Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, April 17, 1968, 2114Z.

148389. NATUS. Deliver Mr. Cargo by 9 AM., Thursday, April 18. Subject: Belgian Freeze Proposal. Refs: USNATO 2255; State 141484.²

1. On basis preliminary consideration Dept has following general observations on Belgian freeze suggestion as regards relationship of freeze to Mutual Force Reductions Study, ceiling, floor, and verification aspects, and probable limits of progress that seem feasible by NATO Ministerial at Reykjavik in June.

2. Relationship Freeze Proposal to Mutual Force Reductions: We have reservations about Belgian proposal being very useful except as first step, largely conceptual, in developing models of and proposals for consideration in course of NATO MFR Study. FYI. In political climate of increasing detente when pressure in Europe is to reduce military forces, it seems unreal to focus much attention on establishing force ceilings. Fact that Belgians hope to realize domestic political objectives and have gone out on limb with Poles regarding topic does not alter this. End FYI.

Prospects of converting “ceiling” to credible “floor” for NATO forces should also be related to development of models for consideration during study. Obviously, NATO can best induce reciprocity from East in direct proportion to extent it can convince East that it will not engage in unilateral reductions, and this proposition relates to consideration freeze as well as whole philosophy behind MFR.

We therefore believe that Belgian proposal should not, standing alone, be considered as very promising proposal to limit forces when there is little real prospect of overall quantitative increase. Similarly, proposal should not be exploited for sole purpose of attempting establish floor for NATO forces as condition precedent to examination possibilities MFR. Main purpose of study is to evaluate political, military and economic implications of, and possibilities for, mutual reductions. Attention should not be diverted to consideration “floors” or “ceilings” to extent of preempting this main purpose.

3. Freeze as a Ceiling: We believe in any mutual force reductions proposal to East that may emerge from study, including features or concepts of Belgian proposal, ceiling on force levels should be quantitative (i.e., limited to number of men in active forces) rather than qualitative (i.e., relating to deployments, delivery vehicles, or nuclear or conventional weapons). We see no practical present possibility of qualitative stage such as Belgians appear to envisage as possible second step. Freeze ceiling should, in our view, include troops redeployed by US and UK and still committed to NATO.

Any agreed ceiling should also in our view be over-all figure for NATO rather than separate national figures in order that better burden-sharing may be arranged, e.g., by increasing one country’s force contribution to compensate for another’s decrease. Similarly, ceiling should apply to whole NATO area and should not inhibit movements within that area, e.g., central front to flanks, as situations of tension may require. Nor should ceilings be stated in such terms as to inhibit reserve programs and mobilization capabilities either alone or in conjunction with reduction of active forces. We would wish to see any language proposed.

Ceiling could at least in theory be based on any of three levels: (1) Force goal proposal level at any given time, (2) Force plan level for 1968–72 or 1969–73 or, (3) De facto level at time of offer or at time of acceptance of reciprocity by East.

However attractive from force planning standpoint, do not consider offer of ceiling based on goals in excess of actual levels at time of its acceptance would be credible and provide NATO favorable image as seeking detente. Moreover, such an offer would prejudice chance of getting countries primarily interested in disarmament to accept a reasonable floor or base line from which to project possible reductions. On other hand, any freeze or reduction offer should not be so framed as to place limits on current efforts improve force posture prior to effective date of East-West agreement or mutual example arrangement. Thus priority task in NATO would continue to be to build adequate forces in being in time to be reflected in 1969–73 force plan to be acted on by Ministers in December 1969. Possibility continued NATO improvement in force level could in this way be reconciled with disarmament aspect of offer.

4. Freeze as Floor or Base Line: Unlike ceiling aspect of freeze, extent to which it would involve any agreed floor for NATO forces in event Warsaw Pact countries not responsive to MFR proposals is internal NATO matter which should not be subject negotiation or agreement by East.

US attitude regarding base line should be consistent with statement by President following call by NATO Secretary General Brosio, February 19, namely “They considered the maintenance of NATO’s strength, including the US commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.”

While idea of clearly defined and firmly agreed NATO floor under forces would contribute substantially to strength and stability, we believe prospects for obtaining agreement this sort not better than in past in light of such factors as BALPA, competing needs for US troops in various parts of the world, Congressional and public sentiments on burden-sharing and existing US force levels in Europe, and pressures for budget cuts in several NATO governments. Although such floor may not be possible, one year commitment aspect of annual NATO force plans might, during period of any MFR offers to the other side, be reinforced at a minimum by official recognition by NATO bodies that strong and stable NATO is political imperative for successful negotiation. Corollary might be understood to be that no arbitrary or destabilizing changes in general commitments of forces would be appropriate.

5. Verification of Freeze: In view well known political difficulties of any attempt gain what Soviets call inspection without disarmament, believe one of questions which should be addressed in forthcoming MFR Study should be possibility of use unilateral means for verification for any freeze proposal as entity in itself or as first step in reduction proposal. Risks and possibilities should be objectively assessed in course study with US Del not endorsing Belgian idea verification unless conclusion of MFR Study clearly warrants.

6. Prospects: Despite apparently growing pressures for accelerated conclusions, we remain of view that Ministerial Meeting in December earliest practicable time for reaching conclusions on freeze and MFR. Even then, we cannot prejudge results of study to say whether finding would be that any specific proposal should be made at that time. It may well be possible at Reykjavik, however, to allude in some public way to Belgian proposal for freeze as one of models to be considered if this will be of assistance to Harmel.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 EUR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Baker and Robert Kranich (ACDA); cleared by G/PM, OSD, and JCS; and approved by Getz. Repeated to the other NATO capitals.
2. Dated March 21 and April 4, respectively, these telegrams discussed various aspects of a Belgian proposal for an arms freeze in Europe. (Ibid. and ibid., DEF 6 NATO)