Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

158. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, April 22, 1966, 1720Z.

7054. I saw Couve de Murville this afternoon at five o’clock and he delivered to me the French reply to our aide-memoire of April 12 (text in telegram to follow).² I read the reply and told Couve that I was disappointed that the French Government had not considered it suitable to accept the suggestion we had made for the termination. I said this suggestion would have provided a legal basis for the common consent provided for in the agreements as well as certain additional time to complete practical measures. I added that following my visit this week to some of our bases in France I could tell him that it would be physically impossible to complete the closing of the bases within the time fixed.

Couve said that they were not denouncing the agreements, to which I replied that I thought we should not have a play on words since in effect they were terminating the agreements by unilateral action whereas the agreements specifically provided in four of the cases for their termination by mutual consent if they concurred before the expiration of the treaty. I told him I did not know what the American reaction would be but I could only take note of the fact that his government was in violation of the terms of the existing agreement. I also told him that we could not accept the one year date fixed in the French memorandum and if we did negotiate it would have to be under some form of juridical protest in regard to this date.

Couve said that the date was of course something that could be discussed and that it was not intended to be an absolute fixed date in all cases. I repeated what I had said previously. I pointed out that the reference to military authorities in suggesting Paris as a locale might give the idea that it was a French proposal that it should be a military discussion. Couve said no, this was definitely not the case and the only reason the military had been mentioned was to underline the fact that there were competent American military on the spot here in Paris. He said what they envisaged from their side was Beaumarchais and de la Grandville. I told him that we wouldn’t have any ideas as to our negotiating team until we had accepted the idea in principle.

Couve then asked me what did I think about publishing the aide-memoire and I said as a personal opinion I thought it would be desirable to publish it since there had been a great deal of speculation in the French press as to its contents, some of which had been very close to the mark. Couve said it was immaterial to them whether it was published or not and he had only thought there should be an end to the “polemics” in the press.

It was agreed that the French would publish on Sunday for Monday morning papers unless the Department has other ideas, in which case we will notify the Foreign Office over the weekend. If we hear nothing the French will go ahead with the agreed arrangement.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and passed to the White House and USIA.
2. The French text and the Embassy’s translation were transmitted in telegram 7053 and 7055 respectively, April 22. (Ibid.) For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 336.