Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

106. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 8, 1965, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• France and NATO

PARTICIPANTS

• Defense
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance
  • Assistant Secretary McNaughton
• State
  • Under Secretary Ball
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Assistant Secretary Leddy,EUR
  • Mr. George Vest, Deputy Director, EUR/RPM
• JCS
  • General Wheeler
• White House
  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
  • Mr. Francis Bator

NSAM

A draft NSAM is attached which incorporates suggested changes as explained below.²

Mr. McNamara thought that the NSAM should begin with a basic statement of objectives which would make it clear that any French actions taken against US installations in France or against NATO are in fact an issue between France and the rest of NATO and not between France and the US. It was particularly important that guidelines for the press should reflect this basic premise. Paragraph one of the attached NSAM embodies this idea.

Mr. Bundy objected to the statement that we would consider Article V of the Treaty no longer applicable if the French ceased to participate constructively in the Alliance. He thought this was an empty threat and that we might as well face the fact that the French will assume that they have our protection regardless of what we say. If the situation deteriorates sufficiently, an Article V decision would be taken later at the top in the light of the circumstances; it should not be stated now, and perhaps appear in The Times. Mr. Ball thought it would be most useful to question the applicability of Article V since this was one of the few areas which might have some effect on the French people. He knew the Secretary felt strongly about this point. It was only reasonable that the French should not profit from Article V if they failed to live up to their NATO commitments under the other articles. The others mostly agreed with him, especially Mr. McNamara who said that if France no longer contributed troops, support facilities, etc., we should not be required to be on record as prepared to defend her. He would have considerable problems with Congress under such circumstances. Ambassador Bruce suggested alternative language which was acceptable to all and is paragraph four of the attached NSAM.

General Wheeler was worried about the possibility that nominal foreign command might be accepted as a principle. This works very well in areas where the local people wish to make it work, for instance in Portugal, but the situation in France would be different and difficult. He accepted Mr. Ball’s suggestion that the phrase “multilateral or formally bilateral” be added to paragraph 5c to cover the point.

At Mr. Bundy’s suggestion the phraseology in paragraph 6 was changed slightly for the sake of clarity to read “the United States should not make the first move in anticipation of possible French actions against NATO. …”

Mr. Bundy said that although language should not be added to paragraph 8 at this stage, he assumed that the President would want to add something concerning his own responsibility for timing and tactics. The President is determined that France should not be allowed to push the US around, but he will want to play the large cards with France himself; particularly he will want to control what is said to the French and when. Mr. Leddy said he assumed that the language to be proposed by Mr. Bundy would relate to discussions with France and would not prevent discussion of contingency planning with others. Mr. Bundy confirmed this. With these comments the group approved the NSAM and the France and NATO paper.

Force Effectiveness

Mr. McNamara was worried that De Gaulle might force us to adjust to a peacetime arrangement which would endanger our wartime capability. He thought there needed to be more studies to check the degree of impairment which might result. There was still time to work on this. Mr. Ball said the most recent estimate is February for the French to lay down “conditions” and then offer to discuss them with us. General Wheeler mentioned that General Ailleret had told General de Cumont that the French want to retain NAC and the MC and an integrated command in Germany but abolish SHAPE and veto its establishment elsewhere, with the timing early next year.

Mr. McNamara said that unquestionably the French attitude and actions would end up in a weakened NATO ability to exercise a conventional option. This is not logically required because even today, if Germany were attacked we would not fall back into France but would have to use nuclear weapons fairly soon. It would be useful to study and see if there are tactical situations in which the FRG is not an automatic shield between France and the Soviets. We can fight a war without France, but the prospect will lead people more and more to accept the likelihood of a “trip-wire” situation. General Wheeler agreed that, although it is militarily acceptable to think of NATO without France, this would have its effect on military concepts.

Germany

Mr. Ball suggested that De Gaulle would increasingly make the point that NATO does not apply to Berlin and would exclude the 1958 Ministerial Council decision.³ The NATO-Berlin relationship needed to be looked at more carefully. Mr. McNaughton asked whether French troops in Germany are there as a result of World War II or of NATO arrangements. He felt that the legal factors here needed to be pinned down too. Mr. Bundy said that obviously the French would play their cards on the theory that the troops are in Germany as a result of the war since this is compatible with their ideas of independence, national sovereignty, less integrated NATO activity, etc. They seemed not to care about the effect their position would have on the Germans.

Bargaining Assets

Mr. Bundy observed that we seem to have a very skimpy bag of assets with which to threaten or bargain with the French. Mr. Ball agreed and recalled De Gaulle’s viewpoints: We are natural allies; France does not need nuclear allies because he does not believe that today there is a threat of nuclear war; also he does not need allies with conventional forces because he considers France automatically protected by German geography. Mr. McNamara thought, since there was so little bargaining power in the military side of the Alliance, we should look at the European economic relationships for levers. Messrs. Ball, Leddy and Bator saw little chance. There might be disadvantageous counter-effects if the US tried to push into the EEC situation. The best hope was to attempt to stiffen Erhard’s spine. Mr. Bundy expected that De Gaulle might try to blackmail the Germans by offering them a moderately acceptable EEC settlement if they would agree to diminish NATO relationship. Mr. Ball saw no sign of it yet. Ambassador Thompson said that although nobody could be sure how our allies would react as the pressures increased, one thing is certain—their disposition will be to try to keep France in the Alliance at a considerable cost, probably under terms which would be very difficult for us.

Mr. Bundy said that, in dealing with our allies, we were going to have to probe delicately to find out what our real choices are, to discover whether the Belgians, divided as they are, are really going to be ready to accept new NATO responsibility in the face of French pressure. The Netherlands would be stronger as a government, but poorer geographically. Mr. McNamara reminded that one way to get Belgian support was money; i.e. to pay the Belgians for support services, to buy Belgian meat, etc. Mr. Bundy questioned whether the FRG is truly ready to look at the issues and make cold, hard decisions. Mr. McNamara thought it would be important to make it clear to the Germans that the result of French actions might be to weaken the NATO military setup so that the US would find it increasingly difficult to maintain the present level of US forces in Europe. In other words, the problem is not merely that the US may be pushed out of France and into Germany but rather that the conventional NATO strength would be so substantially weakened in the next two years that it would no longer be reasonable for the US divisions to stay in Europe. Mr. Bundy commented that, in spite of the military weakness which might emerge two years hence, he thought all the factors, political and otherwise, would lead the US to continue its present policy toward Europe.

Tripartite Talks

Ambassador Bruce asked how in the period ahead the US should try to exercise its power and with whom. He thought we would make no headway in the European context until we had worked out clear understandings with the UK and the FRG to which the other NATO members could subscribe. Mr. Bundy agreed and thought there should be another meeting of the group in the following week to go over the proper subjects for such tripartite discussions.⁴

Mr. Leddy suggested that the subjects should be: (1) the long-term financial problem (pound support and troop maintenance); (2) the collective nuclear problem; (3) non-proliferation; (4) NATO and France; (5) East-West relations; and (6) German reunification. We would first sound out Stewart and Erhard. Then he envisioned high-level talks backed up by technical teams for each of the major subjects. He recognized there would be a problem of publicity. Timing should be sometime late in the winter.

Mr. Bator suggested two other items for the list: (1) an Atlantic Arms Market and (2) the Liquidity Problem.

Mr. Bundy said we should work out clear-cut US policies toward each of these areas in advance, something we do not yet have. We also have to keep in mind the cosmetic effect of this activity, which means there should be solid, hard talks separately with both the UK and the FRG before we go into triangular talks.

Mr. McNamara approved trilateralism as a substitute for NATO as a means of concerting power. He thought we should try to use this technique wherever possible. He had already revised his ideas about the Select Committee in this regard, and was prepared to have any number join but use a tripartite group to coordinate and run it behind the scenes. Mr. Leddy warned that we should be prepared for problems with Italy. Mr. Bundy said he assumed we would be trying to carry through tripartite efforts in real terms while appearances would be played down as far as possible to take account of the pride of the other countries.

Mr. Ball said that the UK Foreign Minister would be here for talks the following week. He and Mr. Leddy would see our Ambassadors from the NATO countries on October 25–26. Thereafter we would have papers prepared to get ready for tripartite conversations.

Mr. Bundy said that it would be useful to have clear in our own minds in what order we wanted to talk about the various subjects. Then we could inform the Germans quietly before they came here. He particularly was interested in going further into the nuclear problem. Mr. McNamara suggested that Messrs. Ball, Mr. Bundy and himself should meet sometime in the following week on the nuclear problem.

At Mr. Ball’s request, Mr. Leddy explained a proposal which he thought might prevent a German national nuclear force and might also be acceptable to Congress. This would include a tripartite statement of principles presenting a collective nuclear force as part of an overall approach to non-proliferation, etc. The nuclear force would be commonly controlled, financed and operated, that is, mixed-manned. The weapons group would include the V-Bombers (mixed-manned), some US and the UK submarines (mixed-manned when no security risk would be involved) and a provision for mixed-manned surface ships in principle but with implementation to take place only when it is agreed surface ships are effective and relatively invulnerable. The force would be commonly financed, but if the necessary mixed-manning were not achieved in a given time, there would be a sliding scale for a reversion of costs. He agreed to send a brief paper explaining this idea to both Mr. McNamara and Mr. Bundy.

Attachment⁵

DRAFT NSAM

SUBJECT

• France and NATO

This NSAM provides the framework and guidance for further discussions with our Allies in dealing with prospective French actions against NATO.

1. The basic premise in the US consideration of this problem is that any French action taken against US installations in France or against NATO is in fact an issue between France and the rest of NATO and not between France and the United States.

2. The United States remains committed both to the NATO Alliance, as embodied in the 1949 Treaty, and specifically to NATO as an organization.

3. The US will not be willing to substitute for an integrated NATO a system of bilateral security commitments incorporating the substance of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

4. If France should cease to participate constructively in the organization and activities of the Alliance, the US security commitment given in Article V will obviously have to be re-examined by the President, so far as it relates to France.

5. The United States, while remaining prepared to examine French proposals for reform of NATO, will develop its contingency planning with the other thirteen NATO Allies. In this regard, the objectives of US policy are:

a. To carry on the common effort with the remaining Allies in NATO regardless of French willingness to participate fully in Alliance activities or French actions which would substantially impair NATO effectiveness.

b. To maintain the defensive capability of NATO forces, including the viability of the “Forward Strategy”, and to achieve the optimum military posture attainable in light of French actions.

c. To preserve the concept of integration, particularly integrated command and combined planning, in NATO. Modifications in existing relationships, multilateral or formally bilateral, which may be proposed by the French should be considered on their merits; however, the US will resist proposals which significantly impair the peace-time or war-time military capability of the Alliance.

d. If forced by France to abandon facilities on French soil, to relocate those forces and facilities essential to the defense of NATO territory.

e. To facilitate the ultimate return of France to status of full participating member of the Alliance.

f. To achieve a common position through consultation with our Allies before any steps are taken in response to French action against NATO or US forces and facilities in support of NATO.

g. To make clear to the other Allies that in addition to the defensive measures set forth in this NSAM the US is prepared to explore and cooperate in affirmative actions which strengthen the Alliance.

6. The United States should not make the first move in anticipation of possible French actions against NATO or US facilities in France, but should seek through continuing consultation with our Allies a common appreciation of French moves looking toward collective action when and if a confrontation with France becomes unavoidable. In these consultations we should be careful to make it clear that we are not endeavoring to organize the other NATO countries in a campaign to isolate France or to initiate action against France.

7. Priority should be given to examining contingency alternatives with our other Allies to determine how and when we should jointly respond to French moves. The primary purpose of Allied consultation should be to establish a consensus among the 14 that the French threat is real and that an understanding must be reached in principle now on the necessity for meeting this threat, if it develops, on a collective basis. Further specific discussions should be held on relocation problems with our Allies, with special attention to those countries most directly affected, e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, the UK and Italy.

8. The Department of State is responsible for coordinating US Government efforts on this problem.

1. Source: Department of State, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vest and approved in U on October 15. The conversation was held in Under Secretary Ball’s office.
2. On October 4, Ball transmitted to Bundy the texts of a draft NSAM on France and NATO, dated September 25, and a 22-page paper entitled “France and NATO,” also dated September 25. Except for the changes noted in this memorandum, the September 25 draft NSAM is the same as the approved text attached here. (Ibid., POL 1 EUR W–FR) The draft was scheduled for discussion with the President on November 11, but he did not approve nor circulate it as U.S. Government policy. (Memorandum from Leddy to Rusk, November 9; ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265)
3. For text of the North Atlantic Council declaration on Berlin, December 16, 1958, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 560.
4. No record of another meeting of the group has been found.
5. Secret.