152. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State1
Ecbus 894. NATUS. Re Depcirtel 1731.2 Subj: Relationship of EEC and NATO crises. Below are Mission’s comments on relationship EEC and NATO crises, analysed from point of view of French and of Five, followed by conclusions re U.S. posture.
French. If French tactics are based on rational evaluation their own interests—not necessarily a safe assumption—it is clearly very much in their interest to keep NATO and EEC crises apart. This means that French have every reason for wanting to avoid blow-up in EEC while they are fomenting major crisis in NATO. There are at least two reasons for this. Looked at from point of view of Moscow trip, it is obviously in De Gaulle’s interest to play a disruptive role re NATO alliance but, by same token (if he wants to maintain pretension that he is somehow speaking for Europe) to avoid an EEC crisis. Furthermore, De Gaulle’s capitulation at Luxembourg showed he recognized that Europe is indeed a popular issue in France which he has to reckon with. Community sources French nationality tell us that there is increasing recognition among affected interest groups in France that De Gaulle’s NATO policy will adversely affect French EEC objectives.
If this analysis is correct, it is clear that pressure is on France, not Five, to be conciliatory on EEC matters. This, by the way, is the exact opposite of the conclusion reached by Luxembourg economic official reported in Luxembourg’s 254 to Department.3 It does, however, represent overwhelming view within Commission and of at least two PermDels (Dutch and German), who have explicitly stated position along these lines.
Results of Council meeting April 5 would seem to confirm that French recognize burden is on them to prevent crisis in EEC. They appear to have pulled back from their earlier insistence that absolute priority must be given to settlement of agriculture financing.
Five. Basic issue which the Five will be wrestling with as NATO crisis develops and becomes more acute will be extent to which they want to move forward in the EEC with a Gaullist France which is pulling out of the whole Western political and security structure. There are signs of this basic concern, such as Luns’ comments in the meeting of the Fourteen in [Page 356] Paris March 29 re the NATO crisis affecting the EEC and the view attributed to Schroeder that agriculture financing should not be finally agreed until De Gaulle returns from Moscow. However, although there is a realistic assumption that evolving NATO crisis cannot help but affect EEC, there is heavy support within Five for not invoking the NATO crisis in the EEC, and for moving ahead with Community business in order to enmesh De Gaulle more and more in European integration and preserve the Community structure for the post-De Gaulle period. This does not at all mean making one-sided concessions to the French on what they want (agriculture financing), but rather an insistence upon meaningful parallel progress on Kennedy Round and other items of interest to Five.
U.S. Active U.S. intervention here is clearly undesirable. However, we should at least attempt to clarify our own views. Mission feels that our preference should be for approach which Five are evolving: i.e., to extent possible, balanced progress on internal Community issues and Kennedy Round, with these issues considered on their merits and no conscious effort made to link EEC and Kennedy Round with NATO crisis. We must, however, also recognize that evolving NATO crisis is bound to affect developments in EEC, especially if as we expect political temperature will mount in NATO crisis. We for our part must not give impression that we regard NATO crisis as a technical, easily compartmentalized affair.
Major conclusion we draw from present situation is that, given fact that de Gaulle, in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] words, “cannot tolerate” an EEC crisis between now and French elections, we have an exceptional opportunity to make progress on our key economic programs. This applies in particular to Kennedy Round, which fortunately has become a major Community issue. An exception to this is monetary reform, which unlike Kennedy Round is not at center of Community bargaining. But on other issues like Kennedy Round which are intimately related to European unity, French will be very much on defensive until after their Parliamentary elections. I believe we should take this very much into account and exploit this tactical position by planning with our friends to seek maximum progress during next year on those issues that are disdained by the General as “grubby” economic matters, but which, he seems to realize, could become politically embarrassing for him if his failure to permit progress led to a new EEC crisis.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, Geneva, The Hague, Luxembourg, Paris, and Rome.↩
- Document 140.↩
- Not found.↩