Office of the Historian

151. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, April 4, 1966, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • France-NATO

PARTICIPANTS

  • Secretary Rusk
  • Secretary McNamara
  • U—Mr. Ball
  • S—Mr. Acheson
  • EUR—Mr. Leddy

1. US Response to French aide-memoire

The State draft of the US reply to the French Aide-Mémoire of March 29 was approved with the addition of a clause at the beginning of the third sub-paragraph of numbered paragraph 5, making it clear that the US [Page 354] intends to remove its facilities from France as promptly as possible in view of the attitude of the French Government.2

2. Relocation of NATO and US Facilities

It was agreed that the North Atlantic Council should move from Paris and that the NATO military headquarters should be co-located with the Council.

It was agreed that the Defense Department should assume the responsibility for preparing promptly a total plan embracing:

(a)
Relocation of all NATO and US bilateral elements in France, taking account of the need for co-locating the NAC and the military headquarters;
(b)
The reorganization of the command structure, having in view the creation of a “Supremo” with command and planning functions over all NATO elements, in lieu of the present separate commands of SACEUR, SACLANT, etc; and
(c)
Assurance of civilian control (via NAC and the Secretary General) over the military elements.

3. French Troops in Germany

It was agreed that:

(a)
If Germany is prepared to insist that French troops may remain in Germany only under existing arrangements and will have to withdraw if the French proceed to decommit these forces from NATO, the US should fully support the Germans and do nothing to dissuade them:
(b)

If, on the other hand, the Germans wish to find some new arrangement which would permit the continuance of French forces in Germany, the US should urge them to incorporate in these new arrangements effective safeguards assuring their use in accordance with NATO requirements and an adequate quid pro quo giving to the other allies in Germany facilities in France such as transit and overflight rights.

State was assigned the task of preparing a position paper along the foregoing lines.

(c)
It was agreed to explore the possibility of initiating US-UK-German discussions on this problem at the Foreign Ministers’ level, possibly in Washington, at an early date. Alternatively, a special US representative might be sent to Bonn for the purpose.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. The time of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)↩
  2. For the final text of the U.S. reply, see Document 154.↩
  3. The participants in this conversation also discussed nuclear sharing. Acheson stressed that the problem had to be settled on the basis of a U.S., British, and West German agreement. The President should decide what he could live with and then authorize the Secretary of State to meet his British and German counterparts to insist on an agreement. Acheson’s views were approved, and Secretary Rusk agreed to pursue the matter with the President. (Memorandum of conversation, April 4; ibid.)↩