Office of the Historian

104. Memorandum of Conversation1

SecDel/MC/45
New York, September 27, 1965, 6 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September–October 1965

SUBJECT

  • MLF and Non-Proliferation

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • Secretary Rusk
    • Mr. Emmett B. Ford, Jr.
  • Dutch
    • Foreign Minister Luns
    • Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. J.A. de Ranitz

Luns asked the Secretary whether the U.S. was still keen on MLF. The Secretary recalled that MLF was an attempt to respond to an initiative taken in Europe in 1960. Our temperature with regard to MLF largely depends on the current attitude in Europe. While there are those who say that we should take the lead, we can’t lead if others are not willing to follow.

Luns said that he still felt that if Germany were given possession of a nuclear deterrent we would be on the brink of war with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said that giving Germany a nuclear deterrent would also serve to break up NATO. He mentioned in this connection the fact that De Gaulle is seeking to keep Germany in a secondary position in Europe.

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Luns said he believed that MLF should not be abandoned. He looks upon MLF as a means of holding NATO together.

The Secretary replied that MLF or something close to it is certainly necessary. He pointed to the long-range trend in German attitudes. Even Brandt had recently talked about not having a second-class industry. Given the attitude of De Gaulle on Germany, we would invite another Hitler in another ten years.

The Secretary mentioned also that the leaders in certain European countries must consider nuclear weapons from an operational point of view or they will lose touch with reality. He mentioned the fact that some of these leaders tend to think of nuclear deterrent without giving any thought to what would happen to the areas which they are trying to defend in the process of nuclear exchange.

Luns said that under no circumstances can we give the Soviets the impression that we will not use nuclear weapons but that there we must draw the line.

The Secretary said it must also be remembered that the nuclear decision is probably the last decision which leaders in North America would ever make. The assurance lies in the megatonnage which exists in Germany. In this respect the Athens guidelines seem very realistic.

Luns concluded that the MLF is a political instrument which will both aid us in preventing proliferation and serve to strengthen NATO.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Secret. Drafted by Ford and approved by S on October 25. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled “Part 3 of 4.” Memoranda of conversation on NATO, the EEC, and a Dutch request for military and nuclear technology are ibid.↩