122. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State1
Ecbus 525. Ref: Circusito 293.2 Joint Mission/USIS. Up until the outcome of NATO Ministerial Meeting and Erhard visit to Washington, there was clear and growing belief that U.S. was losing interest in Europe and Atlantic partnership.
Four general lines were stressed:
- A)
- Washington, tired of European internal squabbling, was in process of soft-pedaling 20-year policy favoring European integration and reluctant to take further initiatives to revitalize Atlantic partnership idea;
- B)
- War in Viet-Nam occupies America’s full time and attention and U.S. therefore interested only in peace and quiet in Europe;
- C)
- Washington, intent on detente with Soviet Union, prepared to make great concessions at Europe’s expense, to come to terms with other superpower; and
- D)
- U.S. unwilling to confront French on important issues of NATO or nuclear problems and Europe would do better to accept maximum of De Gaulle’s theses on organization of Europe rather than confront De Gaulle without U.S. support.
Lack of authoritative reaffirmation of U.S. policy toward Europe and Atlantic partnership in troubled period after June 30 EEC crisis contributed much to foster this uncertainty and doubt. It was reinforced by press judgments such as:
Europe Bulletin, November 9, “… absence of clear indications from Washington” as to its support of Rome Treaty encourages those who “would make the whole of Europe into vast free-trade area excluding agriculture.”, and
Le Monde, Washington correspondent Alain Clement on November 21, “At present point of stagnation in American foreign policy, Mr. Johnson’s only choice is between a sweeping movement, or sinking into bog of somnambulistic routine … the weakness of his intermittent leadership in this important field is largely responsible for the weakening of American authority abroad.”
Mission was also much troubled by extent to which this feeling was expressed privately, but almost without exception, by participants in European Parliament session in Strasbourg November 23–26.
This mood so deep seated that returning leader grantees generally express surprise at real extent U.S. interest in and support for Europe.
Even among those in Commission who have formally expressed to us their belief that official U.S. silence on EEC crisis was prudent and welcome, qualifier began to creep in that U.S. should, without involving itself in crisis, restate clearly its general policy on Europe before it was too late.
In addition to results of French elections, which have had their own impact on European political opinion, U.S. handling of NATO Ministerial demonstrated clearly that U.S. prepared to stay in Europe and develop and improve existing structure without reference to French intransigence. Secondly, reference in Erhard visit communique3 to support for European unity was most useful, but unfortunately not picked up in European press as far as we aware. Both these developments have had helpful effect, but are not in themselves by any means adequate, in Mission judgment. What is needed is statement in context which will attract widespread attention in Europe.
This suggests to us that significant portion of President’s State of Union address must effectively treat these Europeans concerns and reaffirm our policy towards and our role in Europe lest this adverse trend of opinion be resumed.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR W–US. Limited Official Use. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg for the Embassy and USEC, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rome, and Geneva and passed to USIA.↩
- This telegram, December 17, noted the growing appearance in the Western European media of the line that the United States was tired of European squabbling and preoccupied with Vietnam, and asked for a report on significant developments on the subject. (Ibid., POL EUR W)↩
- For text of the joint Johnson-Erhard communique, December 18, see Department of State Bulletin, January 10, 1966, pp. 50–51.↩
- For text of the State of the Union address, January 12, 1966, in which President Johnson briefly mentioned that the United States would take new steps to help strengthen the unity of Europe and the Atlantic community, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 3–12.↩