155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- The Nuclear Problem in NATO
The crisis in NATO resulting from the French defection seems almost sure to bring the problem of nuclear-sharing to the fore. In fact, the Dutch Ambassador has called at the Department to urge that it be taken up again since France has made discussion possible, and Erhard [Page 364] spoke to George Ball about it ten days ago in Germany. The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest some considerations you might want to think over while you are away. When you come back perhaps Bob McNamara, Ball, Acheson and I might talk with you about them.
I enclose a thumb-nail history of the problem,2 beginning with 1960 and ending with the latest correspondence between you, Erhard and Wilson. The major issue of how the West should handle the nuclear weapon in its common defense has gone unresolved for five years for a number of reasons:
- —The Germans have been uncertain as to how far they might safely claim a nuclear role without antagonizing others, especially France. This has led observers to interpret German desires variously, depending in part on their own predilections.
- —The British have been playing a game. They have been for abandoning their independent nuclear weapon in principle, but against it in practice. They have talked of equality for Germany but have been unwilling to give it. They have advanced the ANF as a substitute for the MLF; then backed away from their own proposal.
- —We ourselves have had to face divisions and uncertainties among our Allies; concern in Congress that a nuclear-sharing proposal would fracture rather than cement the Alliance; and the controversy over non-proliferation.
Of course, the Soviets have blamed, and will continue to blame, the failure to conclude a non-proliferation treaty on Western desires to help Germany “proliferate”.
We have asked ourselves these questions:
- 1.
- Is an early settlement of this problem more desirable than postponement of it? We think the balance is in favor of an attempt to settle it, because delay keeps open the argument between a hardware solution and other solutions and prevents progress toward any solution. The continuance of this problem helps the Russians make propaganda on the proliferation issue. It is building up an issue between the British and the Germans; Chet Holifield believes that the present crisis in NATO creates a possibility of bridging German-British differences in such a way as to minimize Congressional difficulties.
- 2.
- Is it possible to approach this issue without posing a direct confrontation between a “hardware solution” and “consultation” only? We believe this can be done as we outline below.
- 3.
- Should we urge the British and Germans to sit down with us and talk this matter out over several days and at a cabinet level? We believe that in such a talk we could narrow the differences by shaking out the [Page 365] purely bargaining points and by putting into the discussion what the U.S. could and could not do. Our own views may modify the ideas of both of the others on the value of some of their own positions. For instance, whether we would or would not support a “European clause” would affect both the German and the British positions.
- 4.
- The procedure and plan we would like to discuss with you would be along these lines:
To propose tripartite talks in Washington between the Foreign Ministers with military advice. Bob and I would propose to work together in these discussions. We think it would be better if Schroeder, rather than Von Hassel spoke for Germany, and Stewart rather than Healey for the UK.
To discuss at the same time, and not necessarily as alternatives, some form of ANF and a development of the McNamara committee which has made a good start.
To bring British and German ideas closer together and to reduce our own Congressional problem we might try putting together the framework of the ANF and the consultative committee. But we might try a more firm type of assignment of the submarines to a NATO Supremo rather than purchase, and, instead of a European clause, a more realistic commitment to review the whole nuclear situation when Europe achieved some further degree of unity. It is rather fatuous to cause trouble here over a European clause while De Gaulle is vigorously engaged in destroying any immediate prospect of movement toward unity.
We might also try to step up the possibilities of the committee. Fritz Erler, a very sensible German Social Democrat, talks somewhat vaguely of a European influence on the American deterrent going somewhat beyond planning. He does not want to interfere at all in the decisive power of the U.S. President over firing. The participation he appears to want is in the continued creation of weapons systems which a President can fire, including, perhaps, some European production or development work on some of the necessary components. This, plus participation in planning military strategy and some real political strategy in Europe, seem to him to go to the heart of the matter.
An exploration along these lines seems to us to offer promise. The idea would not be to prepare a detailed plan which the Europeans can then unite in criticizing but to devise a path we can gradually unfold to them as a way of escape from their own deadlock and frustration.
These are only preliminary graspings for a line to be taken. When you have a chance to mull them over, we would like to talk with you further in more depth and to obtain your guidance.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it is attached to an April 12 memorandum from Bator to the President, which stated that it was an excellent exploratory memorandum, which had Acheson’s support. Bator added that the procedure and suggested plan in paragraphs 2 and 3 offered a real opportunity to break the existing impasse and would provide a good basis for a reply to Prime Minister Wilson’s letter (Document 149).↩
- Not printed.↩