121. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson1
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have just completed a day and a half of meetings with Chancellor Erhard in which we have had a good opportunity to talk not merely about the problems presently occupying the German leaders, but also the need for the Federal Republic to play a role in world affairs more nearly commensurate with its resources.
In the course of our discussion the Chancellor presented the case for Germany’s participation in some form of collective nuclear defense—a question on which his Government is placing considerable emphasis. In order to make clear the nature of the German interest he gave me a memorandum, a copy of which, with his permission, I am enclosing.2
As you will note, the Chancellor has come down squarely on the side of a “hardware solution.” I know of your own reservation about this matter and I have taken them into account in my discussions with the Chancellor. I have explained to him that the point of greatest importance was for the three of us to reach an agreement that could form the basis for the possible participation of other powers.
The proposals presented by the Chancellor will give me some problems with Congress, and I am sure they will not be easy for you. But what [Page 296] is essential is a stable and healthy Germany that can play a constructive role on the side of the West. On balance it seems to me that you and I should make a serious effort to respond to the German proposals as the Chancellor has broadly outlined them in his memorandum.
The nuclear force he describes would appear to fall within the broad framework of your ANF proposal. Unlike the MLF, it would not contemplate the creation of a new weapons system. From our discussion, it would appear that the Chancellor and his Ministers have been generally thinking in terms of an assignment by the United Kingdom of its Polaris submarines and a matching contribution of Polaris submarines by the United States. These submarines would form the basic elements of the force, which might be added to later. It is our impression that the questions of mixed-manning, veto rights, and a “European clause” can be worked out in a manner consistent both with your requirements and ours.
I think it important that we move ahead on this expeditiously since the matter has been so long in limbo. I would hope, therefore, that Ambassador Bruce might have a talk with you when he returns to London about the middle of January. He will bring with him suggestions as to the best way to carry on the necessary discussions among our three Governments in as quiet a manner as possible. Meanwhile, I should greatly appreciate your comments on this development.3
Let me say again how good it was to see you and how much pleasure and profit I derived from our conversations. We must keep closely in touch.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294. Secret; Nodis.↩
- Not printed.↩
- On January 5, 1966, Wilson replied thanking the President for this letter and saying that he had also received a message from Erhard who was pleased with his talks in Washington. Wilson agreed that some of the German proposals would raise difficulties for both the United States and the United Kingdom, and that they should receive expeditious treatment. The Prime Minister went on to express his pleasure at the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group of the NATO Special Committee, which would help Erhard pre-sent the German position on nuclear problems. Wilson concluded by telling the President how glad he was to hear that the creation of a new weapons system was no longer contemplated. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262)↩