Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

153. Memorandum¹

Washington, April 9, 1966.

MEMORANDUM FOR GUIDANCE OF MR. McCLOY IN HISDISCUSSION OF FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY

The Problem

In its aide-mémoire of March 29,² the Government of France stated that the assignment to NATO of “the French ground and air forces stationed in Germany” will end on July 1, 1966. The French Foreign Minister has advised both the United States and the German Government that France would leave these forces in Germany if the German Government wanted them.

The agreement between France and the United States by which U.S. nuclear weapons are stockpiled for the use of French forces in Germany is by its own terms in effect only while those forces are committed to NATO.

The question of French forces in Germany is primarily of political significance and not one of major military consequence. The United States is in a position to influence, but not determine, the settlement of this question.

How should the United States exercise its influence, and in what direction?

German Position:

The German Government released a statement on April 6 which states:

a) Germany intends to adhere to an Atlantic defense system based on peacetime integration.

b) The Government intends to discuss the complex of questions, including that of the presence of French forces in Germany, in the appropriate NATO forums with all the other NATO partners.

c) The Government regards French troops in Germany as an important element of the common defense and accordingly they should assume a clearly defined mission in the framework of the common defense of NATO and work together, in a way to be agreed, with NATO forces.

d) In reaching an agreement on the stationing of French troops in Germany, all the possibilities of the Franco-German Treaty are to be used after coordination with the American and British governments as well as other NATO governments. This will be done on the understanding that the rights and obligations involved in the relationship of the Federal Republic to these other partners will not be affected.

e) The goal of all efforts must be to maintain in full effectiveness the functioning of the Alliance in the interest of all partners.

f) The German F.O. added orally “that the Cabinet, in addition to approving the public statement, had taken certain other decisions …. A) That if the French withdrew their forces from NATO their right to station troops in Germany must in some way be ended; B) that the same principles must apply to French troops in Germany as to German troops in France; C) other aspects of the status of forces of French troops in Germany must be agreed.”³

These principles apparently indicate the sort of agreement under paragraphs (c) and (d) above upon which the Germans would insist. In other words, in some way or other the French troops in Germany must come under NATO command in time of war, and assume a suitable task in time of peace and suitable participation in planning and liaison. (See Bonn’s 3177 and 3140.)⁴ The Germans appear firm on this.

The British Position:

As reported by the British Ambassador in Bonn’s cable from Ambassador McGhee, it is:

a) Their “overriding interest is not to disturb the framework of the 1954 agreements”.

b) “Satisfactory arrangements must be worked out for the French to revert to NATO command in wartime. This should not be dependent on unilateral French decision.”

The United States Position:

In the discussions in Bonn the United States representative should support the German Government position as stated on Pages 1 and 2. Since the issue relates to the conditions upon which French troops remain on German territory, the German Government must play the primary role. The United States, however, has a strong interest in this issue which affects the security of a large number of its troops and the integrity of the arrangements under which they are stationed in Germany.

The U.S. representative is not authorized to agree to any position or formula which does not include (a) the same undertaking by the French Government as by other governments having troops in Germany to place its troops in Germany under command of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, in the event of conflict involving any of the Allied forces stationed in Germany; and (b) an undertaking to engage in planning so the forces can be used effectively in time of war.

He should further point out that although the immediate conference deals only and in a preliminary way with the question of French troops in Germany, no final settlement of this question should be reached independently of a settlement of the air problems. These include the part to be played by French forces hitherto assigned to the air alert and air defense for Germany as well as the necessary rights for all the Allies to overfly France.

Negotiating Procedures

1) Joint positions should be developed initially among the U.S., UK, and FRG. No final position should be taken without consultation among the fourteen.

2) Discussions will take place in Bonn and a special mission headed by Mr. John J. McCloy will be sent from Washington for this purpose.

Discussion

French forces in Germany presently consist of air and army units comprising about 76,000 personnel. The air units are principally two wings of strike aircraft of two squadrons each, and two Nike Missile Battalions. The army forces comprise two divisions which include two Hawk AAA Battalions.

The French forces are almost reserve divisions, far back from the line and not effectively trained, manned and equipped by U.S. standards. What military value they have is very dependent upon French willingness to put these forces under common command in wartime, engage in joint elaboration of defense plans in peacetime, to cooperate in common post and field training exercises. French forces in Germany in a completely “unattached” condition and without the assignment of U.S. nuclear weapons would have a minus military value if any.

France’s right to maintain its forces in West Germany derives not from NATO arrangements but from a series of agreements dating back to 1945. For example, the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the FRG of October 23, 1954, confirms the French right to maintain its troops in the FRG up to the levels France had there at the time of West Germany’s entry into NATO (i.e., approximately the same as now). Thus, even if France should cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, France can argue that it retains the basic legal rights to maintain troops in Germany. However, the response can be made that, under the complex of the arrangements reached in 1954, the requirement of commitment of troops in Germany to SACEUR is legally binding throughout the FRG and the French forces are subject to that legal requirement.

The French, however, have put the question of the maintenance of their forces in Germany directly to the Germans as a matter of a new agreement, and legal considerations are not likely to arise at the outset. If later on France asserts a right to retain troops as an occupying power, the reaction in Germany will be violent.

1. Source: Department of State, President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to an April 10 memorandum from Ball to the President, which states that both the Departments of State and Defense agreed on the language in the memorandum. In a telegram to the President on April 11, Bator referred to the memorandum as the “draft Ball-Acheson instruction” and noted that it was perhaps tougher than Johnson might have wished. (CAP 66158; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3)
2. See footnote 2, Document 142.
3. On April 6, Foreign Minister Schroeder wrote to Rusk along these same lines and suggested that the talks be held at Bonn. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) On April 8, Rusk thanked Schroeder for the German statement on the French forces, agreeing to hold them in Bonn and naming McCloy as U.S. representative. (Ibid.)
4. Telegrams 3177 and 3140, April 6 and 5 respectively, summarized preliminary talks with the Germans on the question of French troops in Germany. (Ibid., DEF 6 FR)