Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

270. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, October 16, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Ditchley Park Meeting on Future of the Alliance—Information Memorandum

1. I have just returned from several weeks in Europe during which I visited Paris, London, Bonn, Copenhagen and Brussels mainly on the Harmel exercise on the Future of NATO.

2. With the informal approval of the Rapporteurs, I prepared for their meeting at Ditchley Park on October 11–12 a resume of the findings and conclusions of the four Reports which had just been completed. With a few additions and changes the Ditchley meeting decided to forward the document to the Special Group to assist it in its work. I am attaching a copy of this resume in this form (2d clip).²

3. While the style betrays its composite origin, I think the resume states pretty well the situation the Alliance now faces and its tasks for the future.

4. From the Reports, resume and discussion, the following points seem to me worth noting:

(a) The study on the whole takes a balanced view of present Soviet attitudes and military strength and reaffirms the continuing need for the Alliance. While feeling secure, Europeans are aware that the source of their security is mainly the U.S. commitment and capacity.

(b) There is a general desire to use the Alliance for concerting efforts towards detente. In practice, however, ideas on the prospects and what to do vary widely; this may severely tax efforts for a common line. Two major motives of the Europeans are to keep a check on the U.S.-USSR dealings and on West German activity.

(c) The Reports assert that there are real European interests in the area beyond NATO. In practice, however, the Europeans are extremely reluctant to involve themselves outside the NATO areas, partly due to the sense of impotence in influencing the U.S. in such fields.

(d) The resume states much more frankly than is customary the effects of the disparity in power and influence between the U.S. and the European allies. Whether one talks to the UK, Germans, Benelux, or others, this is a central factor in defining the relations within the Alliance.

(e) The Reports recognize (less clearly than one might wish) that changes in procedure will be only palliatives so long as the serious power disparity continues. Most Europeans, including the British, recognize clearly that the only effective answer would be European unity in some form, but they vary widely in assessing prospects for achieving it. If the Europeans should acquire active confidence in achieving further cohesion, this might materially improve the morale in the Alliance even though its achievement took some while.

5. The résumé probably reflects fairly well the views of almost all the Allies except the French, who seem likely to try to block a fruitful outcome of the exercise. Apparently, they intended to put pressure on the Germans, the Canadians, and perhaps others to this end. For various reasons these Allies are most reluctant to have a head-on clash with the French at this time. In this situation, careful handling will be required to assure a constructive outcome. The question may come down to whether or not to accept practical consensus of the Fourteen without a resounding declaration. In any case, the U.S. will need to consider very carefully the resulting tactical issues over the coming weeks.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Bowie and initialed by Rusk.
2. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that an EUR status report on the Harmel study was attached at the first clip and Bowie’s summary at the second clip. Neither is printed.