Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

274. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, November 6, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Special Group Meeting on Harmel Study

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Under Secretary Rostow
  • S/C—Mr. Bowie
  • M—Mr. Enders
  • RPM—Mr. Myerson
• Belgian Embassy
  • Foreign Minister Harmel
  • Ambassador Louis Scheyven
  • Count Davignon
  • Mr. Vaes
  • Mr. Deschamps
  • Mr. Van Bellingen
• USNATO
  • Ambassador Cleveland
  • Mr. Cargo
  • Mr. Wilson
• Embassy Brussels
  • Mr. Manfull
  • Mr. Floyd

1. Mr. Rostow began the discussion by reporting on a talk he had just had with the German Permanent Representative, Ambassador Grewe. Following the discussion between Couve and Brandt on October 16 there had been some discussion between Beaumarchais and Sahm. There had been a Franco-German understanding as the result of these discussions. The Germans are now working on the idea of a 5–6 page declaration to be adopted by Ministers. This declaration would be complete in itself and there would be no need for a classified report to be adopted by Ministers.

2. Mr. Rostow said that, as presented by Grewe, the Germans envisaged a document that would recite the history of the exercise; explain the need for intensified political consultations including a reference to the Wise Men’s Report; and identify the future political tasks. The latter would break down into four headings, namely, improving East-West relations; problems of European security including the German question; arms control; and the special problem of the Mediterranean. The German proposal would also refer to the need for open-ended bodies, with the Western Four to be the nucleus for the German and European security discussion.

3. Mr. Rostow went on to say that he had urged the Germans to speak early, perhaps immediately after Harmel. This could have a galvanizing effect on the meeting since others would assume that the Germans had been in touch with the French and were aware of what the French would accept.

4. Mr. Rostow said that Grewe did not yet have authority from Bonn to make his proposal. Grewe was in the process of clearing it. If he succeeded, and came up with a generally acceptable paper, it might be best for other delegates not to submit papers. This might only confuse the issue.

5. In response to a question by Mr. Harmel, Mr. Rostow said that Grewe had made clear that he could not guarantee French acceptance of the German ideas.

6. Mr. Rostow asked whether Harmel had heard of any sentiment in favor of postponing action on the Future of the Alliance Study beyond the December Ministerial meeting. The Italian Permanent Representative had recently raised this point with Ambassador Cleveland, although it may have been only a personal comment. Grewe had not envisaged a postponement but had envisaged continuing study of some subjects if agreement were not possible in December.

7. Mr. Harmel indicated he still thought a result was necessary in December. He was aware that some countries are hesitant. He recalled that the exercise was not designed to be a trap for France or any other country. Belgium, like the U.S., attached importance to the reported Franco-German understanding. Belgium had generally come to the same conclusions as the U.S. Harmel thought it important to find a common point of departure in last December’s resolution. He also thought that substance was more important than what might turn out to be only a watered-down declaration. Thus, it would be prudent to concentrate on selecting several carefully-designed themes to steer the Alliance in new directions.

8. Mr. Harmel said he thought that Belgium would be in agreement with the German ideas as outlined by Mr. Rostow. He agreed on the order of priorities, namely, East-West relations in general, European security and Germany; arms control problems; and the Mediterranean. Open-ended groups might be established on other subjects at a later time. Mr. Harmel felt the question of a Ministerial declaration could be taken up later after substantive questions were settled.

9. There followed a discussion on procedures in which Messrs. Harmel and Rostow agreed that it would be good to press the Special Group discussions as far as possible on the following day. They recognized, however, that it might be necessary to continue on the morning of Wednesday, November 8. In any case, Mr. Rostow doubted that everything could be settled at the Special Group meeting. Any decisions taken, and especially any specific language, would have to be agreed ad referendum.

10. Reverting to the proposed work program, Harmel said that it would be important to make clear that East-West problems were larger than the problem of Germany. He thought there would always be some problem with East-West relations and, therefore, need for the Alliance. It would be a disaster if the Alliance should disappear even should the Soviet threat change.

11. There followed a discussion of the status of the Rapporteurs’ reports. Both sides agreed that they might be attached to the Special Group’s report as reference documents but that governments would not be asked to take any action.

12. Harmel asked about the content of Patijn’s report. He thought we should not lose the ideas involved but pursue them later in a supplementary group or groups. Mr. Davignon expressed the view that much of Patijn’s work, including his more positive ideas, ought to be used as input for an analytical study to be done by the International Staff. We needed more analysis of changes in the Communist world and in the Western world. It would be good for once if the NAC would forget about trying to produce an agreed document and have a paper in this general area reflecting the different national positions. In any case, the issue was too big and too difficult for the Special Group to settle on the following day.

13. The Belgian and U.S. sides then exchanged information about contacts they had had with other countries. Davignon had talked with Mr. De Ranitz of the Netherlands who was in general agreement on the work program idea. Mr. Rostow and Ambassador Cleveland mentioned the Italian sensitivities on the Middle East and explained why we were proposing to call the study a Mediterranean exercise. Mr. Vaes said he understood that the Danes and Norwegians were presently coordinating their positions. Denmark was no longer the weakest country in the Alliance on this subject. The Scandinavians disliked, however, the idea of open-ended groups. Messrs. Harmel and Rostow agreed that the Canadians might not be as weak as anticipated. Mr. Rostow said we had indications that Mr. Martin was more positive than his staff.

14. There followed a brief discussion on the importance of semantics in dealing with the French. Messrs. Davignon and Rostow mentioned the importance of avoiding any implications of common policies or integration. Mr. Bowie said we should be careful that we not go too far. He thought it would be better to formulate the proposition in terms of the freedom of interested members to consult without obliging others to participate. Davignon agreed. He and Mr. Bowie noted that the nature of consultation could range from simple exchanges of information to common action in particular cases.

15. Note: Following the meeting, discussion continued at a working dinner in the Belgian Finance Ministry. The discussion at dinner dealt with disarmament and arms control questions. Mr. Harmel asked whether we saw any possibility for regional European arms limitations actions. Messrs. Rostow, Bowie, and Cleveland pointed to the great difficulty of separating regional arms control problems from the problems of general disarmament. They also failed to see any present indication that the Soviet Union really was interested now. Nevertheless, they said we are prepared to study these matters and persevere in efforts to interest the Russians. Mr. Harmel said he was convinced that limited initiatives on regional arms control issues were desirable even if the Russians failed to respond at present. There would be certain political advantages.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and approved in M on November 16. The meeting was held at the Belgian Foreign Ministry.