Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, October 21, 1965, 7:31 p.m.

490. Following highlights of Spaak-Secretary meeting of Oct 19 are based on uncleared memorandum of conversation² and should be considered Noforn:

EEC—Spaak said principal objective now is to get French back to table. Oct 25–26 Brussels meeting of Five and Commission is first step. Purpose of meeting, in Spaak’s view, is to make sufficient technical progress on agriculture to persuade French to reopen discussions. Not possible at this meeting to develop positions on questions of majority rule and Commission’s powers as French have not made specific proposals on these political questions. Principal dilemma, Spaak said, is that Five do not know what De Gaulle has in mind.

Spaak believes French will agree to meet, but not before 1966. In meeting with French, Five must present them with “reasonable proposals”—i.e., modified proposals on agriculture and willingness to explore in depth any French proposals on majority voting and role of Commission. If French decline to cooperate on this basis, Five should react and, difficult as it might be, proceed with EEC of Five. Spaak did not think, however, this eventuality would arise.

NATO—Spaak said that again no one knew what De Gaulle had in mind, and that it important for Fourteen not to leave initiative in his hands, but rather ask French in responsible but firm manner what changes they envisage for NATO. Spaak questioned policy of waiting for De Gaulle to present proposals as one might conceivably have to wait for 3 to 4 years and Europe cannot hold together that long. (Davignon mentioned on another occasion that Spaak was thinking of asking about French intentions in terms of forthcoming December Ministerial Meeting.)

The Secretary stated that NATO must continue with or without France, that US has been working on detailed studies on feasibility of proceeding without France if this is found necessary, that he hoped consultations on this subject with our allies could begin in November. The Secretary also pointed out the US has no interest in a series of bilateral defense arrangements as substitute for NATO and that we have so informed French.³ In this connection he said that Congress and American people would not approve of any such arrangement as in US view European nations together are of interest from a defense standpoint, but France alone, for example, is not.

Memcon being pouched.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BEL–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Robert Anderson and Jay P. Moffat (EUR/WE) and approved by Leddy. Also sent to USEC in Brussels, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, The Hague, London, Rome, Bonn, and Luxembourg.
2. A copy of this 5-page memorandum of conversation is ibid., ECIN 6 EEC; separate memoranda of conversation on NATO and NATO and France are ibid., NATO 3 and DEF 4 NATO.
3. On October 19, Rusk informed Bohlen that the United States had no interest in a bilateral treaty with France and that while the United States opposed West German acquisition of a national nuclear deterrent, the Federal Republic of Germany must be accorded equality within the Alliance. (Telegram 1711 to Paris; ibid., POL 15–1 FR) Bohlen made these points in a conversation with Couve de Murville on October 21 (telegram 2182 from Paris, October 21; ibid., DEF 4 NATO) and in a brief discussion with De Gaulle during a luncheon at Rambouillet on October 28 (telegram 2337 from Paris, October 28; ibid.).