Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

156. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, April 17, 1966, 1730Z.

3321. Subj: McCloy talks—meeting with the Chancellor. NATUS.

1. McCloy met this morning for more than an hour and a half with Chancellor Erhard for a discussion of the French troop problem. Also present on the German side were Schroeder, Von Hassel, Westrick and Carstens. The Chancellor’s general approach was firm—as he put it, “Hard if need be” since if De Gaulle were allowed to keep his troops in Germany without commitment while retaining their present status, Germany would suffer a serious defeat with adverse consequences for all of Europe. He showed concern, however, about the strength of public support for a firm policy in the US and among the 14 in general. The Chancellor’s judgment was sober. He thought that De Gaulle probably would not accept the conditions which the Germans, in coordination with their allies, would have to set for the retention of French troops in the FRG. The following account is based on an uncleared memorandum of conversation which will be pouched to the Department tomorrow for transmission to McCloy.

2. In opening the conversation, Erhard said that he had followed with the closest attention the trilateral and bilateral meetings which McCloy had held in Bonn and was in full agreement with the general conclusions reached.² Referring to his earlier talk with McCloy at the Bilderberg conference in Wiesbaden, Erhard said that we must take a very clear—and, if need be, hard—position vis-a-vis the French. “We Germans see no other way out.” It was unprecedented in the post-war period for a Western European country to openly violate its solemn agreements. He thought the situation comparable to that which prevailed at the time of the Munich crisis in 1938. He did not wish to compare personalities, but if we do not stand together at this time the world could go apart. In the case of NATO, maximum cohesion and unity is now required. The Chancellor stated, with emphasis, that it is not only the right of the FRG but its duty not to hesitate in the face of the situation brought about by De Gaulle. It was necessary to draw the necessary consequences no matter how much it might be hoped that De Gaulle in the end would accept a sensible solution.

3. McCloy then outlined for the Chancellor the US views as he had done previously for Schroeder (Embtel 3305). He stressed that De Gaulle by his actions had undermined two basic aspects of NATO—(1) its credibility and (2) its provision of equality for Germany. He was stimulating nationalism which would breed more nationalism. We are left with something of a makeshift. The spirit which led to such major accomplishments in the past as the Marshall Plan, NATO itself and the defense of Berlin has been contaminated. De Gaulle now seeks the primacy of France rather than equality among Europeans. McCloy noted that it would require a high order of statesmanship to preserve NATO. The first test would perhaps be the issue of French troops in Germany. He thought that it was clear from the talks during the past two days that the Germans, British and ourselves were in agreement that if the French troops can play a useful military role it is desirable that they remain. If arrangements are not possible which would assure this, however, they could become a military liability. The President and the Secretary of State had come to the conclusion that the United States should support any position taken by the FRG that recognized the seriousness of the situation and provided an adequate response to the French. The FRG must itself decide the position it wishes to occupy in Europe. We are not thinking in terms of forcing the FRG toward any policy or decision. We only wish to make entirely clear that the FRG has full US support.

4. Erhard expressed satisfaction with this US position. He said that Germany can only accept the presence of French troops under conditions that are satisfactory with regard to their status and their military role. He thought that De Gaulle is also in a difficult position. The General can hardly accept the German conditions for the retention of French troops without going back on the principles underlying his attack against NATO. On the other hand if we hold firm, De Gaulle will not find it pleasant to withdraw his troops. Either way, he will in effect suffer a defeat. The Chancellor thought that De Gaulle at present was playing a poker game. The German side cannot back down on the conditions for the retention of troops, conditions which he thought were those wished by all the other NATO powers.

5. The Chancellor then asked concerning public opinion in the US. Would there be a tendency among Americans to query whether it was worthwhile to bring about a deterioration in Franco-German relations and a weakening of NATO simply because of questions of form and legality? For him there was no question but what the Fourteen must remain firm. If together we do not face the present situation, “we shall not be worth much in the future”. If De Gaulle should be permitted to retain his forces in the FRG uncommitted but with undiminished status this would be a defeat for Germany. The question for Erhard was up to what point would the Fourteen stand firm. What will be the effect of public opinion?

6. McCloy replied that there would be elements in the US who would indeed take the attitude that the issue posed by the status and task of French forces was not of sufficient importance to risk a break with France. Others would be disturbed by the increased status in the Alliance which Germany would attain with France’s withdrawal. Still others would say that the situation in Western Europe was so hopelessly complicated that the best course would be to try to reach an agreement with the Soviets. None of these, however, represented the prevalent attitude in the US. McCloy thought that the American public generally recognizes the stubborn and obdurate attitude of De Gaulle. They feel that our general policy in Europe in the post-war period has been right and they do not like to see the basis of this policy attacked by the French. There is no serious body of public opinion at all in America which would favor a deal with the USSR.

7. Erhard asked if McCloy was convinced that the British would “Join up and stand with us through it all”. McCloy replied that he did not personally know Wilson very well but felt that in the trilateral discussions, Roberts had presented a very good British position. Somewhat later in the conversation Erhard returned to this point and said he wished to make clear he had no doubts as to British loyalty to the Alliance. He has posed the question only because it was so important that the three powers be united if the impression of a bilateral US-German approach was to be avoided. The Chancellor thought this important for the other members of the Alliance. Schroeder interposed that he intended to make a special effort to get to the Dutch and Italians in view of the helpful roles they had played at Brussels (the Italians with a grain of salt, he added).

8. Erhard then recalled that at Bilderberg McCloy had told him that the US has 90,000 overflights annually over France. If it comes to the worst and De Gaulle threatens to withhold permission for these, how can the situation be handled? McCloy said that he had talked with the military men and there was no doubt that the overflight problem caused concern. With modern planes much elbow room is required. The matter is troubling but McCloy did not think our military considered this a determining factor in the situation. An alternative would be found even though, to use the term Schroeder had used in an earlier meeting, it would have to be a makeshift. Moreover, McCloy thought the French were perhaps overplaying their unconcern about possible exclusion from the early warning system. He accepted Schroeder’s view that De Gaulle may not approach this problem from what we would consider a rational basis; but he still felt that the French position was a little “over studied”. Overflights contributed directly to the security of France, a fact which the French cannot completely overlook.

9. Erhard next asked if McCloy thought the financial demands that would be made against the French for the removal of NATO facilities and possibly for debts to the US arising from the war would be of any political value. McCloy said he thought probably not. No one really expects that the French will pay. The idea of reviving old war debts would hardly impede De Gaulle from his present plans. We could in theory claim all the military equipment given to France under the MAP. On the whole, however, McCloy thought that the only two things that would influence De Gaulle were (1) the solidarity of the Fourteen and (2) public opinion in France. Erhard commented that French public opinion seemed to have been more united against de Gaulle on the EEC question than on NATO. McCloy agreed. Erhard then again reiterated that the Germans will not give in to De Gaulle on basic issues. They would do everything to avoid an impression that the FRG was acquiescing in a revival of French occupation. For this reason he felt that the greater probability was that it would not be possible to arrive at a satisfactory agreement with the French.

10. In response to the Chancellor’s question as to the President’s attitude, McCloy said that while he had not had an opportunity to speak directly with the President, the President had personally concurred in the US decision to support fully a strong FRG position.

11. Erhard commented than anyone who knows De Gaulle—as McCloy and he did—realizes that the General is capable of anything. One has to be prepared for the worst. Suppose, he said, we are not able to reach agreement with the French but the French forces stay anyway. What do we do? Schroeder laughingly interjected that the Germans would cut off the electricity, water, etc. Slightly more seriously, Schroeder said that before it reached this point De Gaulle would “mobilize his fifth column in Germany”. Erhard brushed this aside by saying that the fifth column wasn’t very big any more.

12. Turning to the question of the 1954 agreements, Erhard said that he understood there was general unity that these agreements constituted one entity. McCloy said that the US Government was prepared to support the FRG in this position although the legal situation was a complex one. Schroeder added that the British were a bit more differentiated in their attitude because of their concern for the status of Berlin and the Western position vis-a-vis the Soviets. Erhard considered this a very decisive question. If we were to allow others to split up the 1954 agreements we would be “giving trump cards to De Gaulle”. McCloy agreed on the importance of this point and noted that it would be studied in the working group. Schroeder—directing his comments to the Chancellor—said that he thought the simplest and at the same time most persuasive argument was that the withdrawal by France of its forces from NATO commitment inevitably affects the status of their presence in Germany.

13. When the question of possible effect on Live Oak of French actions came up, Erhard said that he could not imagine that De Gaulle would withdraw from all of the powers and rights which France has as one of the victorious powers. He asked in this connection whether McCloy felt that the Soviets take De Gaulle seriously. McCloy replied that the Soviets were intent on exploiting divisions in the West and would utilize France for purpose. In the end, however, they were basically interested in real power. Turning to Schroeder, Erhard asked whether the FonMin had thought of the possibility that De Gaulle might propose a special meeting with Erhard prior to the Moscow trip in order to “put on the thumb screws”. Schroeder said that he had thought of it but that “given De Gaulle’s overriding interest in scenic effect”, he doubted that he would come to Bonn before going to Moscow, and Bonn would be the site of the next Franco-German heads of government meeting. De Gaulle wished to go to Moscow, Schroeder said, with the stage clear.

14. Erhard’s final question was when would the US Government enter into bilateral talks with France regarding our bases there? McCloy said that he did not know precisely. Our general disposition is not to refuse to talk about withdrawing our troops. We have no desire to keep troops in France longer than is necessary if the French oppose them. He had the impression that the legalistic position taken in our reply to the March 29 French aide-memoire was partly a bargaining ploy. We did not intend to drag things out indefinitely.

The conversation ended with the Chancellor asking McCloy to convey his warm greetings to the President.

Hillenbrand

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38–6. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin.
2. McCloy met privately with Schroeder on April 15. This meeting was followed by a meeting of U.S. and West German delegations. (Telegrams 3305 and 3306 from Bonn, April 15 and 16; ibid., DEF 4 NATO and POL 38–6) Later on April 15, Schroeder and McCloy met with British Ambassador Roberts and a second trilateral meeting took place on April 16. (Telegrams 3307, 3312, and 3316 from Bonn, April 16; ibid., DEF 6 FR and POL 38–6) These meetings resulted in the formation of a Bonn Working Group to discuss the question of French forces in Germany and report to their Ministers. The approved report would then be submitted to the other NATO Allies.