105. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals1
CA–4576. Subject: NATO Secretary General Brosio’s Visit, October 5–6, 1965. The following summary is based in part on uncleared memoranda of conversations. It is for information only and its contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials.
This airgram summarizes the principal subjects discussed during the recent visit to Washington by NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio. Mr. Brosio met with the Secretaries of State and Defense. He also met with other Departmental officers, including Under Secretary Ball and [Page 249] Assistant Secretary Leddy, and he stopped briefly at the President’s office to exchange greetings after a talk with McGeorge Bundy.2 The basic issues for discussion included: (1) France and NATO, (2) Nuclear Sharing, (3) Select Committee, (4) Infrastructure, (5) NATO Force Planning, (6) NATO Personnel, (7) Vietnam, and (8) the December Ministerial Meeting. The recurrent themes of the visit were France-NATO and the nuclear problems.
In contrast to last year’s visit which was his first to the United States as NATO Secretary General, this was a “working” visit with few formalities.
1. France and NATO
Secretary General Brosio said he felt the French attitude had changed recently. It has been generally known before that the French were ready to stay in the Alliance, although they were dissatisfied with the organization. His impression was that France was now disturbed by the German position. The French had offered the Germans reconciliation and had felt they, in return, deserved German support, particularly for the force de frappe. When it became clear such support was not forthcoming, the French turned to the Soviets. The Secretary General was uncertain whether the approach to the Soviets was meant to put pressure on the Germans or was actually the first step for uniting Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. He said the Alliance could not wait for France but must move forward where possible.
In conversations with Mr. Leddy and Mr. Ball, the Secretary General was worried that the French would try to keep US-French differences over NATO in the bilateral channel. It was made clear to him that the U.S. considered this to be a France-NATO problem and not solely a bilateral one. When the French make their proposals we would want to consult other NATO members at an early stage and work out with them how to handle the problem. He was told in general terms of the U.S. tentative studies and of our preliminary conclusion that it would be feasible to relocate facilities in the low countries, backstopped by bases in the UK, if this should become necessary. It would, of course, be expensive and take about three years to accomplish. There would have to be intensive consultation with our Allies before any moves could be undertaken. He was urged to look into contingency steps for facilities and activities under his own responsibility. Brosio asked to be kept informed of the progress of U.S. contingency plans and was assured he would be kept up-to-date.
[Page 250]Mr. Brosio was glad to note the U.S. position remained that we would try not to provoke a confrontation with the French but were planning in order to be prepared for all contingencies. He was told we are ready to wait until the French wish to make suggestions. He replied that we would continue to press the French to come forward with their ideas.
2. Nuclear Sharing
Secretary General Brosio sought reassurance that the U.S. had not abandoned the ANF/MLF concept and asked our views on its relationship to the Select Committee. He emphasized nuclear sharing was a central problem for the Alliance. He was concerned about the “German problem,” making clear he was convinced that Germany must share nuclear responsibility within a NATO framework, otherwise she would in time wish to develop her own capability.
He was assured that we recognized that the NATO nuclear problem would not go away. We see ANF/MLF and the Select Committee as two activities, independently valid and parallel. We are still interested in the ANF/MLF or whatever variation will satisfy our Allies, particularly the Germans. We expect to know more about the situation after Erhard’s visit to the United States. We agreed with Brosio that if the FRG did not have more of a voice in nuclear affairs, it would in time be driven toward a national nuclear force.
In this connection, Brosio brought up the question of non-proliferation, saying there was no danger that either the U.S., Russia, or France would disseminate nuclear weapons information, that it would be easy for Russia to sign a non-dissemination pact as she had no intention of disseminating anyway. The problem thus was not one of dissemination but rather of inducing the Third World of non-nuclear states not to acquire a nuclear capability. Meanwhile all that non-proliferation could do would be to give the Soviets a chance to press to weaken the Alliance.
3. Select Committee
This was discussed primarily with Secretary McNamara. Mr. Brosio stated his belief that the Select Committee would have to be constituted on a larger base than originally anticipated. He wondered if he should not chair such an “open-ended” group, although this might cause trouble with the French. In any event he believed the French would not participate. Mr. McNamara suggested that, in order to avoid a problem with the French, it might be better for the Secretary General not to chair the meetings. He suggested as an alternative a rotating chairmanship from among the Ministers of Defense. Brosio thought he would probably not attend but would rather send a member of the Secretariat to observe. He thought the French might just possibly attend Select Committee meetings if the ANF/MLF were not discussed. To this Mr. McNamara replied that, although we have no objection to the French being there, the [Page 251] agenda should be for the other members to decide and he could not agree to restrict discussion in order to bring the French in. Mr. Brosio agreed with this position. He urged that the U.S. come up with specific proposals to ensure that the first meeting would be a success. Mr. McNamara said the U.S. would work on an agenda and be ready for a meeting in the second half of November.3
4. Infrastructure
Brosio said he was having great difficulty in getting Europe to accept a larger share. He stated he did not think the U.S. should go below 25% in its support of NATO. He believed it would be impossible to persuade the Allies to agree to a formula which would give us less. He said if he could be assured we would not seek to go below a flat 25%, he would undertake to squeeze the British and the Germans and try to get acceptance of such a solution. This question was left to be worked out further in Paris between Ambassador Cleveland and Brosio.
5. NATO Force Planning
Brosio noted that there are two questions—what the Ministers should decide in December and what the Allies are heading toward in the future. Mr. McNamara thought that force goals for years had been fictitious, particularly with reference to the logistical support aspect. He did not plan to raise the point at the December Ministerial Meeting that the BRAVO goals cost too much. His preference would be to change the goals to make them more realistic; an alternative would be to label them “Tentative Objectives” and to complement the statement of tentative objectives with the recommendation that the nations should report their plans to meet the goals in the qualitative as well as quantitative sense. Then Ministers could act on the data in May.
Brosio defended the responsibility of the NATO military authorities to make honest recommendations which would naturally be more than what countries would spend. Furthermore, he pointed out that NATO does not have the political power to decide on goals other than those recommended by the military authorities. He asked about the relationship between the contingency studies and forces. Mr. McNamara said that the studies may show that the goals are not right or that the configuration of [Page 252] forces is not right. In his view, NATO plans were not adequate and he did not want studies limited to the flanks. The DPWG was doing important work and it should continue its contingency studies.
6. NATO Personnel
Brosio asked that the U.S. and U.K. resolve between themselves which should provide the next Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure. He pointed out that this was a key senior staff position which he needed to settle so he could fill a number of important secondary posts as well. He hoped the U.S. would consider filling the secondary post of Deputy to the ASYG for Political Affairs which he thought was one of the most influential on the International Staff. He was told that we thought ours the better candidate and that we would discuss the problem with the British.
7. Vietnam
Brosio was worried by the attitude of Europeans toward the American effort. He said his position was clear, that Alliance members should support the U.S. and that he intended to go on stating this position. He expressed concern at rumors that the U.S. might escalate the situation in Vietnam before long. He suggested it could be helpful to have further NAC discussions on this subject. This suggestion was welcomed, but with the proviso that there be no question of submitting American decisions in this area for NAC approval or veto. He was assured of U.S. willingness to discuss Vietnam at any time—on brief notice.
8. December Ministerial Meeting
It was suggested that traditional arrangements for Ministerial Meetings wasted some of the Ministers’ time and that it might be worthwhile for Defense Ministers to have private sessions while the Foreign Ministers review the international situation. Brosio said he would consider this suggestion. As for the general approach to France in the course of the meeting, he thought he and the Americans were in agreement. No one wanted to act in such a way as to invite a confrontation with the French and everyone, including the Canadians themselves, thought it would be undesirable to continue with the Canadian State of the Alliance initiative.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Julius W. Walker (EUR/RPM), cleared by Vest and EUR, and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USRO.↩
- Memoranda of Brosio’s conversation with Leddy and Ball on October 5 are ibid., DEF 4 NATO. Memoranda of his conversations with Rusk in New York on October 7 are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. No records of the conversations with McNamara, Bundy, and the President have been found.↩
- On October 4, Rusk discussed the Select Committee with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin, who wanted to know how it might work. Secretary Rusk said that while the committee was not the ideal instrument for solving all nuclear problems, it would be useful in exploring some elements. Speaking frankly, Rusk then went on to address the state of the Alliance. NATO was, he said, “made up of minority governments, fragile coalitions, and brittle configurations. The governments of NATO are too weak to lead and too weak to follow. The United States has welcomed the election results in Germany not out of any favoritism for the political parties involved but because the German Government has been strengthened.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, DEF 12 NATO)↩