Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

225. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 10, 1966, 1953Z.

8923. NATUS. For Secretary McNamara from Cleveland. Subject: Nuclear planning—first steps.

1. The Alliance will be taking a step long past due, assuming the Rome report² secures Ministerial approval next week. NATO, through the DPWG, has made good progress down the road toward rational and meaningful planning for conventional forces. The pressing need has been to extend this systematic approach to problems which have faced us for a decade in the nuclear field. By establishing a small and flexible nuclear planning group, NATO will have, at last, machinery which will enable Ministers to grapple with the substance of Alliance nuclear planning and policy.

2. In the NPG’s first year, no task is more urgent or important than to begin to fill in great void which surrounds question of the role of 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe and their proper relation to external and conventional forces. Our objective is to strive for some understanding, and hopefully agreement, about what kinds of nuclear weapons are needed in NATO, in what amounts and for what purposes.

3. In our view, a good approach would be to divide the problem of the role of NATO’s nuclear forces into its strategic and tactical components. Putting the NPG to work simultaneously on both the strategic and tactical phases of these problems would avoid distortion inherent in focusing on one aspect alone and would permit development of a coherent view of the appropriate balance and mix of NATO’s nuclear forces and their relationship to external strategic forces.

4. In the strategic category we would envisage the NPG starting out on ground already prepared by Working Group III and going on to a thorough examination of the targeting politics, tasks and objectives of NATO strike forces. By taking advantage of consensus already developed in Working Group III concerning SACEUR’s scheduled program, there would be good chance that NPG could produce an agreed NATO targeting and attack policy at an early date. Such a prompt outcome would not only establish prestige of NPG (thereby undercutting FRG doubts about its value) but would also in another way demonstrate Alliance is up to date and vital.

5. On the tactical side, we would see the NPG beginning with studies of the possible use of battlefield nuclear weapons (tubes, missiles, aircraft) and of denial and defense nuclear weapons (AA, ASW, ADM). This ground-up approach to tactical systems has the advantage of immersing NPG at outset in systematic examination of some problems of principal concern to its members. It would also lead to more informed and orderly consideration of such problems as selective use, command and control, rules of engagement, special release procedures, contingency studies, etc.

6. We understand that as soon as NPG formally comes to life (which should be next week) UK intends to raise question of the first steps to be taken. To get off to a brisk start, and in the right direction, it would be useful to arrange toward end of Ministerial Session a meeting of the six Defense Ministers who will be participating in NPG during 1967.

7. There may be political obstacles that make this too difficult. The six ministers can hardly meet (even if there is already a firm gentlemen’s agreement) until they have been formally selected by the (probably twelve-member) NDAC. Since Brosio is chairman of both NDAC and NPG, he needs to be present especially the first time each body meets; yet he will be chairing North Atlantic Council during this period. Probably we can and should do nothing about this idea until the SPECOM report has been considered and approved; backfield in motion might draw penalty of resentment. But once action is taken hopefully in final form at DPC Wednesday, then we can see whether the formalities can be sufficiently complied with to enable us to get to work on the substance of a work program.

8. We have some specific suggestions for work program (following general line in 2–5 above), for discussion with Secretary McNamara when that moment comes.

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret.
2. Reference is to DPC/D(66)39, “Suggested Improvements for Nuclear Planning,” a report of the Special Committee of Defense Ministers. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 113)