Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

150. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 31, 1966, 1640Z.

6415. Now that the full French program on NATO (with certain ambiguities in regard to the French troops in Germany) and on American bases has been fully exposed, I believe a certain number of conclusions in regard to De Gaulle’s policies and actions in this field might be worthwhile, in particular for those who might be briefing for background press or other sources of public media. I would not recommend that any of this be used for attributable briefing:

1. It is perfectly apparent that De Gaulle never had any intention of engaging in any negotiations with the US or his allies for a “reform” of the NATO organization. A check of the record shows that American officials, from President Kennedy (to Couve de Murville), to the Secretary, Ball, and myself, all had on a number of occasions asked De Gaulle exactly what he wished to do in regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Practically on every occasion he said it was too soon to be discussed, but that we would be informed (sic) in good time. De Gaulle obviously was engaged in deliberate utilization of “Ruse” (one of his favorite gambits in international affairs).

Therefore, there is not the slightest validity to the statements of Lippmann, for example, or any other correspondent to the effect that if differently handled we might have produced certain modifications of the organization which would have kept France in. What De Gaulle wanted, and finally achieved, was his total withdrawal from all multilateral aspects of NATO organization while attempting to create the illusion for French and European opinion that he is faithful to the Alliance.

2. The questions as to De Gaulle’s motivations as to timing are still subjects of discussion in Paris. I have yet to find a Frenchman, even a Gaullist, who can give you a satisfactory explanation why De Gaulle, contrary to the general essence of his press conference of February 21, chose to precipitate matters and above all to treat matters of NATO and US bases at the same time and in the same communication. The best guess is as follows:

De Gaulle wished to have the matter settled from the point of view of decision well before the probable date of elections in February/March 1967. He probably recognized that the continuance of the Gaullist majority in the Assembly was not certain and may have felt that a rebuff in these elections might make it very much more difficult for him to do what he wished to do in regard to NATO and the American bases. In any event, he most certainly wished to have the matter disposed of and no longer an issue by the time the electoral period came around. It is probable that his change of tactics, which led him to accelerate the process, was due to his sudden realization that had this been announced after his visit to Moscow he would have been open to the charge, and many French would have believed it, that he made a deal at the expense of his allies with the Soviets. In De Gaulle’s eyes it is one thing to betray the Alliance under his own steam but another to do it in collusion with an enemy.

3. This has been virtually one hundred percent De Gaulle’s own idea. From the scattered bits of information we have obtained in regard to the handling of this it is apparent that the Quai d’Orsay, and to some extent the Defense Nationale, disagreed with De Gaulle’s timing and handling of the matter. It is doubtful if without De Gaulle there would have been any such move in French Government to pull out of NATO so completely as he has done. It is an interesting sidelight on the future of affairs in Gaullist France, where one man can literally dominate not only the policy itself but its execution in the most minute terms without any serious reference to any other body or Parliament. In this connection, it might be mentioned, however, that under French law the denunciation of these agreements and their termination do not require assembly approval.

4. There is absolutely no chance of changing De Gaulle’s mind or modifying his ideas. The only possibility would be to bring about a set of conditions in the Alliance which might affect his future operation of policy.

5. In effect, we (and the other members of the Alliance as well as other nations of the Western world) have a confrontation between two diametrically opposed ideas concerning the conduct of foreign relations in the modern world. On one hand De Gaulle is fanatically a proponent of the idea of independence; that the nation-state is the sole enduring, viable entity in international relations; that this entity is uncompromisable and multilateral arrangements tend to limit its freedom and independence. On the other hand is the concept espoused by the US and other states in the modern world which considers all nations, even the most powerful, as inter-dependent in their relations with other like minded, particularly allied, states. It is not necessary to pursue the two different lines in too great detail since the consequences are obvious. It is only that the recent actions against NATO, while not the only ones, are the most open and manifest expressions of de Gaulle’s idea on this subject.

6. It is obvious that there is not much that we can do except to endeavor to keep the Alliance together to make the necessary physical transfers, and to do this with calm and avoidance of over dramatizing the issue, which would be greatly to De Gaulle’s liking. There is also the very important question of the reaction of French public opinion, which at the moment is still confused and not too clear as to the issue involved and the gravity of De Gaulle’s actions. It would seem to me, and this is the view at least of a number of experienced diplomats in Paris, that there are three points in this procedure which concern, or will concern, French public opinion, they are: (1) the isolation of France in the diplomatic and military sense, (2) the increased weight of Germany in military matters, and (3) the effect on the future of Europe, and particularly the Common Market.

It seems to me in conclusion that it is extremely important that we should be very careful to avoid giving the Gaullists any reason, which they are obviously now looking for, to state that the US is attempting to intervene in French domestic affairs, particularly in connection with the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Therefore, any moves that we make, for example to increase the information program as recommended from here, should be done very discreetly and no action, except those of the government in connection specifically with NATO and bases, should be carried out in such a way as to emphasize the importance of France.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals.