Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

183. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, July 2, 1966, 1610Z.

83. Eyes only for Amb Foster. Subj: German attitude on nuclear sharing.

1. During the visit of Amb Foster to Bonn over the last two days, he had many useful discussions with the highest German authorities on various disarmament issues, which are being reported separately. Of particular value, however, was his probing of the German attitude on nuclear sharing. In his meetings with FonMin Schroeder and DefMin Von Hassel, reported in Embtels 84 and 85,² he sought without indicating any change in US policy toward a “hardware solution” to the problem, to determine what the real German position on such a solution is.

2. As might have been expected, both Schroeder and Von Hassel held firm in asserting that the Germans still seek a “hardware solution.” The extent of which this view is shared by others is not known, however, there is no one else in the CDU/CSU Fraktion who takes a very positive line on the issue except Deputy Kurt Birrenbach—whose views are well known to us. Recently, however, he told me confidentially that the “hardware solution” was his second choice—his first being the traditional SPD position of seeking participation in planning and decision—recommending—not just for nuclear forces under SACEUR but SAC.

3. The SPD at its convention in Dortmund on June 1–5, of course, rejected the MLF concept and the FDP has never endorsed it. It is believed that Chancellor Erhard has little independent conviction on the issue. However, he has in the past followed Schroeder and Von Hassel’s line. One middle rank FonOff official, following Foster’s meeting with Schroeder, asked us pointedly why Foster had not pressed Schroeder harder on the ANF-MLF, shrugging his shoulders in dismay. Von Hassel, in his discussions with Foster, had indicated a willingness to give up a “hardware solution” but only under certain circumstances, i.e., that the McNamara committee evolve into an acceptable basis for planning and crisis management in the nuclear area, backed up by sure and instant communications.

4. The following are believed to be the motives underlying Schroe-der and Von Hassel’s attitude. I believe that Amb Foster, with whom I discussed this analysis in general would agree. This is, of course, in addition to Schroeder and Von Hassel’s natural desire as political leaders not to have to admit the failure of a project with which they have been so closely associated.

A) The “hardware solution” now has a certain status. It results from a US proposal to Germany which Germany accepted, and even though it has not yet come into being we have not withdrawn it. We admitted during the Chancellor’s visit to Washington last December³ that the proposition was still on the table subject to discussions with the other countries involved—which have of course never materialized. The Germans, as von Hassel indicated to Foster, are not now pressing for a decision. They are in the position of having been accepted as being qualified for membership in a hardware-owning organization, which they consider has already brought them a certain prestige and bargaining power. In a sense, they have for the first time been recognized as first class nuclear citizens. Since the ultimate success of the project seems doubtful, they would prefer a continuation of the present situation to a “showdown.” As I understand, Birrenbach told Foster this morning that this option must be kept open until a European nuclear option can be tangible enough to take its place. If the hardware approach were abandoned, the Germans would lose the present symbolism and potential for bargaining which it provides—even in limbo.

B) I believe that both Schroeder and Von Hassel also see in the “hardware solution” a hedge against the uncertainty of the future. NATO may change drastically in its organization or policy. Technical changes may upset the balance between conventional nuclear defense, or between defense and offense in either category. There may be a drastic change in US policy, i.e. an isolationist government may come into power. Under such circumstances, the Germans are reluctant to commit themselves, especially to their implacable enemy the Soviets, in a way which would tie their hands in the future. Many Germans have always had in the back of their mind the possibility that they could in extremis make a nuclear deal with the French comparable to the one they have with us. By 1970, moreover, the French should have quite a respectable nuclear force.

C) Another probable Schroeder-Von Hassel motivation is a conviction on their part that participation in a “hardware solution” puts them on the inside for future developments. For example, once such an organization had been developed, if a new weapon is developed, the Germans would naturally be in on it. They would be in on any extension of the powers or scope of the initial organization.

D) Both Von Hassel and Schroeder, although they would of course not admit it directly to us, undoubtedly value the bargaining power of their present position—both vis-a-vis US and the Soviets. With US it can perhaps be traded in to assure that something suitable comes out of the McNamara committee—which Von Hassel has indicated he is not yet sure will produce the desired end result vis-a-vis the Soviets, the Germans would hope to gain at least some way station on the long road toward reunification.

E) Schroeder and Von Hassel, moreover, undoubtedly feel that they are under no pressure to abandon the “hardware solution” because there are many other unresolved differences blocking a non-proliferation agreement, including that with the Indians. In the event nuclear sharing should become the sole remaining obstacle, they would likely find themselves under unbearable pressure to yield. However, there is ample time to make the required concessions and the probability is that it will not be necessary at all.

F) Schroeder and Von Hassel may conclude that German influence under a “hardware solution” would be greater than in a consultative arrangement, since they would be in a position to buy a proportionately larger share than some of the smaller European countries involved. This may, moreover, see in a hardware approach the ultimate solution of their offset problem. Buying into a nuclear weapon system could absorb a large proportion of the offset payment for several years.

Comment: I assume that it is our present policy to so steer the outcome of the McNamara committee [so] that a nuclear consultative organization will be created which, at least for the time being, will satisfy German nuclear ambitions. If this is the case, I hope that the recommendations which will go forward to the NAC in its December Ministerial Meeting will be broad enough to take this requirement into account. From the German viewpoint, the scope of the new group’s final decision—recommending powers should include not only nuclear forces under SACEUR but our own SAC. This latter extension has never troubled me since, in such circumstances, I believe the President would want to know the attitude of Erhard, in whose country his troops are or may be fighting, before making a final nuclear decision. If we are willing to go this far, I believe that we could swap off such a result to the Germans for an agreement to forego a “hardware solution” for the foreseeable future. It might be desirable, however, to endow any new consultative committee with standby powers which could ultimately provide an umbrella for such a solution. This would give us the needed flexibility in arranging the nuclear affairs of the Alliance in the future, and permit the Germans to retain their status as acceptable and potential nuclear part-owners. The obstacle such a development might create with the Soviets achieving a non-proliferation agreement, might be overcome if provision could be made in the agreement that the Soviets have the option of withdrawing from the agreement—in the event that a new nuclear force is created—even one which we could easily prove did not constitute proliferation.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Geneva.
2. Both dated July 2. (Ibid., DEF 18–3 SWITZ(GE))
3. See Document 119.