Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

277. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, November 23, 1967, 0334Z.

594. NATUS. Subject: Meeting of Special Group on Future of Alliance—Profile.

1. Strong hands were laid on from several sides during the November 22 meeting in Brussels of the Special Group on the Future of the Alliance (Harmel Exercise), with the result that (A) the broad consensus on key issues which began to take form in subgroup sessions has begun to be converted into Alliance doctrine, (B) confronted by this momentum, France appears to have made decision that it prefers the embarrassment of compromises to the risk of rejection, (C) the exercise has evidently been a soul-searching experience for at least half of the Allies, presumably accounting for their resolution and France’s appreciation of it, and (D) there is emerging a rather firmly-stated report, supported moreover by the considerable body of legislative history which the Harmel Exercise has written. Hardly less important is the fact that allies are now generally viewing the emerging report as source of some form of public document. Principal segments of opinion which have emerged within this profile are discussed below.

2. An important factor in keeping the Harmel Exercise on a route headed toward a (public) report has been determination on the part of Denmark and Norway to see to it that the Alliance produces a persuasive contemporary statement of its rationale. They frankly acknowledge their concern is rooted in domestic political needs. While the two countries have been out in front in this respect, it has become clear that concern about educating member country public, particularly youth, is very widely shared among Allied governments. The public relations aim shared by these governments is to present to their publics explicit answers to the sort of politically-charged questions Alliance diplomats have been skirting for many months. Faced with this widespread interest in finding common answers to deliver publicly, French PermRep Seydoux fell back to simply quibbling about language for making such points as: the international situation has changed significantly, but not fundamentally; the Alliance must maintain and develop its military capability to assure a balance of forces and thus a climate of stability; security and detente are not contradictory, but complementary; detente cannot thrive in disorder; collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics; the Alliance and the solidarity it involves serves to promote detente in Europe. As evidence of the importance Denmark and Norway attach to this aspect of the Harmel Exercise, Foreign Ministry Under Secretaries from both countries (Paludan and Jacobsen) participated actively in the meeting.

3. UK Minister of State Mulley was a hard task master to those who wished to bypass a report or diffuse the product. In terms of confrontation of personalities, Mulley probably made it clearer than anyone else to Seydoux that French field of maneuver in trying to wear down the exercise was narrow indeed. Fog at both ends of the air lane restrained Mulley from returning to Brussels November 23. He did his share November 22, however, to convince Seydoux that the wisest course to take was to jump into the drafting himself and salvage what he could of the French viewpoint.

4. If Seydoux’s behavior during the meeting is enduring, it means in effect that France looked at the alternatives in this instance, discovered that the year-long exercise had exposed and pointed up national interests to such an extent that some of the usual wells of sympathy for French obstinacy had run dry. Scandinavian preoccupation with the public dimension (discussed above), joined prominently by Canada and Belgium, and supported by the US and UK, and careful FRG concern for the essentials of European security provided little room for a totally negative French position. Seydoux was much too wise then to try to convert the Allies from any of the hard convictions formed into words during recent weeks about the need, nature and purpose of the Alliance. Instead he entered energetically into the drafting, to do all he could to erase the impression that the report was a refutation of Gaullism foreign policy. Where he insisted most vigorously, the problem usually had to do with the need to eradicate a term anathema in Gaullist doctrine. Seydoux managed a difficult task with skill and good humor.

5. Canada and FRG were prominent among those countries which apparently concluded during recent weeks that the Harmel Exercise could not just terminate in empty space and that if there was to be a report, it had better be an acceptable product in terms of their national concerns. For this, Canadian PermRep Campbell made it clear that Canada, like Denmark and Norway, needed a sound rationale of the Alliance to gain public appreciation, and the stress of FRG PermRep Grewe’s interventions was to point up the need the FRG sees in keeping established Alliance doctrine from unravelling.

7. [sic] Reference to the flank countries in the Brosio draft provoked a demurrer from Norway (supported by Denmark) and precipitated sharp contrast between northern and southern flank sentiments. Norwegian Under Secretary Jacobsen urged the Alliance not to refer to defense problems of the flanks in a document likely to be made public. However, Turkish PermRep Birgi and Greek PermRep Cavalierato were inclined to insist on a reference to the defense problems on their flank; special reference to Mediterranean (with bow to UN jurisdiction in Mideast) has survived.

8. Meeting was enlivened considerably by Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel, who objected to the inadequate treatment rendered in the Brosio draft to inter-Allied relations. Harmel observed that peace in Western Europe owes much to the multiple means which have brought about solidarity, and it is explicit in Articles I and II of the Treaty that the Alliance is designed to play a role as a stabilizing influence drawing together Western nations. Harmel made the point eloquently that this role of preserving peace within the area needed reaffirmation.

9. Italian PermRep De Ferrariis made a strong bid for enlarging the terms of reference and expanding the time frame of the Harmel Exercise, a hardened variation of the Italian theme about postponing the reporting process. De Ferrariis cited three salient omissions from the present study (A) the “legal structure,” by which he said he meant the change from obligatory to discretionary membership after 1969, (B) NPT, on which he thought answers were needed about possible effects on the Alliance on East-West balance, on the significance of nonratification by some, and on the possibility of extending the nuclear cover of the Alliance pending implementation of NPT, and (C) ABM’s and their repercussions on the Alliance.

10. As for U.S. Delegation, we have naturally taken a good deal of leadership behind the scenes and around the edges, but participation at Special Group Nov 22 and drafting committee Nov 23 has been very widely shared, and it has been comparatively easy not to overdo it.

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the other NATO capitals.