Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

223. Scope Paper¹

NATO/G–3

Washington, December 7, 1966.

The Political Atmosphere

The December 1966 Ministerial Meeting will take place in an atmosphere of transition and ferment. Western Europe remains a collection of relatively weak sovereign nations. While economic progress continues, the move towards political unity has been stalled, and each nation seeks to maintain a balance in its immediate environment, avoid entanglement in global problems and ensure its security. The traditional European leaders (a neutralist France, a weak, self-centered UK and a Germany governed by an untested coalition) are unable to provide reassurance to the other Alliance members. The latter are uneasy about the evolving balance of power (i.e., read Germany) in Western Europe, unready to abandon NATO’s security but unwilling to contribute a larger share to its defense effort, uneasy about the US commitment to the Alliance and our increasing involvement in Viet Nam, and interested but uncertain about how to capitalize on the apparent detente in East-West relations.

The Alliance

Despite these uncertainties the Alliance in 1966 has met De Gaulle’s challenge. The Fourteen, who formalized their determination to maintain NATO at the Brussels Meeting in June, have in large part sorted out the France-NATO relationship. They are prepared to have France participate in NATO activities so long as she pays her share and does not try to obstruct the others. But France has effectively bowed out of almost all military aspects of the Alliance and in the process has made it increasingly clear how tenuous is her claim to be “the ally of her allies” and how determinedly she is bent on an independent course tantamount to neutralism.

As a result of the French position, the Fourteen recognize more clearly the benefits provided by NATO for which De Gaulle offered no substitute: (a) security (the Soviet machine is still there and NATO’s joint defense effort is the only effective protection against possible Russian encroachment or blackmail); (b) Western European political stability (this looks ever more precious to them in the light of the recent German political shifts); and (c) political influence (they see the NATO consultation process as their best hope of securing US attention to their interests and objections, and indeed Russian respect for them). An evidence of this need for and support of NATO is the fact that they are now prepared to take the decisive forward step to make the Special Committee on nuclear planning into a permanent NATO institution (the NATO Defense Affairs Committee) in spite of past French opposition.

Nevertheless, there are serious strains in the Alliance. European confidence in a solid US commitment to NATO has been weakened not only by De Gaulle’s unremitting attacks and innuendoes, but also by events in the US like the Mansfield Resolution² and the periodic Washington intimations linking withdrawals to manpower needs in the Pacific or balance of payments.

At the same time the detente atmosphere has fostered heavy public and parliamentary pressures to relax NATO defense efforts. Some nations (such as the UK and Belgium) are already looking for ways to rationalize defense reductions. Others are prepared to follow. NATO strategy and force levels are under scrutiny in the Trilateral talks as well as in NATO force planning studies. Further progress in both areas is delayed until the US, UK and the new German government are ready to take some vital policy decisions.

The East-West Aspect

The atmosphere of detente has also spurred the NATO nations to an intense and occasionally uncritical pursuit of improved East-West relations. Thoughtful examination within NATO during 1966 of bilateral activities and future possibilities revealed a considerable variety of views. The Scandinavians and Belgians were optimistic as to possibilities of future developments. The Greeks, Turks and Germans viewed the situation with considerable reserve, feeling that the attitudes of some of their Allies underestimated the continuing Soviet threat as a bar to detente. The French have disassociated themselves from any concerted NATO position.

In essence, the Allies recognize NATO’s real value and indispensability as long as the basic problems of peace and of European security and German reunification have not been resolved—but they are searching more insistently for ways to adapt NATO to changing conditions and enlarge its usefulness.

US Objectives

Our general objectives at the December Ministerial Meeting will be:

a) to present the picture of an Organization and of an Alliance which has surmounted its crisis with France but which will continue to accept French cooperation to the extent this does not damage essential NATO interests.

b) to demonstrate that the Fourteen are going ahead in a businesslike manner, modernizing NATO to meet their needs—in the defense structure, in the nuclear field and in the area of communications and crisis consultation as well as in the non-military fields.

c) to demonstrate that, in spite of a reduced probability of war in Europe, the nature of the Soviet threat still calls for an effective NATO.

d) to evidence that a strong Alliance is an essential prerequisite to the attainment of a genuine detente and an equitable settlement in Europe.

e) to support European efforts to study the future organization and activities of NATO.

Organization of the Meeting

As a result of a “constitutional” arrangement which was recently agreed in NAC, the Fourteen, sitting as the Defense Planning Committee, conduct the Alliance’s military business and the Fifteen conduct its non-military business. Thus in December for the first time in NATO history business will be formally divided between these two groups, meeting at the Ministerial level.

Work of the Council of Fourteen (DPC)

Specifically we hope that the Ministers of the Fourteen will accomplish the following:

1. Note the favorable progress made since last June in resolving the France-NATO relationship. We are midstream in relocating SHAPE, AFCENT and the NATO Defense College. NATO has taken the last remaining major relocation decisions, to move the Military Committee and the NAC to Brussels. Some Ministers may wish to examine the details of financing and timing for moves; the actual work would normally be left to the Fourteen PermReps. At this point there appear to be no tendentious issues with France on matters relating to its withdrawal from NATO. Politely and publicly, NATO is leaving France.

2. Approve the Special Committee reports which (a) would make the Special Committee and six-nation Nuclear Planning Group into permanent NATO institutions for nuclear consultation, and (b) set in train arrangements for improved data exchange and communications and for crisis consultation. This will be a major accomplishment and dramatic evidence that the NATO nations are moving to give substance to their common interests in the nuclear area—in spite of past French objections and the deep-seated reservations of NATO nations about smaller or inner groupings.

3. Note the report of the US–UK–FRG Trilateral talks and recognize that the original time table for winding them up, mid-January, has slipped. Any concern by Ministers over the slippage should be balanced by relief that the UK is willing to defer precipitate action with regard to the BAOR and by the recognition that this interim trilateral report is sufficiently comprehensive to permit the regular NATO force planning to proceed in phase.

4. Provide the necessary guidance for the NATO military authorities to push on with their studies and activities on aspects of strategy and force posture, looking toward a full examination of these matters at a special Defense Ministers’ meeting in the spring or at the next regular Ministerial meeting.

5. Express their interest in and support for the DefComSat proposal which NAC is now studying. It will not be ready for final action at the Ministerial.

Work of the Council of Fifteen

We hope that the Ministers of the Fifteen will undertake the following:

1. Consider thoughtfully Belgium’s proposal for a NATO study on the political future of the Alliance and instruct Brosio and the Permanent Council to work out and recommend to governments procedures for a productive study. It would be premature to expect a more decisive response at this stage since the Ministers will have had little or no time to consider the fundamental objectives and potentialities of this initiative.

2. Welcome Italy’s proposals in NATO for dealing with the “technological gap” and encourage her to refine her ideas.

3. Endorse the Permanent Representatives’ report which examines possible initiatives looking toward improved East-West relations. The French are expected to abstain, being opposed in principle to any evidence of concerted Western “bloc” activity.

4. Stress as fundamental to the East-West problem that (a) Western strength and cohesion is a precondition to improved East-West relationships, (b) progress toward detente and progress towards the solution of the German and Central European problems are complementary objectives, both of which we support, and (c) the foregoing are a part of the determined search for ways to build a “surer foundation of mutual trust” between East and West which the President advocated in his speech on October 7.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 115. Secret. Drafted by Vest and cleared by Hinton, McAuliffe, Myerson, Springsteen, and Leddy. Prepared for the December 14–16 NATO Ministerial Meeting.
2. See Document 199.