Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

184. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, July 5, 1966, 0947Z.

108. Ref: Deptel 7056.² It seems to me that the French in attempting to do the delicate balancing act between departure from NATO and remaining in Alliance are confronted with a genuine dilemma. In order to give effect to their fallacious premise concerning integration, the French have recently made it clear that they do not intend to return to integration via the back door and are obviously reluctant to maintain in substance the previous command relationship, for example in regard to the French forces in Germany, as existed prior to French action. On the other hand it is extremely difficult to see how any formula for command relationship in time of war with SHAPE, which would have any validity and acceptability to the Fourteen which would not in effect merely repeat what had previously existed.

It is our understanding that De Gaulle wishes to have the theoretical possibility in some instances, and the actual possibility in others of a purely French decision in regard to French participation in a war. In a number of cases, such as sudden massive Soviet attack on Europe, the question is completely theoretical and French reaction would be almost instantaneous. However, in others, notably in the case of some Soviet action in regard to Berlin, De Gaulle might choose to interpret Soviet action as resulting from some U.S./Soviet clash in the Far East and decide that France should remain neutral. Another similar situation might arise if there were a revolt inside any satellite area, particularly East Germany, in which France might disagree with her allies. In actual fact these contingencies were covered in previous NATO arrangements whereby, except for air defense, General Lemnitzer had no command over any existing forces and would only receive command as a result of positive and conscious action by governments concerned.

It is of course true that De Gaulle apparently sees in anything that smacks of automatism a danger of involving France by momentum, perhaps against her will and her interests, but this is very thin and it merely means that France would be in a worse position to hold out against the rest of the Alliance before rather than after withdrawal from NATO organization.

This message is to point to a problem which may become more important as time goes on. It does not appear from our conversations with French officials, notably my last talk with Couve de Murville (Embtel 8915)³ that this problem i.e., how to reconcile membership in Alliance with absence from organization, has either been thoroughly studied or decided. It is probable that De Gaulle, with the preparations for his Moscow trip, has not himself seriously considered it.

However, he will undoubtedly have to examine this problem carefully now and reach a conclusion thereon in a relatively short time.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Ottawa.
2. Telegram 7056 to Paris, June 30, transmitted the Department of State’s preliminary thinking on the phasing of negotiations between the French and the 14 NATO states. The telegram also noted the hope that the U.S.-French talks on re-entry could begin early in July. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 8915 from Paris, June 18, reported that Couve de Murville had confirmed in a brief conversation that France had no national interest in maintaining troops in Germany but would be prepared to leave them there for the sake of French-German relations. (Ibid.)