Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

272. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, October 25, 1967, 1740Z.

3313. BUSEC. Subject: UK-Common Market: Where do we stand?

1. British strategy and tactics during past six months have been both intelligent and effective:

A. They put in a straightforward and uncomplicated application, and have focused their efforts since on the single issue of getting a dialogue going.

B. They appear to have grasped that this cannot be played as a traditional intergovernmental negotiation but requires an effort to manipulate the domestic politics of the Six.

C. They have stopped talking about their own “problems” and have undermined previous French tactics by showing a willingness (once negotiations begin) to discuss all legitimate issues, including British domestic situation and sterling problem.

D. They have gone a long way to solidify support of “Europeans” in Commission, in the Five and even in France by stressing need for a strong Europe able to stand up to us and play its role on world scene, and by hinting that Britain as a member would be in forefront of move towards greater economic and even political integration.

2. As a result, the British are over the first hump—the Six must now face the issue, and discuss the issues on basis of a Commission report which makes clear all problems are soluble given goodwill and determination. The problem for the British, the Commission and the Five, is how to engage a dialogue and get down to problem-solving.

3. French reaction to this evolution is clear from Couve’s presentation:

A. The General remains unalterably opposed to British entry, at least for foreseeable future (i.e. until Britain has been brought to her knees by unsolved economic problems).

B. But he appears unwilling or unable to use flat veto because

• —it would create crisis in Community, and 1956–66 experience demonstrated France has greatest stake of all in Community’s survival;
• —veto be bad French domestic politics, given public support for British entry, particularly after Giscard’s public stand reported Paris 5530.²

C. Hence French position will be

• —to delay and discourage, in hopes British will voluntarily withdraw or stop pushing application, at least for a while;
• —to keep British on the defensive by emphasizing the issue on which they are weakest—British inability to break through stop-go cycle and reconcile growth with balance of payments surplus;
• —to agitate “nationalization” of sterling as an issue which would necessarily take a long time to solve.

4. German position was clearly stated in off record talk by Kies-inger at House of Commons yesterday:

A. Germany favors and will continue to support British application. (Kiesinger pointed out that over 60 percent of the German people support British membership even though only 38 percent think it would be to Germany’s economic benefit.)

B. But German Govt will not at this stage try to force any decisions (even on opening negotiations) by leading the Five in a face-down with France. Because:

• —German relations with France remain essential, especially to Kies-inger;
• —to do so might risk a crisis in Common Market, and Germany too cannot afford such a crisis;
• —in any case, Germans don’t think the tactic would work—“if you want to bring a girl to the altar, you must first persuade her.”

C. Hence Germans (who hold the key) propose to follow strategy of not forcing issue but maintaining steady pressure on French in the expectation that eventually France will yield to the pressure of “European public opinion.” (Everybody is too polite to discuss frankly whether this means before or after De Gaulle leaves the scene.)

5. From British viewpoint, German position knocks out theoretical option (probably favored by some) of trying to push the Five into face-down with France, first on starting negotiations and then on final decision. Instead, they must prepare for the long pull. Wilson’s statement yesterday (London 3270)³ that “time is on our side” confirms that this is HMG’s view. While it is not yet clear what the talk of “strengthening EFTA” (reported separately) means, our initial judgment is that this is largely razzle-dazzle designed to maintain sense of forward movement until things sort themselves out more clearly in EC Council.

6. Whether time is really on Britain’s side will depend largely on evolution of domestic economic and balance of payments situation in coming months. We will be in better position to assess this after October returns are in.

Bruce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Luxembourg, Brussels, Paris, Rome, and The Hague.
2. Dated October 20. (Ibid.)
3. Dated October 24. (Ibid.)