Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, September 12, 1966, 1:25 p.m.

44917. Ref: Saigon 5517.²

1. We find Lewandowskyʼs thinking as conveyed by DʼOrlandi very interesting but not always lucid. Would like you to discuss some of these ambiguities with DʼOrlandi and suggest that he explore them further with Lewandowsky, hopefully not waiting until DʼOrlandi has his “possible agreement formula” worked out. In ensuing paragraphs puzzling items are identified, together with points we would like to have you make to DʼOrlandi.

2. Lewandowskyʼs remark that the aim of the exercise should not be to “reinforce the status quo” is all right if he is talking about the present status quo in South Viet-Nam. But we cannot buy a discarding of the status quo ante, i.e. the 1954 and 1962 Agreements. We have had so many experiences in the past 20 years with the Communists saying “What is mine is mine and is not discussable; we must talk about dividing what is yours”. You may add for DʼOrlandiʼs own information that we do not rule out consideration of revisions of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements but we could accept no changes until we had a clear picture of what was the total context of an understanding with the Communists.

3. As you have already indicated DʼOrlandi can reassure Lewandowsky that we are not thinking of South Viet-Nam as a piece of a general Chinese puzzle; nothing is further from our minds than the idea that we should try to settle the China question somehow in Viet-Nam. However, DʼOrlandi should be aware of our concern about Lewandowskyʼs statement that “the problem could be simple enough if limited to South Viet-Nam”. North Viet-Nam is inevitably involved if there is to be any lasting settlement in South Viet-Nam. At the same time we must be very careful not to accept the idea that North Viet-Nam has a full right to sit in on the disposition of the internal political arrangements within South Viet-Nam (for example the points mentioned Para 2 reftel) just because it has sent 19 regiments where they have no right to be.

4. FYI. As you know our hope is that the GVN will be able to improve successively its position as the sole governmental authority in South Viet-Nam and will be able to dispose of as many as possible of the problems mentioned in Para 2 as a government dealing with a dissident group within its borders. This is process which we are hoping to get underway at the earliest possible moment pursuant to Deptel 23182 of August 5.³

5. Re Para 7 we remain skeptical as to whether Hanoi and even Warsaw likely to choose the Lewandowsky-DʼOrlandi channel for substantive negotiation. We do nevertheless want to do nothing to discourage this channel but somewhere along the way we suspect we will reach point where we will not be able to be more concrete about our positions unless we have better evidence that Lewandowsky empowered to speak for Hanoi and that they are ready to go beyond standard positions. Nevertheless we will consider here whether there is something that could be given to DʼOrlandi for his “possible agreement formula” which could demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and smoke out Hanoiʼs intentions. This might lie, for example, in realm of mutually-timed withdrawal formula, or quid pro quo on cessation of bombing and halt in expansion US forces against end to infiltration by Hanoi.

6. Please continue keep us closely informed of any indications of what Lewandowsky really in position do. For moment we would prefer you not even mention to DʼOrlandi possibility sweetener for his “formula” mentioned in preceding paragraph.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, and Harriman; and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 251–252.
2. Document 227.
3. Document 203.
4. Lodge replied in telegram 5965, September 14, summarizing a long session with DʼOrlandi during which Lodge clarified the points raised in this telegram. According to DʼOrlandi, Lewandowski was “not interested in de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would lead to a settlement and which would at the same time perpetuate the personnel of the present government.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 252–253)