Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, August 5, 1966, 8:08 p.m.

23182. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. State 21944.²

1. In this message I would like to put before you longer range GVN program mentioned ref State tel. I would appreciate your giving this overt program intensive study at your earliest convenience and telling me how you feel it might most effectively be promoted with GVN (with such modifications as you consider desirable) for execution at appropriate moment.

2. We have touched on certain elements of this plan in past, notably through Deptels 2534 of last February³ and 5454 of July 11,⁴ in conversations when you were last in Washington and in paper (Item 17) prepared for that visit⁵ and, we understand, it was discussed by you with Henry Kissinger during his recent visit to Saigon.

3. The essence of the program would be an approach to VC/NLF personnel, individually and collectively, to promote their reconciliation with GVN and reincorporation in body politic. As we see it now, and subject to your views, the approach would be in the form of a proclamation by the GVN PriMin or Chief of State offering the VC/NLF in return for the surrender of its arms and the abandonment of its insurgency, amnesty for its members and their right to participate in the political process as well as possible material rewards. Specifically the proclamation might follow these lines: Sketch out the origins of the present struggle; mention the improved military situation in the South and the strikes at the root of the aggression in the North; call on VC/NLF to recognize that it cannot impose its will on the people of SVN by force; urge it to join in effort to achieve national reconciliation and to carry out the peaceful reconstruction of the country.

4. More particularly, the proclamation would offer VC amnesty in return for turn in of arms, or freedom to return North; would renew GVN pledge to carry out program of transition to civilian, representative government, with VC participation in political life whenever they forswear violent means, would leave local administration undisturbed pending local elections, at same time affirming GVN authority throughout country in principle; would announce phased withdrawal of foreign troops as security reestablished; and would announce intensified economic and social programs. Finally, proclamation would envisage talks with Hanoi at appropriate future date on trade resumption, etc. and reunification. (Fuller exposition of program together with one or more versions possible text being pouched.)

5. Briefly, we see following advantages to such a program:

(a) Would go long way to take heat, domestically and internationally, out of demands for VC/NLF representation in international negotiations or Conference, since GVN would have made offer (whether accepted or not) to work out internal political problems on reasonable basis.

(b) If offer rejected would put onus on VC/NLF side and would probably intensify their internal differences over continued prosecution of insurgency, encouraging individual and group defections.

(c) If offer accepted GVN dealing from strength in subsequent negotiations.

(d) Would provide phased settlement of conflict without calling on DRV to admit defeat or direct participation in conflict.

(e) Any later international conference could devote itself primarily to provision of guarantees and enforcement machinery since resolution of basic internal SVN political questions would hopefully have been largely achieved by GVN-VC/NLF negotiation.

6. Successful launching of such a program requires that GVN speak from strength so that its action is not interpreted as a preparation for a compromise deal with VC/NLF and therefore a signal for politically sensitive individuals to seek their own accommodation. Politically and militarily present time appears relatively favorable but we see following difficulties in moving ahead too soon:

(a) Will require careful preparation with GVN, particularly to overcome anticipated reservations of military, and successful launching requires full understanding and acceptance of program by entire GVN leadership. May take time achieve this if violent reactions (coups?) are to be avoided.

(b) Offers to VC/NLF personnel envisaged in proclamation concerning restoration civil rights if made prior to Sept. 11 elections could create embarrassment with provisions of present electoral law.

(c) GVN forthcoming posture more credible following successful elections.

We have concluded therefore the program could best be launched in late September or early October, but our views on this are not fixed.⁶

7. In your comments I should appreciate your also covering the possible desirability of launching such a program in one area only at first, as for example in Region IV, before attempting it on a nation-wide basis.

8. Septel⁷ discusses some more immediate measures, including psywar campaign, aimed at encouraging individual and group defections now.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, McNaughton, Thompson, Rostow, and Jorden; and approved by Rusk.1
2. Document 202.
3. Telegram 2534, February 25, stated that “we should do all possible to try to break off some of the elements of the NLF/VC” and urged Lodge to “encourage Ky and Thieu to exercise their imagination and ingenuity in this field.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. In telegram 5454, the Department recommended that Lodge discuss the issue with Kissinger during his visit in July. (Ibid.)
5. “Contacts with the VC,” prepared for Lodgeʼs visit to Washington in early May 1966. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting, 5/10/66)
6. Lodge replied in telegram 3130, August 10. Given how “uninformed” GVN leaders were regarding “diplomatic techniques for bringing a war to an end,” Lodge proposed that such a program not be broached directly to the GVN but that a “broad dialogue on settlement possibilities” be opened with the GVN. “We would seek quickly in this educational process to reach agreement on your specific proposal.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department concurred in telegram 27973, August 15. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)
7. Telegram 23332 to Saigon, August 6; see footnote 4, Document 180.