Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

103. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)¹

Washington, September 23, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Hillenbrand Study on Nuclear Problems of the Alliance:² Information Memorandum

I have the following general comment on the Hillenbrand study:

The implications of a number of statements, in their collective weight, give the paper a tone and cast that I consider to be misleading with regard to the possibilities of some combination of ANF and MLF as a major component in a solution of the Alliance nuclear problem. Specifically:

1. The statement that the President has doubts about the ANF/MLF arrangement should be considered against the different tone of all official statements of policy approved by him—the December 8 Comments paper, NSAM 322, and the press conference of January 16.³

2. The statement that Congress has voiced serious objections should be considered against the background of virtually no Congressional briefings on the NATO nuclear problem as it stands today.

3. The weight of references to opposition by De Gaulle and the Soviets should be qualified by a realization that these objections go to the root and principle of the idea of a stronger NATO rather than to any specific plan.

4. The statement of U.S. policy as one of firm opposition to mixed-manning of submarines is at variance with the NSAM 322 policy statement that it is not precluded.

5. The statement that the “ANF/MLF approach is incompatible with certain of our major objectives stated in Section II” is not documented and in my view not necessarily true in the case of any one of these objectives.

In tone and emphasis there are other features of the study that tend in the same direction—specifically:

1. “Consultative” solutions are treated on the same plane as participation in weapons systems. This seems to me to overlook the fundamental distinction that consultation cannot be equated in its political efficacy with meaningful responsibility and that meaningful responsibility involves, as a minimum, a right by Europe to veto the use of a significant part of the Western deterrent if its proposed use is too much at variance with European concepts of timing, strategy or targeting. This inevitably means hardware. And, equally inevitably, it means a segment of hardware less than the whole U.S. deterrent, which we could not responsibly subject to such a veto. A consultative solution relating to the entire deterrent, however ingenious, is incapable of meeting these criteria.

2. Some of the specifics of tactics and timing, insofar as they follow from the premises I have criticized, seem likewise to downgrade the most promising approach to that of least promising. There is mention of a possible decision to “let the ANF/MLF concept die on the vine or keep it in reserve while moving ahead on some other arrangement”. There is mention of giving priority to overall aspects as compared to nuclear sharing. In my view both the Select Committee and the Paris Working Group should proceed in parallel with equal emphasis and with a business-like pace and purpose. Adjustments to overall tactics should be in timing of their reports, not the pace of their work. There is no danger that either group will run out of problems to consider.

These relatively specific objections should not, however, obscure the fact that this study gives support to many of the major themes and ideas which have needed to be said by an interdepartmental panel. With only minor points of wording or clarification we could, for example, accept all of the summary conclusions as stated at the beginning of the paper. Its emphasis on German expectations regarding ANF/MLF will make good reading in other agencies, its stress on the need for U.S. leadership at the proper time is salutary; its stress on inter-relationships to the Common Market crisis, the UK financial crisis, and strategy on France and NATO is useful; its emphasis on a variety of parallel approaches as opposed to a single solution is realistic, as is its conclusion that no single preferred course need be decided now. Even in most specifics the judgments expressed are those this Bureau agrees with (utility of sharing R&D, need to deepen consultation on specific nuclear problems, doubtful value of European land-based MRBM’s or US-based systems for political purposes, undesirability of new NATO strategic command, desirability of a NATO Defense Minister, desirability of a “political umbrella”).

Most cogent of all, perhaps, is the support the study gives to US–UK–FRG talks to develop an overall approach as regards both substance and tactics on the inter-related economic, political, and military aspects of the Alliance problem at this juncture. In short, the report represents a useful contribution to thinking on the problem.

My own tentative and general conclusions as to a course of action on the basis of a first reading of the Hillenbrand paper and the staff study prepared in the Department which you sent to Mr. McNamara on September 22,⁴ are as follows:

1. First priority should go to scheduling and preparing for a series of US–UK–FRG bilateral and trilateral meetings on overall strategy and the inter-relationships of Alliance problems along lines set forth in my memorandum to you dated August 19, 1965 (copy attached).⁵ We should seek approval of a scenario and schedule before the end of the month.

2. Suitable machinery (not too cumbersome) for preparation of positions should be worked out at an early stage. EUR might assume responsibility for development of positions within the Department and for coordination as appropriate with other departments.

3. The examination of positions and alternatives should include a hard look at mixed-manning of UK submarines as the key element in breaking the log jam on sharing and a German financial contribution to UK submarines. A breakthrough on this point could enable us to see our way through to practical prospects for a solution of at least the “hardware” component of the complex, and that is the central one.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. Drafted by Baker.
2. The Hillenbrand Study or Report, transmitted to Under Secretary Ball on September 21, comprised a 12-page memorandum on the Atlantic nuclear problem and a 41-page paper on the nuclear problem of the Alliance with an annex and summary conclusions. A copy of the study, which is summarized in this memorandum, is ibid., DEF(ANF).
3. The December 8 paper is the Attachment to Document 61. NSAM No. 322 is Document 65. For a transcript of President Johnson’s press conference on January 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 54–60.
4. Not found.
5. Not attached, but a copy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF).