Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

227. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 8, 1966.

5517. 1. DʼOrlandi told me that in his recent talk with Lewandowski, the problem referred to in my last telegram² regarding Lewandowski and DʼOrlandi working up a proposal to submit to Washington and Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points:

A. He did not want the only outcome of the procedure between DʼOrlandi and himself to be to inform the United States as to “just how far the North Vietnamese would give in.”

B. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I had already given him ample assurances, he feels that emphasis must be given to the need of the U.S. approaching the problem so as to concern South Viet-Nam alone and not South Viet-Nam as a “piece of a general Chinese puzzle.” Lew-andowski feels that the problem could be “simple enough” if limited to South Viet-Nam—but not if the United States is thinking of using conversations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowskiʼs talks in Hanoi) as a way of getting at China or Chinese questions. I quickly assured DʼOrlandi that, of course, we were solely interested in suppressing the aggression in South Viet-Nam and in nothing else. DʼOrlandi said that not only did he realize this, but that Lewandowski did too. (Comment: Perhaps Lewandowski has had this point impressed upon him in Hanoi or elsewhere. It is a curious angle, as I, of course, have never said or even implied anything to justify his admonition. End comment.)

C. Lewandowski said that it was only fair to state that the “aim of the exercise” between him and DʼOrlandi should not be to reinforce the status quo, but to get a “global” settlement. When he says “global,” he obviously does not mean worldwide; he means “over all” as regards South Viet-Nam. This, said DʼOrlandi, quoting Lewandowski, means “guarantees, etc.”; therefore “not just deescalation.”

2. When I asked DʼOrlandi what this meant, DʼOrlandi, for illustration, said that it could mean “elections;” “a new government;” “settlement with the Viet Cong.”

3. Lewandowski went on to say that the purpose of his discussions with DʼOrlandi would not be to inaugurate a “socialist” regime in South Viet-Nam; it would not be to get a “cease-fire” and still less a “standstill.” (Comment: In the light of para 3, the “settlement with the Viet Cong” mentioned in para 2 must refer to some governmental arrangement and not to military operations. End comment.)

4. DʼOrlandi told Lewandowski: “I have very clear cut instructions as I have already told you, and they are: be useful, or go home. Fanfani has instructions for me and Rapacki knows what they are. We may, of course, rule out an agreement confirming the status quo since this would be nothing more than the former approach. The fact is that either you and I are going to have these conversations or else nothing is going to happen at all anywhere concerning Viet-Nam. I was flatly told in Rome that you were to do something with me, and that it was you who wanted the conversation to go on with Ambassador Lodge.”

5. Lewandowski said he was sure that something could be done. Hanoi, he said, looks at the situation through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong through whom they get all their information about the situation. “My job,” said Lewandowski, “is to explain to Hanoi that they have a wrong view.” The last time he had been in Hanoi neither Pham Van Dong nor General Giap were there, and “they are the only two in the whole place who talk sense and understand the real situation in the south.”

6. This was the end of the conversation. DʼOrlandi says he was going to puzzle over a possible agreement formula and when he has figured something out, he will get in touch with Lewandowski. No date has been set for their next meeting.

7. DʼOrlandi is sure of one thing: Lewandowski absolutely does not want the conversations stopped. DʼOrlandi surmises that the Communist intention is to state that there is no hope; for the record to break off all conversations; adopt an attitude of nothing doing; and then to have the kind of “non-talks,” to paraphrase the late E.E. Cummings, with DʼOrlandi of which this telegram treats. They would not only want to be able to deny publicly that they are having talks, they want to deny it to everybody privately. It is real “double talk”; if not “double think.”

Lodge

1. Source: Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:29 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 250–251.
2. Telegram 5229, September 4, which reported that, according to DʼOrlandi, “Lewandowski had returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts Pham Van Dong and General Giap were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There was absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 249–250)