sea, and (D) selective use against battlefield targets in a limited conflict. These fields divided thus among the four permanent members for discussion leadership—(A) US, (B) Italy, (C) UK, (D) FRG.

6. The long-smoldering complaints about national govt participation in military nuclear planning are now effectively answered by NPG Ministerial endorsement of the Military Committee paper on the subject.

7. That other ancient issue, how host countries get enough influence on the use of nuclear weapons from or on their own territory, was nearly (but not quite) laid to rest by US endorsement of the second German paper on the subject. Ministers agreed to a general principle, sought by the Germans, that in nuclear consultation “special weight should be given to the views of the NATO countries most directly affected.”

8. SecDef used occasion to state and advertise US view that NPT would not interfere with NPG. This was well received by continental Europeans. British agreed with this sentiment, and endorsed it in confidential minute, but resisted saying so out loud.

9. Texts of communique and agreed minute in septels. Fuller report of meeting will follow.²

Tyler

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense and to the Mission to NATO and repeated to the other NATO capitals, Geneva, and USUN.
2. The text of the agreed minute was transmitted in telegram 4923 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) The text of the final communique was transmitted in telegram 4916 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) The fuller report was transmitted in telegram 4931 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.)