Office of the Historian

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State1

Warsaw, December 30, 1965.

1073. From Harriman.

[Page 752]
1.
Memcon with Michalowski, Director General, FonMin, 7:30-8:00 p.m., December 29, 1965 at Ambassador Gronouski’s residence.
2.
Michalowski said the Polish Government was treating our approach on the Viet-Nam matter very seriously and would do its best and use all means at its disposal, but he would like to impress upon us question of time. He said it was not easy to communicate rapidly with Hanoi through ordinary channels and they might have to use special means. He repeated it may take time to get an indication of any value from Hanoi.
3.
He said Poles were transmitting to Hanoi their opinions and judgment together with their own formulation of U.S. position. He wanted to make clear there would be no misunderstandings of the facts concerning U.S. position in the Polish approach. He listed the following five points the Polish Govt intends to send to Hanoi as their interpretation of U.S. views:
A.
The U.S. realized that in order to facilitate entry onto a road of negotiations in the Viet-Nam conflict that a period of calm and tranquility is required. So the U.S. made a pause in the bombing beginning December 24. The U.S. expects that the Viet-Nam side will reciprocate with a parallel gesture. The U.S. side hopes that mutual gestures of that kind will facilitate entry on the road to negotiations. The U.S. has made certain suggestions as examples of the gestures which it would expect from the North Viet-Nam side. It envisages possibilities of other types of gestures and would welcome any other similar gesture from the North Viet-Nam [side].
B.
The U.S. side is quite conscious of the need to give appropriate time. However it wishes to draw attention to the difficulties stemming from the convening of the U.S. Congress, the approaching budget considerations and other domestic pressures. In this connection it would appreciate some indication from the Viet-Nam side at the earliest possible time.
C.
The U.S. side has reiterated the statement of President Johnson’s of July 28, 1965 that there will be no difficulties with finding ways for the Front to present its attitudes and views during talks. It elaborated, however, that it does not recognize the Front as a government and from this fact, in the U.S. opinion, would stem certain limitations for the role of the Front in the possibility or event of a conference of the Geneva type. On the other hand, future negotiations can take various forms. The U.S. attitude in this regard is flexible and it is ready to consider the possibilities of talks in all variations and with different participants including also the National Liberation Front.
D.
In the course of eventual talks the U.S. side is ready to discuss the 4 points of the DRV as well as all other proposals coming from other parties including also South Viet-Nam.
E.
The U.S. side wishes also that the known position of the USG in the 14 point statement published on December 292 also be taken into consideration as expressing the general attitude of the U.S.
4.
I told Michalowski there was an urgent need for quick action and prompt response from Hanoi. I described at some length the pressures affecting the USG. Michalowski reiterated that in such a complicated situation it was necessary to be patient and quiet. He said the Polish initiative is in good faith and time would be required. He said he understood pressures on USG, but we must understand Hanoi is in a very delicate position and will need a little time to work out its response.
5.
He said Poles are convinced of necessity of secret negotiations and they are afraid publicity might jeopardize their initiative. I agreed the less publicity the better.
Gronouski
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:51 p.m. and passed to the White House.↩
  2. See Document 248.↩