Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

275. Intelligence Note No. 904¹

Washington, November 9, 1967.

SUBJECT

• First Harmel Hurdle Passed

A general consensus on both substantive and procedural matters was reached among all the NATO members except France at a meeting of the Special Group which is conducting the Future Tasks of the Alliance Study (Harmel Study), held in Brussels on November 7 and 8. In the face of this consensus, the French, reluctantly and after some delay, agreed to go along with the procedural approach favored by their allies. This meeting thereby instructed NATO Secretary General Brosio to draft a report to the NATO ministers (as called for by a ministerial decision of December 1966) which would be based on the Special Group’s discussion and would be submitted for consideration and approval at a second meeting, scheduled for November 22.

The French made clear once again that they will continue to raise every kind of difficulty, relating to both substance and procedure, to torpedo or drastically water down the outcome of the Harmel Study. It was also clear, however, that they are inclined to desist when they think they have accomplished as much as they can at a given meeting. It is to be expected that the French will continue to pursue these tactics down to and at the December Ministerial meeting. But it is probable that, if the Fourteen can continue to maintain the unity shown at this meeting in defense of a genuine if limited consensus among themselves that is not provocative to French policy, the French will not in the end try to block adoption of a report (though they may note their dissent from some or all of it) or, a fortiori, take stronger measures of reprisal against the Alliance.

French Tactics. The French agreement to stand aside to permit preparation of the draft report (termed superfluous by Roger Seydoux, the French permanent representative) was announced only on the second day of the meeting, following an overnight adjournment to permit the French to seek new instructions. But while finally agreeing to this procedural detail, the French continued to find fault with the proposed substantive conclusions of the Study. At the same time, the other NATO allies voiced general agreement that the Harmel Study should lead to positive substantive results, the theme of which would be the need for continuing the Alliance’s deterrent function while at the same time pursuing political conciliation between East and West. This outcome envisions a work program for the Alliance to include intensified and systematic attention to improving East-West relations, European security and the German problem, arms control and disarmament, and the study of Mediterranean security.

In the debate, the Germans, who have been particularly reluctant to risk antagonizing the French over the Harmel exercise, agreed to this general work program and firmly supported the necessity of producing a Special Group report to the ministers in response to the original resolution. The Canadians and the Danes, also sensitive to the French attitude toward the Study, likewise gave reasonably forthcoming presentations.

The French representative replied to the views expressed by his colleagues by questioning the ability of NATO to act as an agent of detente. He reiterated the view that relations between East and West should not be carried on between blocs and questioned suggestions that the Alliance should try to devise a security system for Europe or arms control proposals. Seydoux also asked why specific subjects for consultation should be listed, thus limiting the field after eighteen years of successful consultation within the Alliance. In a slightly veiled reference to France’s power to obstruct, he pointed to the importance of preserving a spirit of cohesion and solidarity in an Alliance which requires decisions to be taken unanimously. He also questioned whether the proposed Mediterranean study was really to be concerned with the Middle East, in which case he felt that all were agreed that this problem should be left to the United Nations.

In private conversations with US officials attending the meeting, Seydoux said that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville not only did not like the idea of a report prepared by the Secretary General for the NATO ministers, but indeed hoped that there would be no report at all. It is clear that the French would still like to reduce the conclusions of the Harmel Study to a paragraph in a ministerial communique. But later, when Seydoux yielded on the procedural point and would agree to Brosio’s preparing a draft statement, he switched his attack back to the substance. The French representative even asked for US help in obtaining a report to which the French could agree, stating that Couve did not want trouble over the Harmel Study at the Ministerial meeting. During this private meeting, Seydoux appeared to be considerably more forthcoming with regard to what the French would accept than in his presentation to the Special Group. He indicated that France could support the work proposals made in the Watson-Scheutz report (East-West Relations) and the Kohler report (Future Security Policy of the Alliance), and perhaps also the proposal for a Mediterranean study—in effect, the work program on which the other allies expressed general agreement, as mentioned above.

The French undoubtedly felt obliged to go along with the proposed procedure for drafting a report in the face of the unexpected strength and near unanimity of the positions of their NATO allies at this meeting, including those who previously have sought to appease the French on these questions. The French desire and purpose undoubtedly is still to scuttle or severely weaken the results of the Harmel Study. However, the general agreement evidenced among the other NATO allies concerning the need for positive results from the exercise presents the French with the risk of over-playing their hand.

Prospects. Notwithstanding the private declarations by Seydoux that France might be able to accept what appears to be the agreed conclusions of the rest of the Alliance members, the French can be expected to continue to test the resolve of the Fourteen, probing for weaknesses as regards support for an increased political role for the Alliance, and taking advantage of any divisions which might appear in order to press for a minimal declaration regarding the future tasks of the Alliance. The Fourteen still face the difficult task of agreeing to words which capture what seems to be an emerging consensus regarding worthwhile results for the Harmel Study and yet do not offend the many sensitivities, French and otherwise, uncovered by this year-long exercise. This game can be expected to continue up to and through the December Ministerial meeting. However, if the Fourteen are able to maintain their present solidarity on the consensus reached at the November 7 meeting, the French will find it difficult to make a convincing case, particularly in the public media, in opposition to an increased NATO role in the expansion of East-West detente and the promotion of disarmament and arms control.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and transmitted from INR Director Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary Rusk.