Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

273. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, October 25, 1967.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE STUDY ONMUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Summary Conclusions: The prospects are poor at this time for reaching an accord with the Soviet Union for a mutual reduction of forces in Europe. Nevertheless, existing economic and political pressures among some NATO members to reduce defense expenditures are likely to continue and may increase. These pressures are presently manifested in budgetary defense cuts by some NATO Allies and in interest in pursuing a NATO study of mutual force reductions. At such time as the Soviets evince interest in the subject any discussions should be based on a step-by-step, “mutual example” approach. This approach could feature either a US–USSR trade-off or percentage reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. In the former case, prior agreement should be sought from our NATO Allies, who would expect to make corresponding reductions in their forces. In the latter case, our Allies would of necessity be involved in planning the approach. NATO discussion now of mutual troop reductions should be directed toward agreement upon procedures and general guidelines, rather than an early discussion of specific numbers of troops and reductions, which could precipitate a divisive debate that would prove disadvantageous to US political interests.

Prospects for Mutual Reductions

We and several of our NATO Allies have sought on a number of occasions to discuss the question of mutual troop reductions with the USSR. However, the Soviets show no inclination to make any cuts in their forces in Eastern Europe, either by agreement or by “mutual example”. They say that European frontiers must be settled first and that, in any case, they could not agree to any arrangement which would free US troops to fight in Viet Nam.

This Soviet caution contrasts with its position in mid-1966 when the USSR showed some tentative interest in the possibility of mutual troop reductions. During the months following, however, Soviet representatives have become increasingly cool to the idea.

For example, British Prime Minister Wilson raised the question of mutual troop reductions with Kosygin in London on February 10, 1967. Kosygin’s only comment was that a prerequisite for any such reductions was to get European frontiers settled. An officer of the Soviet Embassy in London later confirmed to us that the British report was correct and that Kosygin had indeed set a new precondition (settlement of frontier questions) for mutual reductions of troops in Europe. The Soviet officer added that his Government was under considerable pressure internally and from the North Vietnamese not to take actions which would make it easier for the US to draw troops from Europe for use in Viet Nam.

On March 17, Soviet Ambassador to the so-called German Democratic Republic Abrasimov told Ambassador McGhee that the USSR favors a continuation of the status quo. Abrasimov said that, as regards reciprocal withdrawals, the USSR would wait for deeds, not words. After the US, the UK, and France withdrew from Germany (it was not clear whether he meant all or part), then the Soviet Union would withdraw from East Germany. In July, West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt offered to discuss with the USSR reciprocal troop withdrawals from Germany; but, to date, the Soviets have given him no encouragement.

As recently as August 17, a Soviet Embassy officer told a Department of State official that the USSR would not reduce its forces in Europe because it would do nothing to enable the US to send more troops to Viet Nam.

At the present time, then, there appears to be no prospect that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact will commit themselves to match any Western troop reductions with cuts of their own.

[Here follow 9 pages of discussion of the details that might go into a mutual reduction of forces.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to a November 2 memorandum from the Department of State to Walt Rostow, which indicates that the paper was being sent to the White House in response to a “recent expression of continuing interest” and that it was developed in the course of an interdepartmental study of the topic.