Office of the Historian

224. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, December 9, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • Tripartite Talks on Troop Strength and the Offset Problem

PARTICIPANTS

  • Senator Mike Mansfield
  • Under Secretary Eugene Rostow
  • Assistant Secretary Douglas MacArthur

Under Secretary Rostow opened the conversation by briefing Senator Mansfield on the tripartite talks on the NATO troop strength and offset problem in Germany being conducted for the United States by Mr. McCloy. He explained why, if we were to avoid the danger of a serious unravelling of the NATO Alliance, it seemed necessary to authorize $35 million of additional defense procurement in the UK in order to gain necessary time to study this entire problem and reach a sound conclusion with the British and Germans, both of whom have a serious domestic problem He also explained some of the possibilities we are exploring to neutralize the adverse balance of payments effect of troops abroad as well as the commitments that Britain would make in return for our additional procurement.

Senator Mansfield listened impassively and at the conclusion of Under Secretary Rostow’s presentation said that the resolution which he had put forward in the last Congress calling for a reduction of our forces in Europe was a very serious one and had widespread appeal in the Congress. He pointed out that we are the only NATO country that is meeting its commitments, except possibly for some withdrawals for Vietnam, and that he had offered the resolution not just for financial and balance of payments reasons, important as they were, nor because of Vietnam. Basically [Page 509] he felt there were clear indications that fundamental changes had taken place and that the continued presence of so many American troops in Europe 20 years after the war was beginning to grate on the nerves of Germans and Europeans outside of government. He felt in terms of our own overall political and security stance the time had come to make a reduction in forces.

Senator Mansfield said that his resolution in no way weakened the President’s hand since it left to the President the judgment on the extent to which there should be U.S. troop reductions as well as the timing. He believed his resolution actually strengthened the President’s hand in these matters rather than weakening it.

Insofar as the proposed arrangements with the British to place $35 million of additional defense procurement are concerned, he did not think it was a good idea to “subsidize the British” unless the end result would strengthen our overall security arrangements and the position of the dollar and the pound sterling—as a result which he obviously considered very dubious.

He concluded the conversation on this subject by saying cryptically that he appreciated being informed and thought “we understand each other’s viewpoint on this matter.”

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by MacArthur. Copies were sent to Leddy, Kohler, Bowie, Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, and S/S. The meeting was held in Senator Mansfield’s office.↩