Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

271. Record of Discussion at the 23d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group¹

Washington, October 19, 1967.

PRESENT

• Under Secretary of State, Chairman
• Deputy Secretary of Defense
• The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• Director, United States Information Agency
• Administrator, Agency for International Development
• Under Secretary of Agriculture
• Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Counselor, Mr. Bowie
• Staff Director
• EUR, Mr. Leddy
• Amb. Cleveland
• ISA, Mr. Wyle
• JCS, General Orwat

A. Discussion of the Harmel Study.

Eugene Rostow introduced the subject by briefly sketching the background to the Harmel Study and the steps which led to the present critical and political phase. The Special Group, authorized by the Council to review the tasks of the Alliance, will meet on November 7 to consider the reports made to it by the four sub-groups. An excellent Summary of these reports was prepared at last week’s Ditchley Park meeting.² Mr. Rostow explained that originally there had been some thought given to a special declaration reaffirming each nations commitment to the Alliance beyond 1969. The general view at the moment seemed to be that no specific declaration would be sought, but the continuance of the Alliance as long as danger continued would be clearly implied.

For most member governments, it was important domestically that NATO play, and be seen to play, a positive political role in sponsoring policies to improve political relations with the Communist nations. Except for France, there is probably solid support for a strong result from the Harmel Exercise. All members are concerned about the possibility of hostile reactions from France, or even a withdrawal from the Alliance. It is generally thought that if France decides to withdraw it will not need the excuse of the Harmel Exercise to do so. On the other hand it would be easier to withdraw from the “feeble hulk” of NATO if it failed to revitalize its methods of political consultation. Harmel has told us that, while he wishes to avoid provoking the French, he is clear that we must not sacrifice any of the essential elements of the problem in order to propitiate France. It does not seem likely at this time that we shall have to consider going ahead with just Fourteen as we have had to do in the military field. If this kind of confrontation with the French appears unavoidable prior to the Ministerial Meeting, we would of course have to go back to the President.

The ideal situation from our point of view would be to get approval of the Summary by the Special Group which would then transmit the paper to the Council as its own report. Between now and November 7 we will be exploring the reaction of governments to this Summary. We will also be trying to clarify and guide—not too oppressively—the reaction of our NATO partners, and their ideas as to procedure for the next two months.

On substance, the ideas in the Summary fall mainly under the headings of European security arrangements, including the German problem; disarmament and arms control; and activities outside the strict Treaty area. The failure of Europe to speak with any authority during the Middle Eastern crisis has been felt in Europe. There was now a more forthcoming attitude toward the kind of consultation on Mediterranean and Middle Eastern problems which Ambassador Holmes was beginning. Progress in these consultations during the present period should help NATO reach a decision in the Harmel Exercise to continue them through an open-ended group at a level of political responsibility. With respect to NATO consultations on problems arising outside the Treaty area, Mr. Rostow thought the Middle East and North Africa were the obvious subjects with which to start the process of evolution within NATO.

Mr. Rostow sketched the general tactical situation. He said that while there had originally been talk of a ringing Ministerial Declaration to be issued in December, we should be content to play the ministerial decisions in a low key. This could best be done by Ministerial affirmation of the Summary document or a version thereof as a kind of on-going work program. We should try to avoid the word “new”, so as not to cause problems with the French unnecessarily. All governments could make their own statements of what had been decided and play up those aspects of particular domestic importance to them.

There had been talk about various alternative procedures for carrying forward the work recommended on European security arrangements, including the German problem. We had no particular preferences as to procedure. But NATO could not displace the underlying responsibilities of the United States, France, and Britain in Germany. Any consultative procedures to be developed would have to take this fact into account.

There could be a continuing discussion of arms policy and force reductions and this could be done either in a new body or in one of the existing committees. On the Mediterranean Study, the creation of an open-ended committee should be considered for those who wish to participate seriously in this NATO activity.

Before beginning the discussion, Mr. Katzenbach circulated the letter from Mr. Barr³ stating Treasury views on the desirability of NATO considering cooperative methods for financing the presence of Allied troops in countries other than their own. Mr. Rostow said that he has been in contact with Mr. Fowler and Mr. Deming on the subject, which is before the new Deming Committee. They will pursue the problem in that forum. He regarded it as much too late to raise the issue in the Harmel Exercise. On the merits, he agreed with the Treasury view, and we intended to move ahead in the Deming Committee. Mr. Katzenbach agreed. He also commented with respect to the last paragraph of Mr. Barr’s letter that he was not prepared to say that we were wrong in our long-standing policy on European unification.

Mr. Nitze stressed the importance of progress in reviewing the strength of the Alliance. He agreed wholeheartedly with the conclusion in paragraph 27 that a lack of action in December would be a major failure. Mr. Nitze thought that most of the Alliance were together on the importance of defense arrangements, and on the importance also of better political consultation. Even with regard to France, there seemed to be some progress with respect to certain areas of the study, particularly Mediterranean problems. He thought we should put emphasis on this. On East-West policy, the Germans are the linch-pin since they were sensitive both to French concerns and generally on East-West policy since their interest was the most immediate. Therefore he recommended that we let the Germans take the lead on this.

General Wheeler said that the Chiefs wish to second what Paul Nitze had said and emphasized the great importance they attached to positive movement in the Alliance. If not, it would not just be a question of “running down”, but rather of the Alliance’s possible fragmentation and disappearance. While not attempting to deliberately antagonize De Gaulle, we should certainly not avoid doing what is necessary just in order to placate him. We don’t need a dramatic declaration but we do need something positive even if in low key. All the Chiefs concurred in this view. He said he had no trouble with the substance of the Summary.

Mr. Katzenbach said that on the tactical situation there seemed to be basic agreement among all those present on the necessity for reinvigorating the political side of NATO. We should be much worse off if no action were taken. Mr. Marks referred to his recent sampling study of public opinion showing strong support in Britain, Germany, France and Italy for a NATO role in East-West political initiatives.

Ambassador Cleveland described the current political situation in NATO and how it differed from the confrontation with the French last year over defense matters. He said that the balance was now quite changed. At this point, some countries which had been unwilling to engage in a debate with the French on defense policy a year ago were now taking a strong position because the issue was or appeared to be “detente”. He said the US was now somewhere in the middle between the Danes and others who wanted a NATO political role in detente and the Germans who feared offending the French with emphasis on political tasks. He too stressed the fact that the US should not be particularly interested in a public declaration, but rather wanted clear decisions, a good statement, and a solid “working program”.

Mr. Leddy made the point that the East-West relations report prepared by a German and a British official was a good, modest step-by-step program which did not aim at the fundamental security problem. It was his hope that the Germans might get the French to go along with this proposal. De Gaulle seems concerned that the Harmel proposals would seek to “control” the policies of the member countries, and not to be objecting to consultation as such. He stressed that if the French stay out of an agreement on East-West policies there is not much NATO can do because the French are essential to any such discussion.

Mr. Kohler summed up the situation by saying that we needed enough in the way of positive elements for the Ministers to agree upon for a businesslike communique. Then we could let the Ministers portray the results in their own way.

Mr. Bowie stressed the necessity of avoiding a German “run-out”. He supported Ambassador Cleveland’s analysis that the best tactic was to aim for agreement on specific actions in order to minimize conflict with the French about formally approving reports or agreeing on major declarations.

Mr. Rostow accepted the statement that the reports should not be approved as such but left to stand as the work of the Rapporteurs. But he thought something had to be approved and suggested that this could be the Summary or a document of equivalent import that would be proposed by the Special Group. Mr. Bowie said that he hesitated about this because he thought that this would lead to a renegotiation of the Summary and much of its content might be lost; it was better to retain it as a clear statement which could be used by individual members as they needed.

Mr. Katzenbach summarized the situation by stating that all agreed that the Summary was a good statement of where the Alliance stands and provides good guidance for a future work program. All agreed that it was important that the exercise not be a failure however big or little a success it might be. All present also wished to get as much of the substance approved in its existing form without getting involved in a negotiation which might squeeze down the amount of substance in the report. Finally, the worst situation we could be in would be to get expectations up of a major move and then have the Germans defect and NATO perhaps lose prestige in the process. Mr. Katzenbach picked up the point about not needing a political declaration in the United States. He said this should not be overdone. We want a document which will help us convince people in the United States of the importance of NATO so that it cannot be said that we are neglecting Europe or allowing NATO to disintegrate. At most we could hope to get an approved version of the Summary and at least some agreement that the Secretary General would develop NATO actions from the Summary plus the announcement of some specific action at the time of the NAC Meeting.

Ambassador Cleveland thought that Mr. Katzenbach and the Secretary might have to help out in a later stage when it would be necessary to show that the United States was prepared to get into a fight with the French, while not necessarily seeking such a confrontation. We would also have to work with the Germans and emphasize to them the importance of NATO having a political role in order for the United States to maintain public support for our troop commitment in Europe. Mr. Katzenbach agreed and said further that the question was not so much a fight with the French but more the effect on the Germans. We don’t mind fighting with the French as long as we can maintain the unity of the Fourteen.

[Here follows discussion of future meetings.]

A.H. Hartman

1. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. Prepared by Arthur A. Hartman, Staff Director, on October 23.
2. See Document 270.
3. Not found.