276. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals1
71659. NATUS. Under Secretary Rostow called in French Ambassador Lucet on November 15 for an exchange of views on current status Harmel study on future tasks of Alliance. In review of exercise since its inception, Rostow made following points:
- 1.
- It was only after his talks with Couve de Murville and Alphand in fall of 1966 that United States decided to support Harmel initiative. US did this on basis these officials indicated that France was not opposed in principle to going ahead with political consultation in NATO.
- 2.
- This indication was subsequently confirmed by France’s approval at last December’s Ministerial session of the decision calling for the Harmel study.
- 3.
- US has consistently been careful to take into account positions of all our allies vis-á-vis Harmel study and will continue to be sensitive to these considerations.
- 4.
- November 7–8 Special Group meeting in Brussels indicated a growing consensus on objectives of Harmel study. While there was not a complete meeting of minds on all details at this session, there was general support on the desirability and necessity for Alliance consultation in three areas in particular: European security including the German question, disarmament, and the Mediterranean area.
- 5.
- On basis of talks with Seydoux in Brussels it was his understanding that the French were not opposed but favored political consultation on these three subjects, and that while there might be questions of nuance and of defining the terms of reference for such consultation, there should be no difficulty in gaining agreement on language in December Ministerial communique re general concept of political consultation.
- 6.
- In this connection, US has always stressed its desire to increase political consultation in NATO, but is seeking no new commitments by any ally and does not contemplate any “integrated political command structure” in the Alliance.
- 7.
- After seeking instructions to get over procedural impasse on report of Special Group, Seydoux had asked for his help on report to be submitted at December Ministerial as Couve hoped to avoid trouble. Specifically, Seydoux hoped US would sacrifice rhetoric for substance. Rostow agreed.
- 8.
- As we are now preparing for Special Group session on November 22 which will consider Brosio draft, he hoped to have further bilateral talks with Lucet in order to avoid difficulties later. He therefore wondered if Lucet had any comments.
Lucet said that he hoped to obtain instructions before Rostow’s departure on November 20. He then asked about disposition and status of four studies considered by Special Group, noting that France had already objected to Spaak and Patijn studies.
Rostow replied that these papers had no governmental status, were only working papers prepared by individuals for consideration by Special Group, and would be transmitted without endorsement to the Ministers. He added that US had not taken a position on any of these studies and did not plan to do so.
In an aside to Anderson, FBX, after meeting, Lucet said he hoped we “would not go too far with the Harmel exercise” as Paris would react negatively to any attempt to institutionalize consultation in areas we have in mind.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Robert Anderson (EUR/FBX), cleared by Leddy, and approved by Rostow.↩