226. Summary Notes of the 566th Meeting of the National Security Council1
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Acting Secretary Katzenbach: Summarized the State Department paper. (copy attached)2 We cannot take a deep breath and relax, because many problems are ahead of us down the road, such as:
The organization of a permanent nuclear consultative group,
The NATO study proposed by Belgium which France will oppose and which may not come out to be very much, and
The technological gap, the nature of which is not clear.
At a forthcoming NATO meeting in Paris next week, we do not expect dramatic developments or any major crises.
[Page 512]Secretary McNamara: The Nuclear Planning Group, which we are developing, meets the needs of our allies, especially Germany. It will more closely tie in Germany with the U.S. and the U.K. in the nuclear field. It will end talk of the Multilateral Force.
As for tripartite discussions, it is doubtful that the Germans will present a proposal acceptable to us and to the British with respect to the troop offset problem. This means that there will have to be a relocation of U.S. and U.K. forces. We must act to keep the British from suddenly withdrawing U.K. troops.
As to the relocation of our forces outside France, 90 percent of our personnel will be out by April 1. The remainder will be out by mid-summer. The cost of getting out of France we do not yet know.
The President: Let us get out rather than be pushed out by De Gaulle.
Secretary McNamara: Estimates of the cost of getting out range from $175 to $275 million. Some 75,000 Americans, plus 14,000 French civilians on the U.S. payroll are involved. Foreign exchange costs to us may drop from $175 million to $100 million, a yearly saving of about $75 million.
The President: Expressed general agreement with the State Department paper. We should get out of France as quickly as possible. If we cannot meet the French deadline for withdrawal, we should avoid a public fight about it if we can. As soon as our team returns from the Paris meeting, they should report their evaluation of whether the 14 NATO powers can hold together.
Assistant Secretary Leddy: We should await the results of the McCloy mission sometime in mid-January to make up our minds on the level of U.S. forces remaining in Europe. We must be very careful of the political effect in Europe off any withdrawal we make. We must reach an agreed government position on whether we think the allies are carrying their fair share in relation to what we are doing. This position will be essential in defending our policy domestically.
Acting Secretary Katzenbach: The allies’ view of the Soviet threat is such that they are not willing to make adequate force contributions. Our allies face the difficult problem of not wanting to accept de Gaulle’s solution but not wanting to pay for a NATO solution.
The President: Recent French, British and German actions make clear that they are looking inward. We can’t get the American people to support our NATO policy when they see the actions taken by the French, British, and Germans. We are fast approaching a day of reckoning. Our recent elections make this quite clear. Our policy must take into account the diminishing support of U.S. citizens for the present level of our forces in Europe.
We should do our very best to comply with De Gaulle’s request that we leave—even if it means putting men in inadequate housing during [Page 513] winter. We should try to get through to the Germans to convince them of the necessity of offsetting a greater amount of our expenditures in Europe. The serious nature of the problem we face in maintaining support for NATO must be conveyed to the allies. They must understand that the demands on us to meet home front needs are serious—that we are facing a budget of 142 billion with revenue estimates of 120 billion. The labor unions are going to get raises and U.S. Government employees merit salary increases. Expenditures for the poor in the U.S. have increased tremendously since the Kennedy Administration. We are now very near a debt limit.
The Vice President: The NATO alliance is vital. However, changes are necessary. The dissolution of the alliance means the loss of our diplomatic cards in dealing with the Russians. We must talk to Congress every chance we get about the continuing but changed NATO structure.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith.↩
- Printed as Document 223.↩