108. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Collective Nuclear Arrangements—the Erhard Visit
From my recent talks in Germany2—with Westrick and Majonica among others—and with Birrenbach this morning,3 I have no serious doubt about the real desires of the new German government regarding a “hardware” solution to this problem. (detailed memo attached)4
They want Germany to participate, multilaterally with the US, the UK and as many other Europeans as they can get, in the common ownership, [Page 262] management and operation of a substantial strategic nuclear weapons system targeted on the Soviet strategic weapons aimed at Western Europe.
They do not in fact believe, whatever we say, that “consultative” arrangements, whether through the Special Committee of Defense Ministers or otherwise, are enough.
Their primary argument is that common ownership and management of a weapon will give them more real influence on United States nuclear decisions in Europe—even though they fully agree we should retain our veto—than any possible consultative arrangement which can be devised. I think they are absolutely right on this.
I also think that giving the Germans, along with the Dutch, Italians and such others as will join, this enhanced participation in nuclear decisions regarding Europe, is the most prudent, safest course we can pursue in an uncertain future.
Mac Mr. Bundy seems to be dead set against this course of action, notwithstanding the many earlier statements to the Germans by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and yourself that we are ready if they are.
I suspect that Mac is mainly concerned about irritating the French. This is reflected in his memos on the subject. But the emerging French policy toward Germany (and toward NATO) is disastrous. If successful, it would destroy the concept of collective effort and restore nationalism as the norm. The worst thing we could do would be to let the French threaten us into following their own policies of division instead of cohesion. The French may flirt with the Russians in order to try to bluff the Germans out of a nuclear arrangement; but that is all. And the Russians will pull out the propaganda stops but in the end will be guided by a cold view of their national interest.
Your position on this issue will be crucial. I know that you stand firmly on avoiding any commitment in a non-proliferation treaty which would preclude a collective nuclear force with German participation. But more than this is now required. In my judgment the understanding resulting from the Erhard visit will either make or break the collective nuclear project; and the decisions on the United States position may well be taken this week in Texas.
I strongly hope you agree that the creation of a collective nuclear weapons system within NATO is in the long-term national interest and that you will take this position in discussions with the President and Secretary McNamara.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy. A copy was sent to Ball.↩
- Leddy visited Europe at the end of October and early November to participate in a regional officers’ meeting and discuss nuclear sharing arrangements.↩
- A 10-page memorandum of Kurt Birrenbach’s conversation with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Mr. Bundy, and Leddy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO.↩
- Not printed. This 3-page memorandum listed recent statements by German leaders on the hardware solution to the nuclear problem.↩