157. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Atlantic Policy
On the basis of State Department papers you have been considering the issue of French troops in Germany and the framework for our response to Wilson on the nuclear question.
[Page 371]You have also had available Francis Bator’s observations.
At the moment, I can, perhaps, be most helpful by setting down a few fundamental ideas which I believe are relevant to these matters in particular and the Atlantic crisis in general.
- 1.
- The maintenance of an integrated NATO capable of continuing to deter Moscow is fundamental. Given Soviet missile and conventional capabilities, it is truly a mortal issue. Here I believe Mr. Acheson is wholly correct. It is not a question of clinging to outmoded ideas of the late 1940’s: it is a question of whether we and the Europeans have learned the lesson of two world wars and the whole sweep of modern history.
- 2.
- In order to maintain the political base for this deterrent—under French attack—the U.K. and Germany must be brought closer together. This is the way to look at the nuclear issue. We need to sit down with the U.K. and Germany and quietly guide them to a well-balanced package. The first requirement is tripartite talk; but we should not deceive ourselves that anything will emerge unless we push them tactfully towards a package, including, in particular, the nuclear issue and the defense of the pound.
- 3.
-
On the nuclear issue I have no pet formula. I am
clear, however, on two things:
- a.
- at the moment the Germans do not have the political and psychological base to foreclose a hardware option once and for all, without a major concession from Moscow in the direction of German unity;
- b.
- we ought to put our best thought and imagination into designing a lively nuclear consultation club, hardware or no hardware. The design and negotiation of this consultation club are first priority business on which the whole town agrees.
- 4.
-
We ought to do nothing that need not be done to make
Franco-German relations worse than De
Gaulle has made them. We ought to understand
with sympathy the German desire to keep as much going as possible
between France and Germany. But we also ought to be clear about two
other matters, to the Germans as well as among ourselves:
- a.
- It is Paris, not Washington, that is pressing on the Germans a choice between France and the U.S.;
- b.
- Franco-German friendship can only thrive in larger clubs—like the European Common Market and NATO. It will not work on a bilateral basis, except student exchanges, etc.
- 5.
-
We ought to accompany the NATO reorganization with as many forward-looking
measures in the Atlantic as possible. The case for keeping
NATO is widely understood. But
there is also a correct feeling that we need:
- a.
- More partnership in the Atlantic on issues like money, aid, space, modern technology, Great Society issues, political consultation, etc.;
- b.
-
More East-West bridge-building by Atlantic nations: trade, cultural contacts, etc.
[Page 372]We should not become so overwhelmed with the difficult details of moving NATO, negotiating with the French, facing the issues of French troops in Germany, that we fail to give the whole enterprise a new forward look. Planning is under way; but, unless you insist on its being given a priority equal to other matters, it may be pushed aside as window-dressing. It is more than that. It may determine how positively European parliaments and public opinion react to the new NATO package as a whole. Indeed, the same may be true in the U.S.
- 6.
- I shall, of course, be prepared to comment on specific points and issues as they come forward for your decision. At this time, I thought these broad observations might be helpful.
- 7.
- My only operational proposal is this: that you budget for a small, carefully prepared meeting on the nuclear question shortly after your return to Washington. The town needs your guidance. I believe I can lay it out for discussion in an orderly way.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret.↩