119. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Sharing
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Chancellor Ludwig Erhard2
- Ambassador Hand
- Heinz Weber, FRG interpreter
- Harry Obst, State Department interpreter
The President assured the Chancellor that as long as he was in his job and the Chancellor in his, the Chancellor could be assured that there would be a frank and full exchange of views, hopes and expectations. In 1966 Chancellor Erhard would be in on the take-off, the flight and the landing.
Chancellor Erhard replied that was wonderful and very clear. The President could rely on him equally and could have fullest confidence in Germany and the German Government. The Chancellor did not think that the outcome of the French elections had injected a new element into the NATO crisis. The friendship between the US and the Federal Republic was the real foundation of NATO.
The Chancellor reminded the President that Germany was the first nation to renounce the use of ABC weapons. Germany was looking for a peaceful solution. The FRG did not want national control or national possession of nuclear arms but wanted some multilateral, integrated system. The Chancellor said he understood that whenever there was a development which would bring Germany closer to reunification—which could only be achieved with the aid of Germany’s friends and in a peaceful way—at that point Germany would have to make certain concessions regarding borders and other matters. The Chancellor would also be willing to discuss at length any nuclear sharing plan for a reunited Germany. He was looking at the problem without any illusions. The Potsdam Agreement could not stand forever but as long as it was unchanged the FRG wanted to examine closely any steps and talk about anything that would move the country towards reunification. The Chancellor [Page 290] assured the President that neither the German people nor he himself were rigid in their attitude.
The President replied that when looking at a situation, he was always trying to put himself into the other fellow’s shoes. He believed he knew how the Chancellor felt; he knew of the pride of the German people in their accomplishments, of their hope for peace, and their desire to be good neighbors. He personally was not obsessed by any fears about the German people or their attitudes. But he could also understand how the English, for instance, might feel differently. He had told Mr. Wilson that he was neither a broker nor a dominator but that he believed he could understand how the citizens of Great Britain and Germany feel. He begged the Chancellor to tell him what he needed to take home to his people. He could not understand, however, why with all the power of NATO and the United States defenses, Germany would want to have nuclear submarines of its own. He could not understand why the Germans would want to buy something that the United States had already paid for, when Wilson and Erhard and President Johnson all trusted each other. He was committed to the defense of Western Europe for otherwise he would call US troops home tomorrow. If the Germans wanted to spend a lot of money and the United Kingdom wanted to make contributions, however, he would certainly be willing to listen to their suggestions. How final action would be taken was not really important, but it was acting that counted. He had told Mr. Wilson that he would listen to his suggestions regarding submarines or other campaign promises but had added that he would listen to Chancellor Erhard first before agreeing to anything. He asked the Chancellor to comment, since the Chancellor knew the German people better. The President could not judge from what he reads in the newspapers, but he wanted to assure the Chancellor that his problems were also the problems of the President.
The Chancellor replied he thought the present position of NATO was somewhat unstable and that there might be a closer integration of NATO allies in the nuclear field. This had nothing to do with distrust, however, and he did not think anybody was worried. The President holds the last word in nuclear decisions. The Chancellor thought there were too many differences among the fifteen partners at the NATO talks in Paris. Each one wanted to state his own case. If a multilateral solution could be found, with limited participation at the onset, the other partners could then gradually join it.
The Chancellor said he believed such a closely-knit multilateral system would provide more of a deterrent vis-á-vis the Soviets. The FRG did not of course want to shoot. Nuclear sharing was, moreover, not only a military question but also had political implications. De Gaulle had once said that a nation protected by others with no say of its own could not regard itself as truly sovereign. The Chancellor was the last one to believe [Page 291] that President De Gaulle’s pronouncements were the ultimate wisdom, but he saw some truth in this particular statement. The United States, Great Britain and Germany should get together and find a basis for multilateral arrangements. At a later date the Italians and the Dutch might join. Some form of nuclear cooperation might be found which gives more emphasis on defense matters to the European Community without disrupting the US defense structure.
The Chancellor emphasized that Germans realized they were affected by US efforts elsewhere in the world, for instance in Viet-Nam. The FRG realized the heavy burdens the United States is bearing. What happened outside of the NATO territory was also of concern to the FRG. The FRG was considering how it might contribute more in the future. With the rapid rise of technological development in China, the Russians might one day start looking East and there might be an opening or a possibility for peacefully settling the question of German reunification.
The Chancellor said that many find non-proliferation attractive, but agreement on non-proliferation presupposes agreement on nuclear sharing. It was impossible to assume that Germany will go forever without a nuclear deterrent—this was the position of the German political parties. The FRG was not so much afraid of the ICBMs but was concerned about the MRBMs. There were supposedly about a thousand of them targeted on West Germany and Europe. The question was how Europe could protect itself against them. The Soviets also had mobile rocket units with a range of about 1,200 miles.
The Chancellor said a fully integrated system would be the best solution. It would prevent Germany from taking the lead, even in the hypothetical event that some criminal—as had happened once before—would come to rule the Federal Republic. Such an integrated system, especially if it were coupled with a unified Germany, would also be in the Soviet interest.
The Chancellor said some nuclear scientists had told him that in the not too distant future nuclear weapons could be produced much more cheaply and technological aspects mastered more easily, so that many smaller countries would be able to afford nuclear weapons and might actually find them cheaper to maintain than conventional forces. With this in mind, a system could be worked out in the future which would allow as many countries to get inside an integrated NATO system as would want to take part. Non-nuclear powers could elect to participate or not. In this way there would be no discrimination. Each country would make its own decision. In summary, such an integrated force was the best guarantee of peace.
The President responded that with regard to non-proliferation he did not see how much could be accomplished as long as the Viet-Nam problem was in the way. He would discuss this thoroughly with the [Page 292] Chancellor’s government, however, in conjunction with the Chancellor’s nuclear sharing ideas.
The President said he sometimes thought the best solution would be for the British to get rid of their submarines, give up their own nuclear deterrent and let the United States, which is committed to the defense of Europe, assume all its defense alone.
[At this point, the Chancellor gave the President a draft plan on nuclear sharing.]3 The Chancellor explained the nature of the paper and asked the President to read it and give him his comments during their next meeting.
At the conclusion of the meeting the Chancellor said that he would like to pursue further the subjects of nuclear sharing and non-proliferation and that he and the President would stay in touch with each other on these matters.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst and Puhan. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV.”↩
- Chancellor Erhard visited Washington December 19–21 for discussions of topics of mutual concern.↩
- Brackets in the source text. A copy of the draft plan was attached to Document 121 but is not printed.↩