Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

120. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 20, 1965, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Sharing

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Ambassador George C. McGhee
• FRG
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • State Secretary Carstens
  • Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein

It was agreed that they should discuss first the question of nuclear sharing, which had been raised in the discussion earlier in the day between the President and the Chancellor;² the Secretary emphasized that we should not make another false start in nuclear matters. The proposal put forward by the Chancellor should be discussed thoroughly between the US, UK and FRG governments before a new step was taken. The Secretary asked Schroeder whether or not the German paper which the Chancellor presented to the President constituted an adequate basis for such a discussion.

Schroeder did not seem to think that the actual paper itself could constitute such a basis. He urged that careful thought be given to the presentation to be made to the UK, Italians and Dutch on this subject. Two lines of argument must be developed, one for internal use between ourselves, and another for anti-propaganda use against the Soviets. It was first necessary for the US and German governments to reach agreement.

The Secretary responded that this raised a problem. When UK Prime Minister Wilson was here last week he had wished to reach some agreement in principle on this question. However, we had advised him that we thought it best to wait until we could talk to the Germans. It is now also hard for us to agree bilaterally with the Germans. Somehow tripartite US, UK and German talks must be precipitated. He thought it possible that such discussions could result in agreement. There would be a distinct advantage in the UK putting its nuclear forces into NATO. The US Government might also be willing to follow with some type of contribution to a collective system. He suggested that the present anti-nuclear sharing propaganda campaign could be blunted if only existing weapons were to be used in the system.

Schroeder responded that, since his visit to London, he believed that a cornerstone to any possible multilateral force should be the British ANF. The UK nuclear force, however, should not be put into NATO before a combined force was created, after which the combined force itself could be put into NATO. From the German point of view the US MLF proposal was the best system which had been presented to date, i.e. it was mixed-manned, subject to joint use, etc. Perhaps it is these very qualities which have rendered it unacceptable to others. The Germans understand this. They are thinking now only in terms of the UK Polaris submarines, which will be coming out between now and 1969, the US Polaris, perhaps the V-bombers, perhaps the next generation of Pershings, and even the F–111s. He indicated that he would be willing to show the paper the Chancellor had submitted to the UK.

The Secretary raised the question as to whether it would be possible to assign such a force to NATO without the approval of the French. Schroeder replied that the German Foreign Office experts had concluded that this was possible. The Secretary agreed with Schroeder that the UK contribution should be made after, not before, the combination of the force. The UK could give consideration to its own contribution. The Americans and the Germans must not, however, in the meantime, pre-sent any final decision to Wilson.

The Secretary pointed out in this connection the present de facto situation affecting German participation in nuclear matters. Germany has, in fact, an equal voice in nuclear decisions within the Alliance just as it does in decisions affecting conventional forces. Although Germany is without a formal veto over US nuclear weapons in Germany, the de facto situation is that we cannot operate in the Federal Republic without their approval. Due to the presence of one quarter million American troops in Germany, it would, moreover, be difficult or impossible for us not to become involved in the event of hostilities on German soil.

Under Secretary Ball said that in his view the Germans should communicate in some way directly with British Prime Minister Wilson. Unfortunately it would not be possible to arrange tripartite talks. The Italians, Dutch and others would be quite concerned. Perhaps an exchange of letters between the Heads of Governments, i.e. between the President and Wilson, and between Erhard and Wilson, would be the best way.

Schroeder said then that he had at noon today agreed with Secretary McNamara that no new additional nuclear forces are required. Germany relied on the US entirely, under the terms of the Athens guidelines, in the case of both nuclear weapons in Germany and the US nuclear deterrent. Germany wished, however, to share in the “handling” of nuclear weapons. It was not any question of lack of confidence in the US. Bilateral relations between Germany and the US are extremely close. Communications can easily be made back and forth through visits of Ambassadors, without arousing any notice. It is, however, harder to bring a third country into such a collaboration.

The Secretary suggested that the Defense Ministers meeting planned for Washington in January might be a good place to advise the Italians and Dutch about plans for a multilateral nuclear system. In the meantime, letters can be written by the President to Wilson and by Erhard to Wilson.

Schroeder raised the question of contacts with the Italians. Carstens mentioned that they would be in his office day after tomorrow and that he must know what to say. Knappstein referred to the fact that the Italian Ambassador to the United States was breakfasting with him the same day. What would he tell him? Fanfani would be in Washington Wednesday. What should he be told? Schroeder commented that Fanfani was not the best contact possible within the Italian Government. Others would have a more sympathetic view toward a multilateral nuclear system.

Carstens suggested that three of four points might be isolated from the German proposal for disclosure to interested governments: (1) The fact of the force. (2) That it would be subject to common decisions. (3) That no emphasis is being placed on any particular type of weapons for inclusion.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that in his talks with the Chancellor at lunch today,³ the latter had agreed that we must act and not just talk. He advised that the American side would first discuss the matter among themselves, and with the President, before the meeting between the President and the Chancellor and others this evening immediately following the dinner.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by McGhee. A more detailed memorandum of this conversation, drafted by William D. Krimer, is ibid. The conversation was held in Rusk’s office.
2. See Document 119.
3. A 3-page memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO.